Kennedys and King Test Site

Tag: CIA

  • Clay Shaw in Italy – Part 1

    A new and wider look at what Clay Shaw was up to in Italy, set against the backdrop of Gladio, the Strategy of Tension,  Propaganda Due and the utmost fascist: Licio Gelli.

    Clay Shaw in Italy: Amid Permindex and Gladio

    Back in 1992, when I initially went to New Orleans, I interviewed some of Clay Shaw’s remaining family and friends. One of the things that was repeated to me was that he liked to travel; it was not just part of his job as a businessman and as the face of the International Trade Mart. We know about some of these journeys through declassified records. For instance, Shaw filed reports with the CIA from various countries in Europe and Latin America: Peru, Argentina, Nicaragua, and Czechoslovakia. (William Davy, Let Justice Be Done, pp. 198-99)

    But further, Shaw was such a valued asset that the Agency gave him what was called a “Y” number. Shaw’s reports under that rubric include “Observations on International Fairs at Milan, Brussels, Basel, Paris and London/Comments on Western European Economics and Desire to Trade with the Soviet Bloc.” (Davy, p. 199). These journeys explain why Shaw frequented the VIP room of Eastern Air Lines and used his alias of Clay Bertrand to sign in there. (James DiEugenio, Destiny Betrayed, second edition, p. 278)

    But from these relatives, I understood that Shaw’s favorite countries in Europe were England, and even more so, Italy. Shaw was likely introduced to Britain during his service in World War II. (Paris Flammonde, The Kennedy Conspiracy, p. 76) But it is clear through Anthony Frewin–writing under the pen name Anthony Edward Weeks– that Shaw still held British contacts after the war. One of the pieces of evidence that DA Jim Garrison recovered from Shaw’s home was his address book. Since Frewin lives in England, he began to look up some of these persons and penned a 12-page article on the subject. He wrote that the first thing that struck him about the address book was that Shaw’s British contacts all lived in the best, most expensive areas, e.g., Belgravia, Mayfair, Kensington, etc. (see Lobster, No. 20) On a phone call I had with the author, he stated, this guy was not Joe Sixpack. As we shall see, that is an understatement.

    About Shaw’s visits to Italy, the FBI seems to have understood that they were not just social. As the Garrison investigation discovered through an acquaintance of Bureau official Regis Kennedy, “Shaw was a CIA agent who had done work, of an unspecified nature, over a five-year span in Italy.” (Davy, p. 100) As William Davy comments, this almost has to be in reference to Shaw’s service with Permindex/Centro Mondiale Commerciale in Rome. As Davy suggested, this is fascinating, and not just because of Permindex itself. But because one of the main organizers of that business group was Ferenc Nagy, the former prime minister of Hungary. Nagy fled Hungary due to a leftist overthrow in 1947. From the USA, he then became a backer of the Hungarian anti-communist émigré community.

    But Nagy was also a friend of Jacques Soustelle. Soustelle was a former Governor-General of Algeria under Charles de Gaulle. But he split with the French president over the issue of independence for Algeria. Soustelle became a backer of the OAS, the rebel military group that tried to both assassinate and overthrow de Gaulle over the independence movement in Algeria, which Soustelle opposed. There is very little doubt that Soustelle had implicit backing from the CIA on this issue. (Davy, p. 99; James DiEugenio, JFK Revisited, pp. 99-100) And, as we shall see, Soustelle figures into the whole Permindex black op backdrop.

    There is another connection with Permindex and Shaw, which is important to note in advance. It was not revealed until 2003, perhaps as one of the Assassination Record Review Board’s (ARRB) delayed declassifications. An Agency document dated from June 28, 1978 described Clay Shaw’s service to CIA as encompassing from 1949-72. That document made reference to a claim “that CIA used Shaw for service in Italy with U.S. agent Major Louis Mortimer Bloomfield.” Shaw’s part is described as making connections with political circles and the business world in Rome, and also with developing relationships with extreme rightwing groups. As we shall see, this was accomplished, and the Canadian high-powered lawyer Bloomfield was an integral part of it. (Joan Mellen, A Farewell to Justice, p. 389)

    II

    Since 1948, Italy had been a high priority for the then-nascent Central Intelligence Agency. In fact, it was the subject of the first National Security Council meeting in late 1947. (John Ranelagh, The Agency, p. 115) Secretary of Defense James Forrestal was concerned about a communist victory in the 1948 Italian elections. Therefore, a directive was issued initiating propaganda and psychological warfare activities to marginalize the leftist parties and promote the Christian Democrats as a bulwark against them. Both the CIA and the State Department participated in this campaign. It was implemented through both the Agency’s Office of Special Operations and, according to Christopher Simpson’s book Blowback, also through the law offices of Sullivan and Cromwell. The latter being the home of the Dulles brothers, John Foster and Allen. At that location, Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner, James Angleton, Bill Colby and others went to work supervising the rigging of the vote.

    There was a real possibility that the Italian communists and their allies would win the 1948 elections outright. Which meant they would have a foothold in Western Europe. (Simpson, pp. 89-90) For obvious reasons, this possibility was also a nightmare for the Vatican: to have Godless communism in your own backyard? As Bishop James Griffiths, an American emissary to the Vatican, wrote, they feared a “disastrous failure at the polls which will put Italy behind the Iron Curtain.” (Simpson, p. 90) According to Simpson, the CIA laundered ten million dollars to give directly to the Vatican for anti-communist agitation purposes. This was only one part of an enormous 350 million dollar overall total for the American crusade in Italy.

    This fear and this expenditure were justified to these Cold Warriors because in 1946, the Italian Communist party—at that time the largest in the world outside of Russia—and the Socialists had actually outpolled the Christian Democrats for the Constituent Assembly. (William Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History, p. 23). But because they were separate parties, they had to settle for a coalition government under a Christian Democrat premier. In 1947, a party of American congressmen stopped off in Italy and announced the theme of the upcoming election:

    The country is under great pressure from within and without to veer to the left and adopt a totalitarian-collective national organization. (Blum, p. 24)

    The two leftist parties were going to unite in 1948 to form the Popular Democratic Front (FDP), and early in the year had won local elections in Pescara, defeating the Christian Democrats. As Bill Colby later wrote:

    It was primarily this fear that led to the formation of the Office of Policy Coordination which gave the CIA the capability to undertake covert political propaganda and paramilitary operations in the first place. (Blum, p 25)

    This is how important these elections seemed to Washington. Because there was a question in the CIA Director’s mind about legality, the forming of a new department was created to do such missions in the future. And this had both presidential and congressional permission. (Ranelagh, p. 115)

    James Angleton also had a special interest in Italy. His father, who had business in the National Cash Register company, moved his family there when Jim was fourteen. Hugh Angleton was a colonel in the OSS during the war. An operations officer, Max Corvo, said of Hugh’s politics, “He was ultra-conservative, a sympathizer with Fascist officials. He was certainly not unfriendly with the Fascists.” (Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior, p. 33) Hugh sent his son to England to get a boarding school education. During the war, young Angleton started out in the army and was then switched over to the OSS and stationed in London to handle the Italy desk. (ibid., p. 38) He was transferred to Rome in 1944 and made chief of counter-intelligence for the entire country. By all accounts, Angleton liked Italy and stayed there until the end of 1947. When he returned to the USA, he got a high position in the newly birthed CIA. (ibid., p. 44)

    III

    One of the things that Angleton did before he left Italy is important to note for our subject at hand. He and Junio Valerio Borghese organized what was called ‘Stay-behind’ units in Italy. (Paul L. Williams, Operation Gladio, p. 15) Borghese was a Navy commander during Mussolini’s reign and fought alongside the Nazis against the Allies. By most accounts, he should have been imprisoned for war crimes. But Angleton secured his release into US Army custody. He dressed The Black Prince in an American uniform and shipped him from Milan to Rome. As Paul Williams wrote:

    Angleton needed Borghese and the 10, 267 fascists who fought under his command to help establish the stay-behind units that would ward off any Soviet aggression. (Williams, p. 28)

    Angleton got Borghese off with about three years of preventive detention. He wanted The Black Prince to “lead a shadow government, along with a secret army that could manipulate Italian affairs throughout the coming decades.” (ibid) The State Department passed an edict which gave Angleton control over the police, military intelligence and the Italian secret services.

    With this power, Borghese was now running the newly formed Gladio forces in Italy, under sectors entitled sabotage, espionage, propaganda, escape tactics and guerrilla warfare. In addition, a training camp for the stay behind units was constructed on the island of Sardinia. This camp was not just for the Italian Gladio trainees but those from Germany, France and Austria. They were sent there by former Nazi intelligence chief Reinhard Gehlen. (ibid., p. 29) As Angleton had rescued Borghese from post-war justice, Allen Dulles had saved Gehlen. The two war criminals were now in business together. They had lost the war, but—through Angleton and Dulles—they had won the peace. Very soon, there were to be hundreds of these Gladio units infiltrated into Western Europe.

    They were not just a contingent military force, but as with Borghese, a potent political one. Borghese joined the MSI (Italian Social Movement), a neo-fascist party that was largely made up of former supporters of Mussolini. But that was not reactionary enough for him. He later formed the Fronte Nazionale (National Front), which wished to abolish parties and trade unions, and was much more devoted to a quasi-military state. (Philip Willan, Puppetmasters, pp. 93-94)

    He was hardly alone in this belief. There was also Stefano Delle Chiaie, founder of National Vanguard. That group also wished to work outside the political system to subvert democracy to the point that Italy would return to fascism. And it was not just in Italy; his group carried out bombings and killings in both Spain and Chile. (Williams, p. 112)

    These rightwing groups were so powerful and well-organized that they encouraged two coups in six years. The first, in 1964, was called Piano Solo. The previous year, the communists had arranged a large labor rally and, undercover as police, Gladio members smashed it, injuring 200. (Williams, p. 74) As a result, General Giovanni DeLorenzo, assisted by 20 other senior army officers—along with CIA station chief William Harvey, military attache Vernon Walthers, plus the director of Gladio–planned an overthrow which included National Vanguard and the Mafia. Piano Solo was to conclude with the murder of Prime Minister Aldo Moro and the installation of a handpicked Christian Democrat as president. It included extensive surveillance and the rounding up of leftwing activists and their imprisonment at a concentration camp in Sardinia. (Wilian, Puppetmasters, p.35) The coup did not proceed since Moro created a compromise between the socialists and Christian Democrats, plus President Segni—who was in on the planning—sustained a cerebral hemorrhage which forced his resignation. (Williams, pp. 74-75)

    IV

    The timing of all this, the huge communist demonstration and the crackdown, can probably be attributed to President Kennedy’s breaking of Dwight Eisenhower’s Italy policy. The idea for funding the Christian Democrats was to defeat the left; so obviously, that policy did not include making the socialists or communists part of the Christian Democratic government. At the urging of Arthur Schlesinger, Kennedy was advocating for a policy of apertura, that is, an opening to the left. Schlesinger thought that by including the socialists in the government, one could split them off from the communists. Kennedy thought this was a good idea. So, in his 1963 visit to Italy, he decided to advocate the policy change. (David Talbot, The Devil’s Chessboard, pp. 464-68)

    Both Angleton and former ambassador Clare Booth Luce strongly opposed it. Luce wrote JFK an over-the-top letter, and Angleton spread rumors that Schlesinger was a Soviet agent. CIA officer William Harvey also opposed it and recommended ways to defeat it. Richard Nixon also opposed it. (Michele Metta, CMC: The Undercover CIA and Mossad Station, pp. 40-41) Kennedy ignored this. On his trip to Italy, he talked to the Socialist leader, Pietro Nenni, directly. After which Nenni clasped his wife and started weeping with joy. By the end of the year, apertura was made policy. It was this violation of tradition which likely caused the attempted coup in 1964.

    The second coup attempt was in 1970. It was led by Angleton’s favorite son, Borghese. It was supported by Delle Chiaie’s group and over 200 forest guards who arrived in coaches near Rome. Borghese thought he had support from three army regiments, the police and the Air Force. (Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 91) Also, the plotters had met with the CIA and had financing from a Swiss company in advance.

    The Black Prince was so confident of success that he had his speech already planned and, of all things, he was going to back Italy’s intervention in Vietnam! Why? Because Borghese had established contact with President Nixon and with NATO units in Malta to implement the overthrow. One of the connecting points was a man named Pier Talenti, who had worked for Nixon since 1968 and had an estate and business in Italy. Angleton arrived in the country before the coup, and he left shortly after it was aborted. (Willan, Puppetmasters, pp 117-18) In fact, NATO ships were warmed up and ready to go. What went wrong was that the planned call to Nixon was not passed on from Malta. (ibid., p. 93) Another problem was that when the coup did not go as planned, Soviet ships entered the Mediterranean. (Ibid., p. 97)

    In addition to the attempted coups, Gladio’s so-called “strategy of tension” also included a series of bombings. The first one was in December of 1969 in Milan’s Piazza Fontana. Seventeen people were killed and eighty-eight were injured. (Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 123) That same afternoon, three other bombs exploded in Rome, killing fourteen. These bombings went on until the early eighties. The most famous one was the Bologna railway station bombing of 1980, where 73 people were killed and over 200 were injured. Collectively, these were known as the Years of Lead. As time went on, they were discovered to be false flag operations. That is, they were investigated originally as leftist plots but later discovered to be done by neo-fascist groups with support from the CIA. The idea was to destabilize the country out of Kennedy’s centrist/left coalition to a centrist/right one.

    V

    After Borghese’s failed coup, he fled to Spain. He passed away there in 1974. Many years ago, I noted an entry in Clay Shaw’s address book to a Princess Marcella Borghese, who had married into the Borghese family. In my very early investigation of Shaw, this was one of the first hints that he was not the Wilson-Roosevelt-Kennedy liberal that he proclaimed himself to be. (Paris Flammonde, The Kennedy Conspiracy, p. 211) Another was the fact that he scrubbed his Who’s Who in the Southwest entry after either 1963 or 1964. Up until that time, his name appeared regularly. In those prior entries, he was listed as a member of the Board of Directors of Permindex. The exposure of Permindex would also have undermined his self-proclaimed liberal pose. Because Permindex and its offspring, Centro Mondiale Commerciale, appear to be a part of Gladio and this stay behind network in Italy. Shaw seemed interested in concealing this association.

    And for good reason. At that time, this network was so hidden and such a taboo subject that people literally lost their lives over revealing its scope and power. For example, Mino Pecorelli was an offbeat but insightful journalist in Italy in the sixties and seventies. He had some valuable sources inside “the underground state and secret services.” (Richard Cottrell, Gladio, p. 75). His stories about Gladio and its relationship to the kidnapping and eventual murder of Prime Minister Aldo Moro clearly hinted at a connection between the two. Pecorelli was even in receipt of some letters Moro wrote his family while in captivity. Mino hinted that, behind the Moro kidnapping stood a “lucid superpower”, clearly hinting at the USA. He also noted that it was interesting that the State Department sent over a Deputy Secretary to advise the Italian government not to negotiate for Moro’s release. He also indicated a connection between Gladio and the Moro death. Shortly thereafter, he was gunned down in a drive-by shooting near his office in Rome. (Ibid) Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti was implicated in his murder. He was first found guilty, then acquitted on appeal. (Richard Cottrell, Gladio, p. 78)

    Aldo Moro was a natural target of the stay-behind operations. Why? Because it was he who forged Kennedy’s left/center coalition back in 1963. (Talbot, p. 468). But what made Moro even more dangerous to the Gladio network was that, in the seventies, he was going to widen the window even more. He was going to include the communists, or PCI, in his government. In fact, in a visit to the USA, Henry Kissinger harangued him for advocating this policy, plus the fact that he leaned toward the Arabs in the Middle East dispute. It got so bad that Moro foreshortened his visit. Kissinger then slipped a story about it to the New York Times, warning that Italy could go communist. Senator Henry Jackson warned that if Moro did this, Italy would be kicked out of NATO. (Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 220-21; see also Williams, p. 103)

    After he was kidnapped and held in captivity for 55 days, some of the things he said during his so-called trial at the hands of the Red Brigades leaked out. He reportedly said that the strategy of tension was foreign-inspired but implemented with the help of the secret services. He referred to Gladio guerrilla training in case of occupation. Understandably, since he appears to have had a hand in his demise, he had nothing but venom for Andreotti–who was now acting Prime Minister–and Moro accused him of having meetings with the Agency. Moro also admitted that the Christian Democrats were funded by the CIA. (Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 291). But, and it’s a big but, his captors insist that he said even more, and these transcripts have been either lost or stolen. (ibid., p. 281, 284)

    Moro was kidnapped in a precision-type, carefully planned operation in March of 1978, with the killers in airline pilot costumes. The ambush was brilliantly executed: all five bodyguards were eliminated immediately, but Moro was kept alive in the hail of bullets. This happened on the day the debate about his new communist policy was to begin. (Williams, p. 103) In fact, it was so perfectly done that some commentators felt it was beyond the ability of the Red Brigades.

    VI

    Was there a central force behind this strategy of tension and the Moro kidnap/murder? There actually does seem to have been, not just a central force but a central character. His name was Licio Gelli, Venerable Master of the infamous Propaganda Due (P2). On the day of the Moro kidnapping, his secretary stated that Gelli was visited by two men. She overheard the following words exchanged: “The major part is over. Now we’ll see the reactions.” (Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 228) This testimony was so explosive that the Tina Anselmi P2 Commission would not hear it in open session. In fact, when it was discovered that Gelli was the head of this secret group, the government collapsed. When his villa was raided, it was revealed that P2 had well over 900 members and from almost every power center in Italy: 43 members of Parliament, 4 cabinet members, heads of branches of the secret services, chiefs of the intelligence services (SIFAR and SISMI), leaders of the Treasury, finance ministers and chairmen of banks, among many others. It even included the clergy and the military. (Willan, The Last Supper, p. 115, p. 121; Metta, CMC p. 9). It was later discovered that during the Years of Lead, both prime ministers, Andreotti and Silvio Berlusconi, were members of P2. (Williams, p 265)

    In other words, the exposure of Gelli confirmed that there was nothing fanciful about the idea that there was a shadow government overseeing the visible government. And if Gelli’s secretary was correct, that shadow government did control the political system. (Willan, The Last Supper, pp. 113-15). About his P2 lodge, Gelli told one writer, “It was an invisible army, just as Gladio was an invisible army.” (ibid., p. 117). And that was no understatement as, in addition to Moro, there was also evidence that Gelli got his intelligence services to plant ersatz leads in the Bologna bombing. (Williams, pp. 218-19)

    And there was a direct American connection. Because Gelli attended the inaugurations of Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. (Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 67) Gelli had connections to the Allies’ intelligence network during his service in World War II, and P2 was the main Masonic lodge that kept up relations with the CIA; reportedly, the Agency funded them to the tune of millions per month. (Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 70, p. 78)

    When he was exposed through the raid, and the vast power and reach of P2 was now in the open, he went on the run. About three months later, his daughter arrived at the Rome airport. She was searched, and a false bottom was found in her briefcase. It contained a trove of documents. One of them was entitled “Stability Operations, Intelligence—Special Fields.” It outlined how Army intelligence should respond to communist insurgencies in allied nations. Part of the manual suggested that insurgency movements should be targeted and then infiltrated “with a view to establishing clandestine control by US Army intelligence over the work of such agents.” And this specifically included the leadership level. (Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 209) This discovery fit into the notion that the Red Brigades had been penetrated, and this is how Gelli knew what was happening with Moro the day he was kidnapped. The question then became: Was he also knowledgeable about Moro’s murder 55 days later, and was this why he ran? We will likely never know since well over 40 members of P2 were involved in working on the Moro case. (Metta, CMC p. 156)

    How did Gelli ascend so rapidly in the hierarchy of masonry to become one of the most powerful men in all of Italy? The Anselmi Commission on P2 discovered that Gelli was pointed out by assistant Grand Master Roberto Ascarelli to Grand Master Giordano Gamberini, in terms of his ability to do great things and enlist qualified people to the lodge. Prior to joining P2, Ascarelli knew Gelli though a lodge called Hod. (Willan, Puppetmasters, p. 59; Metta, Accomplishing Jim Garrison’s Investigation, p. 73)

    And here is the capper: Permindex/CMC met in the same place as Gelli’s P2 group; in the offices of Ascarelli in the Spanish Steps area of Rome. Later on, in a book, Gelli admitted to this location. But further, Michele Metta discovered that Ascarelli was on the Board of Directors of Permindex/CMC. (Metta, Accomplishing Jim Garrison, pp. 72-73)

    There was a crossover between the two rightwing groups. In other words, the man who sponsored Licio Gelli–the most powerful fascist in Italy– served in the same group as Clay Shaw. So much for the myth of Shaw as the Wilson-Roosevelt-Kennedy liberal.

    Click here to read part 2.

  • Ruth Paine’s Passing

    Ruth Paine, the woman who Marina Oswald was staying with at the time of the JFK murder, has passed away. We have a link to an obituary, but we recommend the reader watch Max Good’s “The Assassiantion and Mrs. Paine” for a more balanced view (free link here).

  • Paul Bleau: “On the Trail of the Plotters”

    Paul’s very detailed address from the most recent Dealey Plaza UK conference, this includes his analysis of case linkage and the Pepe Letters.

    Paul’s DPUK video may be found here.

  • Impact of the Luna Hearings Growing?

    Are Congresswoman Luna’s hearings having a chain reaction effect? Perhaps they are according to this editorial.

    Read more.

  • The Threats to Kill Oswald – Part 2

    Were the threats to kill Oswald genuine, or were they part of a secret plan to get the Dallas Police to improve their protection of the defendant, who was loudly proclaiming his innocence?

    The Threats to Kill Oswald – Part 2

    By Paul Abbott

    With Dallas Police Chief Jesse Curry’s gross incompetence; his lack of regard for due diligence and caution when it came to the handling of Lee Oswald’s security, we must still ask – how legitimate were the ‘committee’ threats against Oswald? The ‘committee’, on whose behalf they were being made, has never been identified. To speculate: which organization would feel so strongly about avenging President Kennedy’s murder? Presumably, they would either have had the membership or resources and motivation in Dallas at the time to mobilize there come Saturday night / Sunday morning.

    Of course, we must bear in mind that Dallas at the time, on account of its heavy, often extreme right-wing climate, was perceived as being the most worrisome of cities that President Kennedy’s tour included that weekend. And with the Democrat Kennedy’s reputation there for being bad for business and soft on communism considered, to the point of being accused of ‘Treason’, are we to suppose that there was an equally extreme organization, to quote Vernon Glossup, that was neither left or right leaning, who felt so strongly about Kennedy’s murder to the point of threatening the life of his accused assassin? It is doubtful.

    One final, but simple point on the ‘committee’ front is that, from the moment of Oswald’s arrest to the morning of his transfer, there was never any record or reports of a large, angry group gathered along the streets of Dallas. No trace of an angry-mob type ‘committee’ anywhere in Dallas that weekend, let alone on November 24, which seems to indicate we can pretty much call the ‘threats’ from a ‘committee’ dubious.

    With the ‘committee’ aspect discounted, what about the caller at least? There is sufficient evidence to substantiate that at least two calls were made that morning. However, the caller/s did not identify themselves nor the organization they were representing, so it literally could have been anyone. The wording attributed to the threat makers by Glossup and Newsom at the FBI, and McCoy at the Sheriff’s Department is interesting and almost verbatim in some parts to each other, particularly with reference to the reason the caller said he was warning of the threat…to ensure no one in the Sheriff or Police departments got injured. Of course, this could be attributed to Glossup’s notes made during the call and the resulting memo passed on to Newsom when calling the Sheriff’s Department and alerting the DPD about it. But neither item ever surfaced, so we can only take Glossup and Newsom’s word for it. Nonetheless, the DPD was not contacted by the threat makers directly, so just how sincere was the caller/s regard for their safety as well?

    Let’s not forget another interesting detail present in both Glossup and the second of McCoy’s calls from the threat makers… that when both first took the call, the caller sounded like they handed the receiver to another man who then warned of harm to Oswald. It’s an odd detail that lends an almost absurdly stage-managed/manufactured slant on it all.

    Could one or both of the callers have been Jack Ruby? If so, was he making such a call to sabotage an order or assignment that he did not want, or was he getting cold feet? It’s an interesting and viable theory that many researchers subscribe to.

    One person largely overlooked, but was central to the whole threat episode, of course, was FBI Special Agent Milton Newsom. He was not present when the clerk, Vernon Glossup, received the first call from the threat makers. This seems odd: for the ranking agent on duty not to be present at that particular moment. Where was Newsom at 2 am? It’s not like it was during the daytime, and therefore there was a greater likelihood of his being in a meeting or out in the field. Wherever he was, he wasn’t far as he seemed to get word of the threat from Glossup and act on it quickly by contacting both the Sheriff and Police departments.

    Perhaps most curious about Newsom was the fact that it was he, and only he, who took the only statement of Deputy McCoy, and the first of Captains Frazier and Talbert for the FBI regarding the whole threat episode. Talk about tying a neat bow on the recording of an event that he was involved in from the start!

    We also have reason to question Newsom on this front because William Frazier, during his testimony to the Warren Commission, disputed literally most of his statement attributed to him by Newsom. For example:

    • Newsom’s statement had Frazier saying that it was Vernon Glossup who rang him to advise of the threat received by him on Oswald’s life.
      • Yet Frazier said it was Newsom who called the DPD and spoke to him.
    • Newsom’s statement also quoted Frazier as saying that plans to transfer Oswald to the County Jail may be changed in view of the threat.
      • Frazier told the Warren Commission that he would not have said this because he did not know what the plans were to transfer Oswald, therefore, he did not know how they might be changed.
    • Newsom’s statement also quoted Frazier as saying Oswald’s planned transfer had been publicized primarily as a form of cooperation with the press and news agencies.
      • Frazier also denied making this statement to Newsom.

    Bear in mind, Frazier’s statement, like McCoy’s and Talbert’s, was barely one page long and consisted of a few paragraphs each. With the above considered, the only portion of his statement that Frazier could confirm as correct was how he (Frazier) mentioned that the DPD had not received any threats and that he was advised that the Sheriff’s office had received a similar threat call.

    Compared to the three-page statement he submitted to Sheriff Bill Decker, C.C. McCoy’s statement attributed to him by Newsom barely lines up. It too attributed McCoy as saying that plans to transfer Oswald to the County Jail at 10:00 am had been made public through news releases. Unfortunately, McCoy did not testify on the matter, so we do not have any record of him denying or confirming Newsom’s accuracy in his statement.

    What we do know is that both Glossup and Milton Newsom continued to work for the FBI in Dallas until at least the late 1970s. The only other part that Newsom played in the assassination investigation was the handling of the Bronson film of President Kennedy’s shooting. In fact, the death notice of Newsom in 2012 stated that he was a 30-year veteran of the Bureau. Vernon Glossup had even worked his way up to Special Agent status and by all reports is still alive. It is a loss to history that both were not subjected to more scrutiny about the threat matter. Unless Mr. Glossop would be willing and able to provide any further details after all these years, we are only left to speculate on him, Newsom and their conduct, in light of Oswald’s fate.

    Threading the Threat Needle

    If the phone call threats on Lee Oswald’s life were not legitimate from either a committee or an (unidentified) individual vengeful against him but merciful for the FBI, Sheriff and Police departments, all we are left with are pieces to speculate on their origin and purpose.

    Let me propose something that might seem outlandish at first glance: the threat phone calls were staged by either Milton Newsom or someone doing so on his orders. Why? He did so to apply pressure on the DPD and, after the fact, manipulate witness statements to further discredit the police.

    Context:

    In his Saturday morning statement, Curry inadvertently accused the FBI of either not knowing of someone like Lee Harvey Oswald and therefore not warning them of his presence in Dallas ahead of President Kennedy’s visit, or knowing of him but not warning them. With its association with Oswald confirmed, to what length did the FBI know of or use Oswald? And how concerned were they that weekend of being implicated by association for the president’s assassination? While Oswald was still alive, they were rendered officially helpless as killing the president was not a federal crime at that time. They would have had more of a stake investigating Oswald if he had shot a postman.

    What we must also consider is that the longer the weekend went with Oswald in police custody at City Hall, the more outrage and controversy were being stirred. For the most part, the scenes filmed and reported on by the media were chaos. Oswald, despite looking unkempt, calmly pronouncing his innocence, asking for legal assistance, and protesting the lineups he was in, provided a clear perception that the Dallas authorities barely had a handle on the situation. And an assortment of officials, including District Attorney Henry Wade, Chief Curry and Captain Fritz, providing updates on the investigation into Oswald did not help either. Doing so attracted the ire of people like J. Edgar Hoover and President Johnson, who were, fairly, worried that Oswald’s defense could argue for a mistrial on the grounds that he could never have received a fair trial thanks to the early opining of police and legal officials.

    Motivation:

    If the Dallas Police Department was out of its depth, with little help and steady guidance from Chief Curry, perhaps the FBI saw an opportunity to exploit this by creating a situation that would really highlight the point – something that would only add to the pressure already heaped on the DPD: a serious threat to Lee Oswald’s life. Such a scheme could be hatched locally with literally nothing to lose and everything to gain for the FBI. It would be the ultimate acid test to see what Chief Curry and his DPD would do. Perhaps the intent was to scare the DPD into actually getting with the program and ensuring Oswald’s security by transferring him sooner rather than later. That’s the best-case scenario because, given his Saturday afternoon statement to the press of when Oswald’s transfer would take place and his reputation for maintaining a closeknit relationship with them, it was more than a safe bet that Curry would remain to his word … even in response to a ‘credible’ threat and not budge on moving Oswald. Recall that Curry is on record as telling his beloved press mid-morning on Sunday that Oswald could have been transferred overnight in light of threats received on his life. But it did not happen because, Curry said, he didn’t want ‘to cross you people.’

    What was the desired outcome? Aside from assuring Oswald’s safety by being transferred early, regardless of how the DPD responded, I think the underlying intent was to completely undermine Curry and the DPD so as to both minimize any more backlash on the FBI from his comments on Saturday morning and to position itself as the ideal body to step in at the right time to competently investigate President Kennedy’s assassination. With control and oversight of the overall investigation, the FBI would be in a position to cover its own tracks in terms of their association with Lee Oswald and protect itself against the likely catastrophic fallout it would attract. Like the fact that Oswald was an informant for the FBI. Which would have been a disaster for J. Edgar Hoover.

    How:

    I think it was as simple as at least two threatening phone calls being made on behalf of a conveniently nameless, purposeless organization that was neither right nor left leaning by a person who also remained nameless. And despite saying they were warning of the threat out of concern for the welfare of FBI, Sheriff and DPD personnel, the threat makers did not bother calling the police to warn them. It was all too easy to make up and do so in such a way that could not be traced back to the FBI. Perhaps the DPD were not called for fear of the call somehow being traced or the voice being recognised. If Newsom was behind it, why risk it when all he had to do was either make or have a call phoned into the FBI (if one was made at all)? From there, Vernon Glossup would have wittingly or unwittingly cooperated in the charade by providing a memorandum to Newsom to make the whole episode official. At that point, Newsom could have made or had someone make two ‘threat warning’ calls to the Sheriff’s Department whilst he, in an official capacity, would call the Sheriff and DPD. That is all it could have taken to whip up the storm that followed that morning.

    Wrapping everything up neatly, as it were, Newsom could have easily positioned himself on behalf of the FBI to take the statements of the two other people pivotal to the threat response – McCoy and Frazier – to cement the narrative. And in doing so, sink a final boot into the Dallas Police Department by misquoting both men to implant a damning reference of Oswald’s transfer being publicized.

    Evidently, the FBI’s stake increased once Oswald was killed because his murder effectively ended the Dallas Police investigation into him. What soon followed was the infamous Belmont memo on November 24th, which mandated that the country be convinced of Oswald’s guilt in killing President Kennedy alone through a report submitted by the FBI. Essentially, with Oswald dead and the DPD out of the picture, with no other suspect to investigate any further, the ball was handed firmly to the FBI to control the narrative. Because the FBI very quickly, yet momentarily, came to sit at the center of the investigation on the back of Oswald’s murder.

    Johnson and Warren Wrap it all Up.

    President Lyndon B. Johnson would establish the Warren Commission on November 29th, which was essentially a high-level PR piece that would ‘review and evaluate’ the findings of the FBI’s investigation into President Kennedy’s assassination and Lee Oswald’s sole guilt. This was because Johnson was concerned that a single report from the FBI would not be enough to prevent a ‘rash of investigations’ that would amount to a ‘three-ring circus’ that would steer away the public from the desired Oswald-lone nut narrative.

    Chief Justice Earl Warren was approached directly by Johnson to head up the commission. Warren originally said no, but when Johnson countered him by putting forth information he had received from Director Hoover about a ‘little incident in Mexico City’, Warren tearfully agreed.

    Just what exactly Johnson used to pressure Warren with has been speculated about ever since. Some have interpreted this reference to be some kind of sordid or salacious piece of blackmail that Hoover had procured on Warren and paid it forward to Johnson. I disagree – I think it was more like the information that FBI-contact/asset Washington Star reporter, Jerry O’Leary, happened upon when in Dallas covering the aftermath of the assassination. I have laid this episode out in another article, but essentially, Jerry O’Leary (who was later named as an asset within the CIA’s Operation Mockingbird) met with a CIA contact of his in Dallas who was an ‘unimpeachable’ source who told him that Oswald returned from Mexico with five thousand dollars in cash. Instead of publishing a story on this stunning revelation, O’Leary promptly reported it to the FBI, who took it straight up to the State Department and the White House. The implication was that either the Soviets or Cubans were behind the president’s murder and that such information could be the catalyst for all-out war with the Soviets. The Warren Commission was formed with sitting senators and representatives such as Hale Boggs, Gerald Ford and Richard Russell, as well as Washington powerhouses in John McCloy and Allen Dulles. Surely enough the Commission would submit its findings that Lee Harvey Oswald was solely guilty of killing President Kennedy and police officer J.D. Tippit on November 22nd and anything contrary to these conclusions was either ignored or manipulated. War against the Soviet Union and Cuba was averted, but the truth behind President Kennedy’s murder, his accused assassin’s intelligence links and Oswald’s own suspicious murder have remained enduring mysteries. We can now add to this mosaic the momentary influence the FBI had when it came to ‘investigating’ the Kennedy assassination and ponder what it did to cover its own tracks when it came to its proven association with Lee Oswald.

    Click here to read part 1.

  • The Threats to Kill Oswald – Part 1

    Paul Abbott revisits a tangent from the first edition of his book, ‘Death to Justice – The Shooting of Lee Harvey Oswald’, involving the threats to kill Oswald before his eventual murder on Sunday, November 24th, 1963.

    The Threats to Kill Oswald – Part 1

    By Paul Abbott

    The incarceration of Lee Harvey Oswald, the alleged killer of President John F. Kennedy and Police Officer J.D. Tippit, and his mistreatment at the hands of the Dallas Police across the weekend of November 22nd has been well established. But the matter of the alleged threats made against his life over the course of the night before his murder at the hands of Jack Ruby has largely been glossed over in the broader scheme of things. But just how they unfolded and were responded to has largely withstood any in-depth scrutiny ever since.

    The Curry Storm

    At approximately 11.30 am on Saturday, November 23rd, Jesse Curry, the Dallas Police Chief, was in his office on the southwest corner of the Third Floor of Dallas City Hall. Seated opposite him were a group of reporters, including the Associated Press’ Peggy Simpson and NBC’s Tom Pettit. It was one of the many occasions that weekend where he would hold court with the members of the press – to the point where he would be directed to stop doing so by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and President Lyndon Johnson across that weekend. Curry’s regard and synergy with the press were legendary and certainly a theme throughout his tenure as chief. In fact, in early 1958, he issued a memorandum to all Dallas police personnel essentially instructing them to provide the media with as much access and assistance as possible. Basically, he regarded them as a PR arm for the department and at that time, with the reputation that Dallas had for crime and corruption, it was clearly a mitigation strategy on his part.

    During Curry’s mini press conference with Simpson, Pettit and others, an interesting exchange took place:

    Curry: (to persons unknown) … They say he.. he said he was a communist…

    Pettit: Hey Chief, did the FBI or your department have him (Oswald) under surveillance prior to yesterday?

    Curry: No, sir, we didn’t have knowledge that he was in the city.

    Pettit: Did the FBI?

    Curry: I understand that they did know he was here and that they interviewed him … oh … a week or two ago.

    Pettit: Did they warn you of his presence in the city?

    Curry: No, they had not.. at the time .. until yesterday.

    Pettit: Do you think they should have?

    Curry: Well, they usually do. They keep us informed. If we don’t have knowledge of it, they usually liaise with us… usually let us know when these communist sympathizers or subversives come into the city. And why they hadn’t got round to informing us of this man, I don’t know.

    This frank exchange would be widely reported and circulated, sparking the wrath of the FBI hierarchy up to and including Director Hoover. The implication of course being that Chief Curry was deflecting all blame on the FBI for failing to detect and stop the communist Oswald and prevent the November 22nd killings. In fact, what Curry was saying to Pettit was completely reasonable. And evidently correct, as the FBI was monitoring Oswald at the time, and they did not alert the DPD to him prior to President Kennedy’s arrival. What followed was an effort by the FBI to mitigate any fallout from Curry’s statement by having Special Agent in Charge in Dallas, Gordon Shanklin, contact Curry and have him retract what he said to Tom Pettit. A summary memo from the FBI’s Cartha De Loach shows that Shanklin was successful in doing this and that Curry even apologized and said that he did not ‘mean to place any blame on the FBI’. The damage control continued with the FBI using their proven media contact on the ground, the Washington Star’s Jerry O’Leary, who was in Dallas to cover events that weekend, to also get in touch with Chief Curry and ‘make him go on record regarding the falsity of his allegations’.

    All of this resulted in Curry speaking to another group of reporters (including Tom Pettit) out in the hall on the Third Floor of City Hall just after 1 pm that same day. He led with the following statement:

    There has been some information that has gone out. I want to correct anything that might have been misinterpreted or misunderstood. And that is regarding information that the FBI might have had about this man (Oswald). I do not know… if and when the FBI has interviewed this man. The FBI is under no obligation to come to us with any information concerning anyone. They have cooperated with us in the past one hundred percent. Any time there’s any information that they feel that might be helpful to us, they have always come to us. Uh.. last night someone told me.. I don’t even know who it was, that the FBI did know this man was in the city and had interviewed him. I wish to say this. Of my knowledge, I do not know this to be a fact and I don’t want anybody to get the wrong impression that I am accusing the FBI of not cooperating or withholding information because they are under no obligation to us but have always cooperated with us one hundred percent. And I do not know if and when they have ever interviewed this man.

    While this episode started and ended within a couple of hours, I think it has been totally overlooked and underestimated in the scheme of things. Think about it…with all of the world focusing on him, his police department and their handling of the man suspected of killing President Kennedy, the Dallas Chief of Police publicly acknowledged that his department was usually alerted by the FBI about people like Lee Oswald (‘communist sympathizer / subversive’) but they were not in Oswald’s instance. It remains a shocking admission.

    No wonder the FBI was quick to act in response to Curry’s initial statement. The implications were doubly negative for them. If they did not know about a ‘communist sympathizer or subversive’ in Oswald, it was a massive oversight on their part that would rightly bring their competence into question. On the other hand, if they did know about Oswald, why did they not alert the DPD to his presence in Dallas? The implication would transcend just incompetence. Thankfully for us, the subsequent years have proven that the FBI was well and truly aware of Oswald, and was monitoring him, so this question, I think, lies at the center of a lot of the intrigue around Lee Oswald, his framing for the November 22nd killings and his own murder.

    What is clear in the Curry matter is that the FBI instantly threw all of its efforts into mitigating any blame it would receive for Oswald and the events of November 22nd, as well as asserting itself as being in control. This is a crucial point to keep in mind for the rest of this article.

    Come the latter hours of that Saturday, the media that had engulfed Dallas City Hall to cover Oswald’s incarceration were starting to dissipate. This was because it had been purported that Oswald had been charged with Kennedy’s murder, so their assumption was that there would be fewer and fewer opportunities to see and ask him any questions. The broader implication being that he would soon be moved to maximum security at the County Jail.

    The matter of transferring Lee Oswald from the City Hall to the County Jail was something that was still only notionally being discussed across the DPD hierarchy that afternoon. In ordinary circumstances, the transfer of a prisoner from City Hall, or any police station, to the County Jail, where they would await sentencing, was the responsibility of the local sheriff. The principle being that the sheriff would present at the police premises the necessary paperwork to take custody of the prisoner from that moment on. Only in extraordinary circumstances, which the weekend of November 22nd clearly presented, would this protocol ever be deviated from. However, in a subsequent statement that he gave, Dallas Sheriff Bill Decker testified to not being notified by the DPD of any plans or intent they had for them (the DPD) or the Sheriff’s Department to facilitate Oswald’s transfer to the County Jail. In fact, he only found out his information on this front through members of the media.

    And examining the statements of Chief Curry and his captain for the Homicide and Robbery Bureau, J.W. Fritz, who had Oswald in custody, shows that the transfer had not been discussed between them at any great length.

    From Curry’s perspective, he was being asked the question by the media about the transfer, so he in turn asked Fritz if he thought he’d be done with his questioning of Oswald that (Saturday) afternoon, so he could be transferred. Fritz said that he still needed more time, which was his right, as it was much easier to interrogate a suspect at City Hall than at the County Jail. Between the two, it was generally agreed that Oswald would stay another night at City Hall for further questioning and be transferred the next morning. On this, Curry duly told the press that Oswald would be transferred the next day at 10 am:

    Over the years, this point has been muddled as Curry telling reporters that if they were at City Hall by 10 am on the Sunday, they won’t have missed the transfer. But using articles) published that weekend, it was clearly reported that Curry stated the transfer would begin at 10 am. (Abbott, Death to Justice, p.363

    As Saturday evening turned into night, Dallas City Hall quietened down to a near state of normalcy, with there only being a handful of reporters staying around in case Oswald was instead transferred that night. We are now able to examine the alleged threats to Lee Oswald’s life in the early hours of Sunday, November 24th, on behalf of a ‘committee’.

    Below is a list of the people who had firsthand, evidential dealings with receiving and acting upon the threats:

    • Police Chief Jesse Curry – DPD
    • Sheriff Bill Decker – Sheriff’s Dept.
    • Captain William B. Frazier – DPD
    • Captain J.W. Fritz – DPD
    • Vernon R. Glossup (civilian clerk) – FBI
    • Deputy C.C. McCoy – Sheriff’s Dept.
    • Special Agent Milton L. Newsom – FBI
    • Captain Cecil E. Talbert – DPD

    Using statements and quoting specific points that each of these people provided to either the FBI or the Warren Commission, we can piece together a chronology when it comes to the receiving and handling of these threats.

    Threat Timeline:

    • At the County Jail, Deputy Sheriff C.C. McCoy was working the night shift which consisted of taking phone calls from all manner of citizens, near and far, who were calling to do anything from express their condolences to warning of a group of ‘fourteen thousand negroes’ who were coming to town to get ‘this bunch’ straightened out. Also on duty were fellow personnel by the names Kennedy, Watkins and ‘Virgil’.
    • At approximately 2:00 am, McCoy even received a call from Sheriff Bill Decker. During this call, he and Decker discussed when Oswald’s transfer would take place and that it should be while it was still dark. They even speculated when it became light (6:30 am or 6:45 am) and agreed that McCoy would call Decker back at 6 am to see about getting Oswald transferred before first light.
    • At 2:15 am, McCoy received another call. This time it was from a man who, according to a statement he later provided, ‘talked like a w/m (white male) and he stated that he was a member of a group of one hundred and that he wanted the Sheriff’s office to know that they had voted one hundred per cent to kill Oswald while he was in the process of being transferred to the County Jail. And that he wanted this department to have the information so that none of the deputies would get hurt.’ McCoy said ‘The voice was deep and coarse and sounded very sincere and talked with ease. The person did not seem excited like some of the calls that had received running down this department, the police department and the State of Texas.’ McCoy said that he had his colleague, ‘Virgil’, listen to part of the call.
    • At 2:30 am, civilian clerk for the Dallas FBI office, Vernon R. Glossup, received a call from an unknown male who also spoke in a calm voice and asked to talk to the man in charge. According to his own statement, Glossup said he ‘told the caller that the SAC (Special Agent in Charge) was not present at that time and asked if someone else could help him. The caller then said, “Wait a minute,” and apparently turned the phone over to another man. I am not certain there were two different voices; however, the tone of the unknown caller’s voice changed somewhat at this point. The voice at this point was calm and mature in sound, and this person stated as follows: “I represent a committee that is neither right nor left wing, and tonight, tomorrow morning, or tomorrow night, we are going to kill the man that killed the president. There will be no excitement, and we will kill him. We wanted to be sure and tell the FBI, Police Department, and Sheriff’s Office, and we will be there and will kill him.” With that, the caller hung up. Glossup transcribed the call in a memorandum for Special Agent Milton L. Newsom, who contacted the Sheriff’s Department at 3:00 am to see if they too had received any such calls. Newsom then called the Police Department at 3:30 am to ask the same and advise of the threat that Glossup had received.
    • Sheriff Deputy McCoy concurred that he received a call from Newsom and that he merely asked if ‘we’ (the Sheriff’s Department) had received any calls threatening Oswald’s life. McCoy said that he had, so Newsom instructed him to contact Dallas Police ‘and give the same information to them.’ According to his statement, McCoy did call the Dallas Police Department but could only recall that he ‘talked to someone in Captain Fritz’s office.’ McCoy stated that he was told by a member of the DPD that they (Dallas Police) hadn’t received any threatening phone calls.
    • Still with McCoy and his statement, he ‘received one other call regarding the transfer of Oswald, and when I answered the telephone, a male voice asked if this is the Sheriff’s office, and I said that it was. He said, “Just a minute,” and then another male voice stated that Oswald would never make the trip to the County Jail. McCoy said he could not determine whether or not this was the same voice that called earlier on behalf of a ‘committee’.
    • At City Hall, Captain William B. Frazier was the ranking officer on duty there that night. He testified to the Warren Commission of being contacted by FBI Agent Milton Newsom between 3:00 am and 3:45 am. He quoted Newsom as telling him that he (Newsom) ‘received a threat from some man to the effect that a group of men of 100 or 200’, Frazier said he couldn’t recall exactly, ‘were going to attempt to kill Oswald that day sometime. That he (the caller) didn’t want the FBI, Dallas Police Department or the sheriff’s office injured in any way. That was the reason for the call.’
    • To somewhat corroborate McCoy’s account, in the same testimony for the Warren Commission, Frazier said he spoke to someone with the surname of, or similar to, ‘Cox’ or Coy’ from the Sheriff’s Department. Frazier testified that he wasn’t clear on the time of the call, but he and McCoy discussed Oswald’s transfer and that McCoy told him that Sheriff Decker recommended that it be brought forward. And if so, there could be two supervisors from the Sheriff Department on hand at the County Jail to receive Oswald.
    • Frazier said that he next called Captain Fritz at his home to tell him of the threats against Oswald and that he would need to be transferred. Fritz told him it was Chief Curry’s decision to make, as he wanted Oswald transferred in the morning. However, when Frazier tried to also reach Curry by phone at home, the line was out of order.
    • At around 6:00 am, McCoy called Bill Decker as agreed and told him who was on duty and how they could carry out Oswald’s transfer if required – including hiding Oswald down in the footwell of the car. He was told by Decker to hold off on any plans until he spoke with Captain Fritz.
    • At 6:15 am, Frazier was at the end of his shift and about to be relieved by Captain Cecil E. Talbert. In the handover, Frazier said that he advised Talbert of the threat situation with Oswald and that both Sheriff Decker and Agent Newsom were anxious to transfer him.
    • According to Talbert’s statement for the Warren Commission, he must have been advised of the issue to reach Curry, as he said that he got the telephone company to put a buzzer on his phone line to determine if the line was faulty. It was, so he sent a squad car to Curry’s house to brief him on the situation and have him call City Hall… if he could.
    • Despite the issues with his phone, Curry soon called Talbert back at City Hall and was briefed on the threats. All Curry did was instruct Talbert to tell Newsom and Decker that he would contact them when he was in his office between 8:00 am and 9:00 am later that morning.

    With all of the above told, no more was done to address the threats to Lee Oswald.

    As the morning rolled on, the transfer at least had some planning put toward it. Once Curry and Decker decided between them that the DPD would facilitate the transfer, it was decided that Oswald would be taken in an armored truck for the twelve-block journey to the County Jail. Acting on orders from Curry, Deputy Chief Batchelor contacted a local armored car company, and they sent two people carrying armored trucks to City Hall’s Commerce Street ramp exit.

    At the last minute, at approximately 11:15 am, Fritz recommended that Oswald instead be placed in the back of an unmarked squad car and that it follow behind the armored car, which in turn would be empty and a decoy. His justification for this was that if there was an attack launched on Oswald during the transfer, a vehicle such as an armored car would be too awkward to maneuver and evade. With that, the transfer finally got underway with a group of detectives and Fritz leaving the Third Floor with Oswald – and the rest is tragic history. Jack Ruby was able to access the basement and be in a position to shoot, and ultimately kill, Oswald when he and his escort emerged into the basement and were walking to the car.

    While there are clear gaps in some of the timings and accounts around the threats response (for example, McCoy’s statement does not include any mention of speaking to Decker after he had both received and received word of the threat calls), it is clear that there was some effort by he and the DPD’s Frazier to bring about Oswald’s transfer early to pre-empt any threat against his life. The roadblocks were Captain Fritz and Chief Curry.

    When first told of the threats by Frazier, Fritz basically put his hands up and said, ‘Not me, not my call.’ What any competent leader within a hierarchy ought to have done, in this instance, was say, ‘It is the Chief’s call… so try and reach him to find out. If you can’t reach him, call me back because we’d best still get the transfer underway.’

    However, if Jesse Curry’s phone line was not a factor and he was reached by Frazier, it would not have made a difference. We can be sure of this because he scuttled any chance to respond accordingly when he instructed that Newsom and Decker be told that he would arrive at City Hall in a couple of hours’ time. That was it. That was how he responded to the word of the threats. There was no action to effect an earlier transfer there and then. If he did decide to do something about it, Curry wouldn’t have had to do much other than give the approval. Between his personnel, and perhaps a quick phone call by him to Sheriff Decker, Oswald’s early and safe transfer would have been incredibly easy to carry out.

    The burning question is why Curry didn’t want to have Oswald transferred at that point in time? At 10:20 am later that morning, when speaking to reporters, Curry not only mentioned the threat made to Oswald overnight, he also said that he could’ve been transferred early as a result but he (Curry) chose not to because he didn’t want to go back on the original time he told the press (Abbott, Death to Justice, p.112). Apparently, it was as simple as that. On top of it all, Curry actually laid out to the reporters that Oswald would be transported to the County Jail in an armored car. Talk about infuriating!

    Having uncovered just how the verifiable threat episode involving the FBI, Sheriff and DPD took place, in Part Two, we will analyze this episode in the context of the furor that Chief Curry started with his candidness on the morning of Saturday when speaking with the press and how the FBI ultimately took the early lead in investigating President Kennedy’s assassination.

    Click here to read part 2.

  • Jeff Meek’s Interview of Joan Mellen

    This is one of Joan Mellen’s last interviews before her recent death, with journalist Jeff Meek. Although she wrote about cinema early in her career, she later wrote significant books about Jim Garrison, George DeMohrenshildt and Lyndon Johnson. Her revelations about Clay Shaw and his work for the CIA helped expose his perjury at his trial.

    The Other Official JFK Assassination Investigation

    by Jeff Meek

    (Originally published as The JFK Files – #40 – December 2023)

    In this column I’ve written about the Warren Commission and their 1964 conclusion that there was no conspiracy in the death of President Kennedy and also about the House Select Committee on Assassination’s 1979 conclusion that there was a conspiracy to kill the president. Here in this edition of “The JFK Files” I’m writing about the only other official investigation into Nov. 22, 1963, that being New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison’s probe into the murder.

    It began just as a rumor that Garrison was making inquiries about the murder, but the cat was out of the bag on March 1, 1967, when Garrison announced that he had arrested New Orleans businessman Clay Shaw for conspiring to kill Kennedy. It was a bold move and attracted a lot of attention, including from the CIA. Two years later the 3-week trial began, and the case went to the jury on Feb. 28, 1969. Hours later on March 1, Shaw was acquitted.

    In 1991, Oliver Stone’s blockbuster movie “JFK” captured the attention of millions. I remember after watching it I was disappointed that Stone had focused on such a discredited investigation, but I was happy that the movie brought attention to the case which in short order resulted in the 1992 JFK Records Collection Act and in 1994 the Assassination Records Review Board that successfully forced agencies and departments to release millions of pages of documents.

    For this column I sought out Joan Mellen, a recognized expert on the Garrison – Shaw case. What she shared with me about certain aspects and people involved in the case were a real eye opener. Mellen is a former professor of English at Temple University and author of 2 dozen books. In the JFK research community, she is seen as one of a very few who have dug deep into the Garrison – Shaw case.

    She first met Garrison shortly after the trial. Her husband had previously sent him clippings from Italian newspapers about an entity called Permindex which was based in Switzerland, founded by the CIA, and had Clay Shaw on its board of directors. None of this information could be used at the trial because it was considered hearsay. In gratitude, Garrison invited Mellen and her husband to come to New Orleans, which they did and sat down together for dinner one evening.

    I asked Mellen what she saw as the biggest surprise of the Garrison – Shaw trial. “The fact that Shaw lied many times. And Garrison was right about everything. He saw Oswald’s movements as those of a CIA operative. Everyone that Oswald saw was CIA.”

    It is now well documented that Shaw was a CIA “active contact” for the CIA’s Domestic Contact Service. Shaw’s CIA contact in New Orleans was case officer Hunter Leake, who reported to Bill Weiss. Another CIA document shows that the CIA was worried about being connected to Shaw. From a CIA document: “We are somewhat more concerned about how we should respond to any direct questions concerning the Agency’s relationship with Clay Shaw.” Still another document refers to Shaw as being highly paid by the CIA. Thus, when Garrison began digging into all this the CIA began sabotaging the case. Mellen believes that Shaw was an Oswald caretaker in New Orleans.

    One example of how Garrison’s case against Shaw was sabotaged relates to a man by the name of Thomas Bethell who came to New Orleans to volunteer in Garrison’s office. Bethell was Oxford University educated and was brought on to Garrison’s staff. But Bethell turned out to be anything but helpful because he turned over a list of trial witnesses, which was not required, to Shaw’s lawyer Salvatore Panzeca. Garrison filed charges against Bethell, but nothing came of it and there was no punishment.

    Mellen also mentioned James Kirkwood who wrote a book, “American Grotesque.” Mellen said Kirkwood was a CIA plant. His job was to write favorably about Shaw. “The book was the idea of CIA,” Mellen told me. Later, Kirkwood’s editor said that had he known of the Kirkwood – Shaw relationship, he would never have signed on to do the book.

    There were many other plants as well. House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) Deputy Legal Counsel Robert Tannenbaum was shown a document that listed CIA plants inside Garrison’s office. Nine names were on that list. Ask yourself this question. If there was no Shaw – CIA connection, why plant people in Garrison’s office? Answering that Mellen said, “because Shaw was their guy.” Tannenbaum also found a memo from CIA Deputy Director Richard Helms that revealed how the CIA followed, harassed, and attempted to intimidate Garrison’s witnesses.

    Space doesn’t allow me to give more examples of CIA infiltration into the matter, but I want to share one very interesting aspect of the case that was unknown to the Warren Commission and well researched by Mellen. I’m talking about an Oswald sighting in Clinton, Louisiana in the summer of 1963. In the late 1970’s the HSCA investigated this lead and found 6 witnesses “credible, significant and truthful.” Clinton is about 130 miles from New Orleans, is the county seat for East Feliciana Parish and was being targeted by the Congress of Racial Equality for a voting rights campaign.

    Oswald first showed up in nearby Jackson, Louisiana, seeking employment at East Louisiana State Mental Hospital. Oswald was told a job there would require him to be a register voter, so he went to Clinton for that purpose. The Clinton witnesses gave physical descriptions that matched Oswald, along with other observations, like Oswald showing his Marine Corps discharge papers as a form of identification. Some witnesses added that Oswald was with 2 older men who were identified as Shaw and David Ferrie.

    The front page of the New Orleans Times-Picayune, Feb. 7, 1969, (see caption) shows that a trial witness, Corri C. Collins, testified that he saw a black Cadillac pull up with 3 men in it. He identified Oswald as the man who stepped from the rear seat, pointed to Shaw as the driver and identified Ferrie as the man sitting next to Shaw in the car.

    Mellen learned that the HSCA refused to authorize investigation of Oswald’s appearance at the hospital. HSCA Investigator Robert Buras was permitted to talk only to Clinton witnesses already identified. Buras was also barred from going to Clinton or Jackson. Mellen points out that this is disturbing seeing as others had more information to share. From Mellen: “An example is Ronald Johnston, the Baton Rouge private investigator who telephoned the committee saying he knew 2 witnesses who had seen Oswald and Shaw together at the Clinton courthouse, as well as at the hospital.”

    Mellen got to know Dr. Frank Silva, the medical director at the hospital. Silva told Mellen that Oswald was ranting about being a Marine and killing Castro.

    So why was Oswald asking about jobs at the mental hospital, I asked Mellen. “He wasn’t interested. He was under orders. He went there with 2 CIA guys (Shaw and Ferrie). Oswald asked what jobs were there.” She explained that Garrison thought that if Oswald was working at this mental asylum and later shows up in Dallas, after the killing, Oswald would be looked at as being crazy.

    Getting back to Ferrie, he was a suspect within days of the assassination, but nothing came of it. I have in my possession the audio recording of a November 1963 Secret Service interrogation of Oswald’s wife Marina and near the end of the recording an agent asked Marina if she knew the name Ferrie. She said she did not. The point is that in 1963, investigators were aware of a possible involvement by Ferrie and a link to Oswald. In 1993 a photo tuned up that showed Ferrie and Oswald together at a Civil Air Patrol function, thus there’s photographic proof the 2 men knew each other.

    Ferrie, well known in some circles as a pilot, used a New Orleans attorney named G. Wray Gill in 1963 in litigation concerning his (Ferrie) dismissal by Eastern Airlines. Another client of Gill’s was Carlos Marcello, head of organized crime in Louisiana. Ferrie is alleged to be a pilot used in anti-Castro operations and was associated with former FBI agent Guy Banister, who is also linked to Oswald.

    In the summer of 1963 Oswald was seen and filmed handing out pro-Castro leaflets. On those leaflets was stamped the address of 544 Camp Street, which was the location of Banister’s office. Several witnesses stated they saw Oswald at that Camp Street address. Ferrie was a crucial witness in the Garrison case, but just as he was about to be brought in for questioning, he was found dead in his apartment on Feb. 22, 1967. Apparent cause of death – a brain hemorrhage.

    In summary the point is that Garrison was on to something, found Oswald – Shaw – CIA links and had the CIA very worried about where his investigation might lead. But in many respects his case was sabotaged and, in the end, made to look foolish. Within just a few hours, Shaw was acquitted of all charges.

    One has to wonder how history would have changed had D.A. Jim Garrison been allowed to investigate without interference. It would be another 10 years before the case came to light again when, in 1976 the HSCA began their 2-year JFK assassination probe which also suffered from CIA lies and interference, just like in the Garrison case.

    This article barely scratches the surface of Mellen’s research. For more, pick up a copy of her 2013 edition of “A Farewell to Justice.” You can find it on eBay and Amazon.

  • Luna Committee Discovery makes MSM

    The latest discovery of the Luna Committee made at the request of Jefferson Morley has made the MSM. Take a look.

  • The JFK Files Volume II: Pieces of the Assassination Puzzle

    Jeff Meek is the only American journalist writing a regular column on the JFK case. This is his second collection of his work on important subjects like Gaeton Fonzi and Jim Gocheanaur.

    The JFK Files Volume II: Pieces of the Assassination Puzzle

    By Jeffrey Meek

    Jeffrey Meek is the only writer I know who is allowed to pen a regular column on the JFK case. He writes for the Hot Springs Village Voice newspaper. He has now published his second collection of articles from that paper and added two long essays he wrote for the new version of George magazine. I have previously reviewed his first collection on this site. (Click here for that critique https://www.kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/the-jfk-files-pieces-of-the-assassination-puzzle)

    The main title of this anthology is The JFK Files, Part 2. This second collection leads off with an interview of the late Jim Gochenaur. People who have watched Oliver Stone’s JFK Revisited will know who Jim was. Jim was interviewed by the Church Committee. As the witness says here, and he said to Stone off-camera, that interview transcript went missing. When he arrived in Washington, he was first interviewed by staffers Paul Wallach and Dan Dwyer, and then by Senator Richard Schweiker himself. Schweiker, of course, made up half of the subcommittee running the inquiry into the JFK case for Senator Frank Church. The other half is Senator Gary Hart.

    What makes that loss even odder is that the man he was interviewed about, Secret Service agent Elmer Moore, was also brought in for an interview. The transcript of that interview is available. Jim met Moore back in early 1970 in Seattle when he was doing an academic assignment concerning the JFK case. The following year, he went to visit Moore in his office. Moore agreed to talk to him about his Secret Service inquiry into the JFK case, which began about 72 hours after Kennedy was killed. But he would only speak to him on condition that he took no notes or made no tapes, and he understood that if anything he said appeared in public, Moore would deny it. (p. 5)

    Since most of this site’s readers have seen Stone’s documentary, I will not repeat the things that Jim said on camera for this review. There are some things that Stone and I did not cover in that interview (we did that one jointly). For example, Jim told Jeff that Moore considered George DeMohrenschildt—nicknamed The Baron–a key player in the case. But unfortunately for Moore, he could not get access to him once President Johnson put the FBI in charge of the investigation. Moore also told Jim that he could not understand why Captain Will Fritz did not make a record of his questioning of Oswald, since he knew that there were two stenographers on hand for the Dallas Police. (p. 6). Moore also had a print copy of one of the infamous backyard photographs of Oswald with a rifle and handgun. Jim noted that one could easily see a line through Oswald’s chin. I don’t have to inform the reader why that is of central importance.

    Jim was also interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). Strangely, that was only a phone interview. Even though the HSCA lasted much longer than the Church Committee and was a direct investigation of the JFK case, the Church Committee was chartered with only inquiring about the performance of the FBI and CIA for the Warren Commission. But further, Jim said they were more interested in another acquaintance he made in Seattle, namely, former FBI agent Carver Gayton. Gayton had told him that he knew James Hosty–whom he met after the assassination. The former Dallas agent told Carver that Oswald was an FBI informant. (p. 11) This action by the HSCA is odd since Jim always insisted that Moore was a more important witness than Gayton was. This two-part interview with Jim Gochenaur is one of the volume’s three or four high points. Made all the more important and poignant since Jim has passed.

    II

    Another interesting interview that Jeff did was with a man named Lee Sanders. Sanders was on the Dallas Police force at the time they were participating in a reconstruction of the assassination. This was for the acoustics testing that the HSCA did towards the end of their term. Sanders was involved with crowd and traffic control during a five-day assignment. Live ammunition was being used in these tests. (p. 49)

    Sanders said that the DPD’s best marksman, a man named Jerry Compton, took part in the tests. He and an FBI sharpshooter took their shots from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. Between test firings, Compton would come down out of the building. Sanders overheard Compton say that they were having problems repeating what the Warren Commission said Lee Oswald had done. As Meek writes, “The scuttlebutt from other officers was that there must have been other shooters.” (p. 49). Sanders then added, “We just didn’t think that one guy could have done this. We didn’t say that in public because it wouldn’t have been good for your career, not if you wanted to stay in good stature with the department.”

    Meek interviewed former Commission counsel Burt Griffin about his 2023 book, JFK, Oswald and Ruby: Politics, Prejudice and Truth. As an interviewing journalist, Meek is rather merciful with Griffin. His technique was to let him burn himself. Griffin tells Jeff that Jack Ruby shot Oswald out of anti-Semitism. He wanted to be seen as an avenger due to the infamous black bordered ‘Wanted for Treason’ ad in the papers. That was signed by a Bernard Weissman. This is Griffin’s money quote about Jack Ruby: “He was convinced at the time, and for the rest of his life, that antisemites were involved, with the goal being to blame the Jews for the president’s assassination.” (p. 56) Griffin properly labels this as his conclusion. He then adds that Jews were being blamed for the attack on General Walker in April of 1963. He then states, “So, antisemitism was an important factor in Dallas at the time.”

    Griffin then continues in this nonsensical vein by saying that there is no evidence that anyone else was involved in the JFK assassination except Oswald. He then adds the antique adage that the Commissioners always use: that the Commission’s goal was to locate a conspiracy. And if he could have done so he would have had an acclaimed political career. Meek does not say if he giggled during these comments. I assume he did not. His goal was to keep Griffin spouting these absurdities, which Griffin did by using Howard Brennan as a reliable eyewitness to the assassination.

    Something puzzling comes up next. It appears to be Griffin who surfaces the fact that the Commission has Jack Ruby entering the basement through the Main Street ramp. The book says that Sgt. Patrick Dean was the head of security, and Dean said no, Ruby did not come down that ramp. ( Meek, p. 57) But if one reads the Warren Commission volumes, one will see that it was Dean who was the first person to say that Ruby proclaimed he did come down the Main Street ramp. And this was right after the shooting. This information is also contained in Paul Abbott’s recent book about the shooting of Oswald by Ruby. (Death to Justice, pp. 226-27) In fact, Abbott implies that Dean might have manufactured this quote by Ruby since, initially at least, no one else heard it. It did not catch on as a cover story for the DPD until November 30th. (ibid) In fact, according to one disputed journalistic account, Dean even said he saw Ruby come down the ramp, which was not possible. (Abbott, p. 229).

    But here it states that Dean said that Ruby did not come down that ramp. It was then this dispute that caused a blow-up between Griffin and Dean. (Meek, p. 57). But yet in Seth Kantor’s book on Ruby he has excerpts from some of Griffin’s contemporaneous memos. This is what one of them says:

    If Dean is not telling the truth concerning the Ruby statement about coming down the Main Street ramp, it is important to determine why Dean decided to tell a falsehood about the Main Street ramp. (p. 288)

    In that memo, Griffin wrote that he thought Ruby came in some other way. And that Dean, who was responsible for security that day, “is trying to conceal his dereliction of duty.” In fact, Griffin even theorized that Dean “simply stated to Ruby he came down the Main Street ramp.” Evidently, through the intervening decades, something got lost in translation or dissipated down the memory hole.

    III

    One of the most fascinating tales in the book was not directly told to Meek. He relates it from an MSNBC show in 2013, an interview with HSCA staffer Christine Neidermeier. She said there was a lot of pressure for the committee to downplay any talk about conspiracy. It also became clear that it was going to be difficult getting straight answers from the CIA, and to a lesser extent, the FBI. (p. 69)

    She then related that she got a call from a man she thought was an FBI agent. Because he seemed to know everything she had told another agent. One of the things she said was that she leaned toward the conspiracy verdict since the HSCA could not duplicate what Oswald did in their rifle tests. The caller then revealed that he knew all about her classes at Georgetown, and also some of her friends. He then said that, with such a bright future ahead of her, maybe she should rethink her position. Niedermeier said this call rocked her back on her heels.

    Three other highlights of the book are interviews by Meek with Morris Wolff, Dan Hardway and Marie Fonzi.

    Wolff was a Yale Law School graduate who was employed by Attorney General Bobby Kennedy in his Office of Legal Counsel, where he worked on civil rights, and also contributed to the famous Peace Speech at American University. (Meek, pp 74-75) According to Morris, he was also a bicycle messenger between the AG and the president when Bobby wanted to get around J. Edgar Hoover. After JFK was killed, Bobby suggested that he go over to the staff of moderate Senate Republican John Sherman Cooper. According to Morris, when Cooper served on the Warren Commission, he was strongly opposed to the Single Bullet Theory. (p. 71)

    The interview with Dan Hardway was for a three-part review of the investigations of the JFK case by the federal government. HSCA staffer Dan tells Jeff that, at first, he and his partner Ed Lopez were stationed at CIA headquarters and allowed to have almost unrestricted access to requested files. That changed in 1978 when Scott Breckenridge, the main CIA liaison, told the HSCA that they were bringing in a new helper, namely George Joannides. George was coming out of retirement. And he assured the HSCA that he had nothing to do with the JFK case back in the sixties. (p. 150)

    As most everyone knows, this was false. Joannides was a CIA propaganda officer who was instrumental in running the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) faction of anti-Castro Cubans in New Orleans. And they had many interactions with Oswald in the summer of 1963. It was around the arrival of Joannides that Dan and Ed were moved out of the CIA offices and into a new building with a safe, and then a safe inside the larger safe. They would now have to wait for files and would get them with missing sentences. They would then have to turn over both the files and their notes into the safe at night. This might indicate that the pair were getting too close to Oswald’s association with the CIA and what really happened in Mexico City, which were the subjects they were working on.

    IV

    The closing three-part essay is an exploration of the life and career of the late Gaeton Fonzi. It is greatly aided by the extensive cooperation Meek had with his widow, Marie. Gaeton Fonzi began as a journalist, first for the Delaware County Daily Times and then for Philadelphia magazine. It was his meetings in Philadelphia with first Vince Salandria and then Arlen Specter that got him interested in the JFK assassination. After consulting with Vince, he was prepared to ask Specter some difficult questions about the Single Bullet Theory, which was the backbone of the Warren Report. Fonzi was troubled by Specter’s halting replies to his pointed questions. (pp. 172-73). He then wrote an article about this for Philadelphia called “The Warren Commission, The Truth and Arlen Specter.”

    In 1972, Gaeton moved south to Florida. He began working for Miami Monthly and Gold Coast. In 1975, he got a phone call that would have a great impact on his life and career. Senator Richard Schweiker was from the Philadelphia area and had apparently heard about Fonzi’s article about Specter. He and Senator Gary Hart now made up a subcommittee of the Church Committee. Their function was to evaluate the performance of the CIA and FBI in aiding the Warren Commission. Schweiker was inviting Gaeton to join as chief investigator, which he did.

    In only one year, that committee made some compelling progress. The combination of their discoveries and the broadcast showing on ABC of the Zapruder film helped cause the HSCA to be formed. Fonzi continued his work there and was hot on the trail of CIA officer David Phillips. That pursuit actually began under Schweiker. And when the HSCA began, the first Deputy Counsel on the Kennedy side, Robert Tanenbaum, went to visit the senator. After a general discussion, Schweiker asked Tanenbaum’s assistant to leave the room. The senator then opened a drawer and pulled out a folder made up largely of Fonzi’s work. He handed it to Tanenbaum and said, “The CIA killed President Kennedy.” (click here https://www.kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/robert-tanenbaum-interviewed-by-probe) That file is what got Fonzi the job with the HSCA.

    As we all know, once Tanenbaum and Chief Counsel Richard Sprague were forced to resign, the writing was on the wall for that committee. And Fonzi did a very nice job outlining this in his memorable book, The Last Investigation. That book was presaged by a long article Fonzi did for Washingtonian magazine, which had a significant impact on the critical community. (p. 174) Fonzi clearly implied in both the article and the book that the findings in the HSCA report were not supported by the research that the committee conducted. When the Assassination Records Review Board ordered the HSCA files declassified, this was proven out in spades.

    A column that Meek apparently got a lot of reaction to involved an interview with this reviewer. It was about John Kennedy’s evolving foreign policy views from 1951 until his death. This included his visit to Saigon and his signal 1957 speech on the Senate floor about the French crisis in Algeria. (p. 103) No speech Kennedy made up to that time elicited such a nationwide reaction as the Algeria address. The Africans now looked to Kennedy as their unofficial ambassador. Meek follows through on this with the Congo crisis: how Kennedy favored Patrice Lumumba, while Belgium and the CIA opposed him. This was at least partly the cause of Lumumba’s death in January of 1961, about 72 hours before Kennedy was inaugurated.

    There are two essays that I find problematic. The first is with Antoinette Giancana, daughter of Chicago Mafia chieftain Sam Giancana. As I have been at pains to demonstrate, the Mob had nothing to do with either Kennedy’s primary win in West Virginia or the result in the general election in Illinois. Dan Fleming proved the former in his important book Kennedy vs Humphrey, West Virginia, 1960. He conducted extensive interviews and found no evidence of any Mafia influence on anyone. And he also outlines three official investigations of that election, on a state level, on a federal level, and one by Senator Barry Goldwater, which all came up empty. As per Illinois, Professor John Binder did a statistical study showing that, in the wards controlled by Giancana, not only did the results not show his support for Kennedy, they indicated the contrary: that he might have discouraged voting for candidate Kennedy. That essay first appeared in Public Choice, and it has been preserved at Research Gate.

    The second essay I find problematic is the one dealing with the whole Ricky White/Roscoe white imbroglio from the early nineties. In August of 1990, Ricky White was presented as the son of the Grassy Knoll shooter, namely Roscoe White. Roscoe was also supposed to have killed Patrolman J. D. Tippit. Meek bends over backwards to be fair to Ricky White. I will not take up space to deal with all the problems with this story. But for a contrary view, I include a link to Gary Cartwright’s 1990 article critiquing this concept. (https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.7560/711990-014/html?lang=en)

    All in all, Jeff Meek has done some good work. We are lucky to have him toiling in the vineyards of the JFK case oh so many years afterwards. I hope he keeps it up.