Tag: FBI

  • Larry Crafard – The Leads the Warren Commission Lost – Part 2

    Even Commission lawyers Burt Griffin and Leon Hubert had suspicions about the tall tales of Larry Crafrard and, among other things, his incredible journey from Dallas to Michigan.

    Larry Crafard – The Leads the Warren Commission Lost – Part 2

    By John Washburn

    LEAD V

    Crafard’s alibi for November 22

    Crafard, when interviewed by the FBI on November 29, 1963, claimed he was sleeping at the Carousel Club during Kennedy’s assassination on November 22. He stated he overslept and was awakened by a phone call from Armstrong at 11:30 am and then again in person between 12:30 and 12:45 pm.

    With Ruby detained for Oswald’s murder, Andrew Armstrong managed the Carousel Club. An African American who handled the bar and cash takings, Armstrong was interviewed by FBI Agents Lish and Wilson on November 25, 1963 (CE5310-A). His testimonies are consolidated as CE5310 A-G here.

    That first interview focused on Jack Ruby, his reactions to Kennedy’s assassination, and a list of club employees. Crafard was not mentioned.

    Agent Lish (CE5310-B) visited Armstrong again that day, and Crafard was of interest, likely after Patterson’s lead. The second interview revealed Crafard had left on Saturday, and his whereabouts were unknown. But Armstrong found and handed over Crafard’s notebook, entered into evidence as CE5230. A typewritten transcript of it was made on November 27, which is on file but not included in the Commission’s evidence.

    FBI Agents Peggs and Zimmerman then made a third visit on November 26 (p.288 WC files, no exhibit). Because Armstrong had found a letter from Crafard’s cousin, Gail Cascadden, which listed her address as Box 303, Harrison, Michigan. Page 288 includes the notebook transcription and a typed copy of Gail’s letter. It was that letter which enabled the FBI to trace Crafard to rural Michigan, where he was found on November 28.

    Only on January 23, 1964, to Agents Sayer and Clements (CE5310-G), did Armstrong provide an alibi for Crafard regarding November 22, 1963. But Armstrong did not then (nor ever) mention Crafard’s claim of being awakened at 11:30 am.

    Armstrong’s improbable journey

    Armstrong lived at Dixon Circle, Dallas, over 4 miles due east from Downtown.

    Armstrong testified on April 14, 1964, that his regular working hours were from 1:00 pm to 1:00 am, and he typically left home at noon to catch the bus from Dixon Circle to Downtown. That would have been the 12/50 bus route along Scyene Road (Dallas City bus map). Armstrong said that he usually unlocked the club just before 1:00 pm and stocked the refrigerator so that the beers would be cold later in the day.

    In his January 23, 1964, FBI statement, Armstrong said that on November 22, 1963, he boarded a bus near his home at 11:53 pm, arrived at Main and Akard at 12:25 pm, missed the motorcade, but saw it was west at Main and Lamar before walking to the Carousel, arriving at 12:30 pm. The Carousel Club was on Commerce near Field, one block south of Field and Main. It would be a 2–3-minute walk from Main and Field to the Carousel.

    He said he took his jacket off and went to the men’s room. When he left there, he said he was curious about hearing sirens and hence got a transistor radio and listened to KLIF Dallas. Then he heard the President had been shot and tried to wake Crafard, but Crafard did not wake. He listened for two minutes more, then heard the President had gone to Parkland. Then he woke Crafard.

    He said that 15 minutes later, Ruby called from the Dallas Morning News and asked, “Had he heard the news?” He then said if “anything happens to Kennedy, the club will close.” He carried on listening until the announcement that Kennedy was dead at 1:30. He said Ruby arrived at 1:45-2:00 pm. Ruby said “what a terrible thing,” and the club would close for 3 days. Ruby made calls. Then he heard the announcement of the death of Tippit. (CE5310-G p320.)

    If Armstrong was on a westbound bus on Main Street, missing the motorcade but still seeing part of it further down (by his description, three blocks down), then there is a very narrow time window in which his arrival can have occurred.

    The Motorcade – running 5 minutes late – entered Main Street at Harwood (at City Hall) at 12:25 pm and was at Field and Main at 12:27 pm, Main and Houston at 12:29, and Kennedy was assassinated on Elm at 12:30 pm.

    If Armstrong was on a bus ahead of the motorcade, he would have observed the entire event. So, to have just missed it, Armstrong would have had to have arrived on Main immediately after the motorcade had, approximately 12:26 pm. But when he testified to the Commission, he claimed to have arrived at the Carousel at 12:15-12:20 pm. That places him at least 5-10 minutes ahead of the motorcade, and he wouldn’t have missed any of it.

    Further, if Armstrong could get from Dixon Circle to Main Street on a noon bus that could get him to the Carousel that quickly, then, on a normal working day, he would be arriving over half an hour too early for his 1:00 pm arrival. Added to which a noon bus from Dixon Circle would be hard pushed to arrive on Main in 20 minutes, even in normal day traffic conditions.

    But Armstrong then undermined his account even further. He testified he got up at 9 am, took the noon bus to see the parade, and stopped at Moore’s Barbers on the way. Merely adding the haircut time would have made it impossible for him to reach Main Street until well after 12:30 pm.

    The Dallas City Directory shows there were two Moore’s Barber Shops, 1124 S Haskell and 1125 Stonewall. Both of those were several blocks north of the Scyene bus route, a ten-minute walk. That detour would add an extra 20 minutes.

    This is what Armstrong said to the Commission about the barbers.

    Mr. HUBERT. And you got to the club about what time?

    Mr. ARMSTRONG. It must time been about 12:15-12:20, or something like that, because when I got downtown I could see portions of the parade, you know, like I got off of the bus at Main and Field- at Main and Akard, I’m sorry, which is the usual stop, I always get off at Main and Akard, and further down you could see portions of the parade, but I felt that I had missed the parade I didn’t realize that I had missed the parade until I was in the barber shop and thought, well, maybe I’ll get downtown, I said to myself, and I will see some portion of it, but when I got downtown I was surprised to see that the parade had moved forward – further down.

    Anyone who’d left home at noon and intended to stop by the barbers shouldn’t have been the least bit surprised. With the motorcade scheduled for 12:20 pm on Main, he could not have made it.

    Crafard and the sleep story

    Hubert asked Armstrong if he had called Crafard to wake him up (Crafard’s 11:30 am call claim). Armstrong said no and added that he didn’t usually wake him even if he was asleep upon arrival.

    Armstrong’s account of the events at the Carousel Club was also inconsistent. On January 23, 1964, he told the FBI that he went to the restroom when he heard sirens and learned of the assassination via a transistor radio. He ran to wake Larry, found the door open, but despite his efforts, Larry fell back asleep. Armstrong then returned to the restroom without waking Larry.

    Gary DeLaune, a news anchor at KLIF radio in Dallas, Texas, was the first to break the news at 12:40 pm. CBS-TV, with sound only, started at 12:45 pm. WFAA Dallas started live TV at 12:45 pm with Bill and Gayle Newman, the closest civilian eyewitnesses to the fatal shot to Kennedy’s head.

    Armstrong then said he heard further reports, and 2 minutes later, he went to wake Larry up, and this time, Larry got up and dressed.

    That places Armstrong in the restroom from 12:15 pm to 12:40 pm on one account (for the Commission) and 12:30 pm-12:40 pm on the other (for the FBI).

    However, Armstrong’s inconsistent and impossible ‘alibis’ for Crafard were blown apart by Crafard himself when he testified in Washington on 8th, 9th and 10th April 1964. WC Vol XIV.

    Crafard was actually an early riser.

    Mr. HUBERT. Do you drink much?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Very seldom. I drank, I think, three or four different times while I was there that I drank a beer or two, that was all.
    Mr. HUBERT. So that your heavy sleep on the morning of the 22d couldn’t be attributed to the fact that you had a hangover?
    Mr. CRAFARD. No.
    Mr. HUBERT. Or that you were suffering from any overindulgence in alcohol?
    Mr. CRAFARD. No, sir.
    Mr. HUBERT. You don’t take any kind of sleeping pills or anything like that?
    Mr. CRAFARD. No, sir.
    Mr. HUBERT. So this was just normal sleep?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes.
    Mr. HUBERT. And his call failed to wake you?

    Mr. CRAFARD. I left the 23d of November, I believe it was.
    Mr. HUBERT. What were your hours there?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Any hours. I would just get up, I usually got up about 8 o’clock in the morning and I would be lucky if I would get to bed before 3:30, 4 o’clock.
    Mr. HUBERT. How come you would get up so early?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Get the club cleaned up.
    Mr. HUBERT. Wasn’t there a man to help?
    Mr. CRAFARD. I took care of that mostly myself

    Mr. CRAFARD. If I started cleaning up at 9 o’clock I would be finished by 11:30.

    Mr. HUBERT. In other words, you had 2 1/2 hours?

    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes.

    Mr. HUBERT. Were you then usually free?

    Mr. CRAFARD. No. Jack would come in about 11:30 and be there 2 or 3 hours. After he left I had to stay there and answer the phone.

    Mr. HUBERT. What was the purpose of keeping you around the club after your cleanup job was over?
    Mr. CRAFARD. So far as I understand just mostly answer the phone.
    Mr. HUBERT. Were there many phone calls to be answered?
    Mr. CRAFARD. There was quite a few that would come in–generally, usually, people calling in, would start calling in about 1 o’clock for reservations.

    The cold beer story

    Then, contrary to Armstrong’s account of leaving home at noon on November 22, 1963, Crafard’s testimony put Armstrong arriving at the club at 9:30 am.

    Mr. CRAFARD. Andy woke me that morning. He come in early. Andy always put the beer in and he come in early to do that so that he could have the rest of the day off.

    Mr. HUBERT. What time did Andy come in?

    Mr. CRAFARD. I think it was about 9:30 or something like that.

    Mr. HUBERT. Came in personally?

    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes. He was there when the President was shot.

    Mr. HUBERT. Were you asleep when he came in?

    Mr. CRAFARD. I was asleep when he came in.

    Mr. HUBERT. Did you waken up when he came in?

    Mr. CRAFARD. I didn’t wake up—Andy woke me up and told me that the President had been shot.

    There seems to be some confusion here. And Hubert should have clarified it. Because if Armstrong came in that early, he could not have told Crafard about the JFK murder. Jack Ruby did little to help.

    Ruby on June 7, 1964, told the Warren Commission party at the jail, regarding his actions when he was at the Dallas Morning News: “I could have called my colored boy, Andy, down at the club. I could have-I don’t know who else I would have called, but I could have. Because it is so long now since my mind is very much warped now.”

    If Crafard was at the club and Armstrong was having a half day, then Ruby would have expected to have called Crafard. Did Ruby think that Crafard was not going to be there?

    Crafard didn’t even sleep at the club towards the end

    Stripper Karen Carlin ‘Little Lynn’, who testified before Hubert on April 15, 1964 (WC Vol XIII), said Crafard did not sleep at the club. She said she worked at the Carousel for 2 months before the assassination, to the end of December 1963, and she worked 7 days a week.

    Mr. Hubert. Do you remember a man that stayed there and slept on the premises?

    Mrs. Carlin. No; I don’t know of anyone that did. Andrew was the only one I knew that ever spent the night there, and that was just because he would say so the next evening. He said, “I am tired.” He said, “I had to stay here all night.”

    Mr. Hubert. I might add that this man Larry’s full name was Curtis Laverne Crafard.

    Mrs. Carlin. Yes. That was a little young boy, the one that worked the lights.

    Mr. Hubert. He stayed on the premises?

    Mrs. Carlin. Yes. But he stayed next door most of the time. I know he was sleeping there for a while, but Jack put a stop to it.

    Mr. Hubert. You mean Jack wouldn’t let him sleep in the club?

    Mrs. Carlin. Jack didn’t like him sleeping there, because there was too many things gone.

    Mr. Hubert. Then he made him go next door?

    Mrs. Carlin. He went next door. I don’t know who was next door or what it was next door, but he went next door.

    Mr. Hubert. But what you heard was that this man had, Crafard, Curtis Laverne Crafard had been staying on the premises, but that Jack had put a stop to it and made him move to some place next door, but you don’t know which next door?

    Mrs. Carlin. Yes.

    Mr. Hubert. Who did you hear this from?

    Mrs. Carlin. It was from Larry. He was taking care of the dogs or something.

    Mr. Hubert. He told you he had to move out?

    Mrs. Carlin. Yes.

    Mr. Hubert. Out of the premises altogether?

    Mrs. Carlin. No. He just said, “I am going to have to move. I can’t stay here. I don’t know where I am going to get the money, but I am going to have to move.”

    Mr. Hubert. That must have happened just before the assassination of the President?

    Mrs. Carlin. Yes. After that I didn’t see Larry no more.

    Mr. Hubert. So to your knowledge he never did actually move, but just said he was going to have to move, and he informed you that Jack had told him he would have to move?

    Mrs. Carlin. Yes.

    Mr. Jackson. When you say move, you mean move out at night and not sleep there?

    Mrs. Carlin. Yes.

    Mr. Hubert. That is what I meant, to move next door, I think is what you meant?

    Mrs. Carlin. Yes.

    (The Jackson who interjected was her attorney.)

    In her FBI statement of November 26, 1963, taken at the Carousel Club to agents Peggs and Zimmerman (Tuesday) CE5318, Carlin said that she’d last seen Ruby at the club the night before the assassination.

    By all that, Carlin didn’t see Crafard at the club after he’d moved out of it, and that was before the assassination.

    “Next door”, may have been the Colony Club. Crafard’s not being at the Carousel Club would be due to his working at the Vegas Club near Lucas B&B, which is where he was seen by Mary Lawrence, as confirmed in Crafard’s November 28, 1963, FBI statement. But Crafard, when he testified, left out any mention of working at the Vegas Club before the assassination.

    Mr. CRAFARD. I have tried to think of what I was doing before, the night before [the assassination], a couple nights before, or something like that. I don’t recall anything out of the ordinary.
    Mr. HUBERT. If it was the ordinary, then I suppose it would have been that the club closed up at its usual hour.
    Mr. CRAFARD. As far as I recall, yes.
    Mr. HUBERT. And you were still sleeping there?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes; I was still sleeping there.
    Mr. HUBERT. So you would have gone to sleep?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes, sir.
    Mr. HUBERT. And then I suppose Ruby would have wakened you?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Andy woke me that morning. He come in early. Andy always put the beer in and he come in early to do that so that he could have the rest of the day off.

    Was Armstrong trying to give Crafard an alibi? But in doing so, Armstrong got tied in knots and created a highly improbable travel time scenario for himself, which Crafard himself seemed confused about.

    Armstrong testified at Ruby’s trial in March 1964 and told the Warren Commission he spoke with Crafard, who also testified for Ruby, in a courtroom corridor. That brief interaction likely did not give them time to align their stories.

    Crafard and the TV

    Crafard claimed to be watching TV after the assassination. Hubert tested him.

    Mr. HUBERT. It was a Dallas station or a Fort Worth station?
    Mr. CRAFARD. It is one there they call the Dallas-Fort Worth, WWTV12, I think it is.
    Mr. HUBERT. KLRD, is that what it is?
    Mr. CRAFARD. I don’t know what station it is. I am not sure whether it was WWTV.
    Mr. HUBERT. How long did you stay there watching?
    Mr. CRAFARD. We turned it up real loud where we could hear it and then listened to his radio, too, where we would hear both of them.
    Mr. HUBERT. Go ahead, what happened next?
    Mr. CRAFARD. I don’t recall exactly what was said except the fact that the President had been shot.
    Mr. HUBERT. How long did you continue to watch it?
    Mr. CRAFARD. We watched it right up until–most of the day, I think, we had the television on there, then, most of the day.

    A remarkably vacant memory for some very eventful testimony by, for example, Bill and Gayle Newman, taking up much of the coverage.

    In CE2430, a very late interview with the FBI on August 27, 1964. Crafard stressed that he was with Ruby when they both heard of the death of Tippit – by name – and the death of Kennedy.

    However, Kennedy’s death was announced at approximately 1:35 pm by TV and around 1:25 pm by radio. There was no announcement of the death of Tippit by name before Oswald’s arrest at the Texas Theatre at 1:50 pm. Indeed, by 2:00 pm, the DPD radio tapes show that Tippit’s wife had not been told.

    Whereas Armstrong in his FBI interview of January 23, 1964 CE5310-G says, correctly, that the name of Tippit didn’t appear until after the official announcement of the death of Kennedy. He said Ruby arrived 15-20 minutes after the official announcement of that, and then made one or two phone calls in about 5 minutes. It was after this, when KLIF mentioned the names of Tippit and Armstrong, he said that Ruby told him he knew Tippit. There is no mention of Crafard.

    LEAD VI

    Crafard and the police badge

    There is also this detail in Karen Carlin’s FBI statement,

    “She said that LARRY attempted to impress her by showing her a badge and telling her that he was a policeman.”

    In my “Death of Tippit article, I suggested that Tippit was waiting at Gloco, the end of the Houston Street Viaduct, to pick up whoever was on the Beckley bus, acting out the narrative that it was the way Oswald was making a getaway from Downtown. When Oswald most likely had actually been driven to the Theater in a Rambler.

    It is also important to remember why Karen Carlin was asked to testify. She was a key witness for the official line that it was her telephoning Ruby for her wages that caused him to be at Western Union opposite City Hall at 11:15 am on November 24 (Sunday), where he then happened on the transfer of Oswald.

    However, she actually said two things contrary to that line. She testified that Ruby said on Saturday, November 23, 1963, “I don’t know when I will open. I don’t know if I will ever open back up. And he was very hateful.”

    That seems to suggest premeditation by Ruby, perhaps having an inkling of the consequences of what he was going to do next, to Oswald.

    Also, when she testified to the Commission, she said that Ruby had said to her on the telephone on the morning of November 24 (she in Fort Worth, he at his apartment on South Ewing), “Well I have to go downtown anyway”.

    Ruby himself, when he testified after his trial, said. “So my purpose was to go to the Western Union–my double purpose but the thought of doing, committing the act wasn’t until I left my apartment.”

    Having a ‘double purpose’ in going to Western Union also indicates premeditation.

    LEAD VII

    The incredible journey. How did Crafard get to Michigan?

    Crafard said he took Routes 66 and 77, passing by Oklahoma City, St Louis, MO, then the outskirts of Chicago, IL. From there to Lansing, MI, Mount Pleasant and then Clare, MI, where he arrived at 9:00 pm on Monday, November 25, and stayed with his cousin, Clifford Roberts. A total distance of 1,282 miles.

    Crafard said that the 59-hour trek began when he decided to leave Downtown Dallas at 11-11:15 am on November 23 (Saturday). He had only $7 on him, he was carrying two bags, and he walked 15-18 blocks until he hitched a ride.

    Remarkably, he said the first ride was from a person he knew from the State Fair, but did not know his name.

    Mr. HUBERT. Did you walk there?
    Mr. CRAFARD. I walked out about 15 or 18 blocks, I think it is, and a guy I had met out at the fair picked me up. He saw me.
    Mr. HUBERT. Did you arrange for him to pick you up?
    Mr. CRAFARD. No; he was going by, he saw me, and he recognized me.
    Mr. HUBERT. What is his name?
    Mr. CRAFARD. How’s that?
    Mr. HUBERT. What is his name?

    Mr. CRAFARD. I don’t remember what his name is. He worked out there for a while. I never did know his name. I don’t think he knew my name. He recognized me as having worked out there.
    Mr. HUBERT. You were on the highway hitchhiking at that time?
    Mr. CRAFARD. That’s right.
    Mr. HUBERT. Did you have a bag?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes.
    Mr. HUBERT. How large was it?
    Mr. CRAFARD. It was a regular satchel and I had another bag

    Hubert elsewhere displayed incredulity about the tale of rides and the fact that Crafard said he had $7 on leaving Dallas. But he still had $3 left when he left Clare on Tuesday to go to Harrison. –This was to visit his aunt Esther Eaton and cousin Gale Cascadden – where he stayed the Tuesday night and then hitched to Kalkaska (another 85 miles) to stay with his sister Cora Ingersoll, Wednesday night. It was there that he was traced by the FBI, and he was interviewed on the 29th ( the day after Thanksgiving), in the morning at nearby Bellaire, MI.

    Assuming that the first ride from Dallas was around noon, with Crafard saying he arrived in St Louis around 6:00 am on Sunday, then that was 705 miles in 18 hours, averaging 39 mph. 

    Then he said he did St Louis to the Chicago outskirts. I measure that distance as Country Club Hills, where the road bears to Michigan, at about 284 miles. He told Hubert he arrived there at 2 pm on Sunday. That’s 8 hours, averaging 35.5 mph and the whole Dallas to Chicago journey averages 37.6 mph. After that, his description of getting from the Chicago outskirts to Clare breaks down as: to Lansing, 212 miles, then Mount Pleasant, 69 miles and then Clare, 16 miles, arriving 9 pm, Monday.

    That’s 31 hours, averaging 9 mph. Had he averaged 35 mph, he could have done it in 8 hours. But Crafard did not describe any long stops, sleepovers, or waits for lifts. He described near continuous travel. Hubert picked up that the final 16 miles from Mt Pleasant to Clare, according to Crafard, took 12 hours.

    Mr. HUBERT. Then there is some mistake in timing of about 12 hours.

    Mr. CRAFARD. That is what I was saying. I’ve lost some time there

    Mr. HUBERT. It may be that you are making a mistake, Larry. Let’s see if we can’t refresh your memory from the time you got that last long hitch that took you to Mount Pleasant because you remember getting to Mount Pleasant at night, about 8:30.

    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes.

    Mr. HUBERT. And that, you say, is a run of what–about 5 hours, 6 hours?

    Mr. CRAFARD. I don’t believe it would take that long.

    Mr. HUBERT. So if you got there at about 8:30 at night, then either you didn’t get any hitches for a long period of time, or else something else happened.

    Mr. CRAFARD. I’m just trying to—-

    Mr. HUBERT. Because you told us, and if it is not so, why we want you to correct it. Everybody can make mistakes.

    Mr. HUBERT. You said that you picked up this ride at a point 60 miles outside of Lansing and into Mount Pleasant prior to dawn on the 25th. Now, maybe that is wrong. Maybe you got that ride late in the day. Let’s put it this way. Was that a continuous ride straight on?

    Mr. CRAFARD. It carried me straight on through to Mount Pleasant.

    Mr. HUBERT. Did you stop at all?

    Mr. CRAFARD. Not that I can recall. It isn’t that long a run across there.

    Mr. HUBERT. Did you stop for lunch or anything of that sort?

    Putting all into context. Crafard got from Dallas to the Chicago end of Lake Michigan in 1 day 2 hours, 77% of the distance. But he took 1 day, 7 hours to travel 23% of the trip, within Michigan itself. Hubert spotted that the most egregious time discrepancies occur from when he said he missed Chicago by bypassing it.

    Mr. HUBERT. He didn’t take you through Chicago?

    Mr. CRAFARD. No; I bypassed most of Chicago.

    Mr. HUBERT. How did you do that?

    Mr. CRAFARD. On a couple alternate routes.

    Mr. HUBERT. With hitchhikers?

    Mr. CRAFARD. Different rides.

    Mr. HUBERT. Different rides?

    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes.

    Mr. HUBERT. How many?

    Mr. CRAFARD. I got three or four different rides in Chicago.

    Mr. HUBERT. With these several rides around Chicago, bypassing it, how long did it take you to get around Chicago?

    Mr. CRAFARD. Probably 2 or 3 hours.

    Mr. HUBERT. And these were all short ones?

    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes.

    We can almost see Hubert raising his eyebrows.

    When did Crafard hear Ruby had shot Oswald?

    Ruby shot Oswald on live TV at 11:21 am on Sunday. By Crafard’s described journey, Oswald was shot when Crafard would have been heading to Chicago; then he had 3-4 rides bypassing it, then he took the one to Lansing. That is 5-6 rides, with the opportunity to hear the radio news of the big story, or any of the drivers commenting on it if they’d already heard it.

    Earl Ruby testified (Vol XIV) that he heard at noon that day, whilst on a phone call, that Oswald had been shot. He turned on the radio and, within 10 or so minutes, learned that his brother Jack had done it.

    Therefore, anyone first hearing of the shooting after 12:30 pm on Sunday, November 24, 1963, would know that Oswald was shot, and Ruby had done it. To know the former but not the latter could only have occurred early, between 11:21 am and 12:30 pm.

    So, when did Crafard say he heard that Oswald was shot, and Jack Ruby was the person who did it?

    Mr. HUBERT. When did you first hear that Oswald had been shot?
    Mr. CRAFARD. I had heard that Oswald had been shot Sunday evening.
    Mr. HUBERT. Where?
    Mr. CRAFARD. It must have been while I was getting through Chicago.
    Mr. HUBERT. Where did you hear that?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Over the radio.
    Mr. HUBERT. What radio?
    Mr. CRAFARD. The car radio.
    Mr. HUBERT. Did you know that Ruby had done it?
    Mr. CRAFARD. No; I didn’t find out who had done it until the following Monday, the following morning, Monday.
    Mr. HUBERT. Where did you find that out?
    Mr. CRAFARD. I heard that over the radio.
    Mr. HUBERT. As a matter of fact, Larry, I suppose all of those cars you were in had radios, didn’t they?
    Mr. CRAFARD. A lot of people don’t listen to the radio when they are riding like that. That was the first I’d heard of it—was Sunday evening, the first I heard Oswald had been shot.
    Mr. HUBERT. Sunday afternoon, wasn’t it?
    Mr. CRAFARD. How is that?
    Mr. HUBERT. You said it was while you were working your way through Chicago.
    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes.
    Mr. HUBERT. Which took you two or three different cars; about 2 hours or so?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes.
    Mr. HUBERT. It was in one of those that you heard it?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes.
    Mr. HUBERT. There was no announcement that Ruby had done it?
    Mr. CRAFARD. I don’t believe so, because I didn’t know Ruby had done it until Monday morning.
    Mr. HUBERT. How did you find that out?
    Mr. CRAFARD. I heard that over the news.
    Mr. HUBERT. In a car?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes.
    Mr. HUBERT. During the night when you were driving from Chicago to Lansing, during the period from 5 in the afternoon to about midnight, didn’t you hear any radio announcements about any of this matter?
    Mr. CRAFARD. No.
    Mr. HUBERT. Did that car have a radio in it?
    Mr. CRAFARD. I believe so
    .

    Crafard tried to extract himself from that muddle by changing the time he said he was ‘passing’ Chicago to Sunday evening. But in doing so, he created another problem for himself by claiming he didn’t know it was Ruby who shot Oswald until Monday. Clearly, if Crafard had only found out Sunday evening that Oswald was shot, then that news would have also informed him that Ruby did it. After all, Ruby was very well known within the DPD.

    I suggest the reason for the inconsistencies and likely deceptions — which Hubert was having problems with — is because Crafard didn’t bypass Chicago in a hitched ride. He was taken to Chicago itself, and he stayed overnight on Sunday. This was more likely a camouflaged getaway. I would also suggest that Crafard was going to meet someone there clandestinely.

    Because his story did not add up, Crafard was questioned again in the morning of April 10, and put his time of his arrival in Chicago 20 hours later to late morning Monday 24th.

    Mr. GRIFFIN. On that basis, what time would you say that you arrived in Chicago?
    Mr. CRAFARD. It probably would put me in Chicago sometime Monday, about 10:30 or 11 o’clock in the morning.
    Mr. GRIFFIN. When you arrived in Chicago, then you knew that Ruby had killed Oswald?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes.
    Mr. GRIFFIN. And what time did you arrive in Lansing, Mich.?
    Mr. CRAFARD. I believe it was about 6:30 or 7 o’clock Monday evening.
    Mr. GRIFFIN. When you arrived in Chicago did you make any effort to call any of the Rubensteins?
    Mr. CRAFARD. No.
    Mr. GRIFFIN. Did that occur to you?
    Mr. CRAFARD. No; that arrival in Lansing would have been about 3:30 or 4 o’clock. It would have been a couple hours earlier
    .

    Despite the ‘correction’ of 20 hours, his times are still all over the place, and he created no reason to know Oswald was shot without knowing Ruby did it. Griffin was rightly suspicious that Crafard was meeting people in Chicago.

    The Man he recognised – with no description

    In that session, when Crafard was asked more about the man, he said he recognised him from the State Fair, and who drove him out of Dallas. But he couldn’t say whether he had hair, or was bald, or wore glasses or not.

    Mr. GRIFFIN. How old would you say this man was?
    Mr. CRAFARD. I would say he was probably in at least his middle forties, more likely in his late forties.
    Mr. GRIFFIN. Was he bald or did he have hair?
    Mr. CRAFARD. I don’t really remember.
    Mr. GRIFFIN. Was he a graying man or what color was his hair?
    Mr. CRAFARD. I don’t remember that either.
    Mr. GRIFFIN. Do you remember if he wore glasses?
    Mr. CRAFARD. No.
    Mr. GRIFFIN. Do you remember what kind of a car he owned?
    Mr. CRAFARD. I believe he had a Chevy. I am not sure.
    Mr. GRIFFIN. How would you describe his physical build, anything remarkable about it?
    Mr. CRAFARD. No; not that I could think of.
    Mr. GRIFFIN. Was he a thin man?
    Mr. CRAFARD. He was about medium build for a man his age and height.

    A question arises as to why Crafard held to the only $7 story, a point of detail that seems, again, improbable. I can only conclude that having little money was essential to the central story he’d hitchhiked, whilst also ruling out the possibility he’d used public transportation. Travel by public transport could invoke a search for witnesses, and would firm up the times.

    The lone fish journey does serve a purpose: it distances him from a team effort. From all that I outlined above, it is more likely that Crafard didn’t hitchhike at all. In my view, he was driven to Chicago and then told to lie low with relatives in remote Michigan, with the hitchhiking story as a cover.

    Having been asked how Crafard knew the route to Michigan from Dallas without a map, he said he’d done it previously, but then gave an irrelevant answer about a prior hitch to Sacramento and Bakersfield with his wife and two babies. That led to more questions about why Crafard’s wife wanted to take her 2 babies (one his, one by a prior marriage) hitchhiking.

    It’s impossible to stitch most things Crafard said to make something sensible out of it. But this was the man who was deceptive about getting to Dallas, the dates when that was, and clung to a dubious story about what he was doing on November 22.

    But the Warren Commission Final Report stated:-

    “An investigation of Crafard’s unusual behavior confirms that his departure from Dallas was innocent.”

    And,

    “Although Crafard’s peremptory decision to leave Dallas might be unusual for most persons, such behavior does not appear to have been uncommon for him. His family residence had shifted frequently among California, Michigan, and Oregon. During his 22 years, he had earned his livelihood picking crops, working in carnivals, and taking other odd jobs throughout the country.”

    That conclusion avoids the fact that Hubert and Griffin exposed Crafard’s account as being full of bizarre improbabilities that seem like cover stories. Working for the FAA in Nevada is excluded from that summary, as was his regular presence in Dallas.

    Whoever drafted those assertions wasn’t reflecting the underlying evidence.

    Click here to read part 1.

  • Larry Crafard – The Leads the Warren Commission Lost – Part 1

    Did Ruby employee Larry Crafard impersonate Lee Harvey Oswald in the lead up to the JFK murder?  And did the Warren Commission seriously consider this?

    Larry Crafard – The Leads the Warren Commission Lost – Part 1

    By John Washburn

    This article focuses on Curtis LaVerne “Larry” Crafard. Crafard had worked for Jack Ruby from mid-October 1963 at the Carousel and Vegas clubs. Ruby purportedly recruited him from a fairground.

     

    Crafard said he left Dallas late on the morning of November 23, 1963. This would be Saturday, the day after the assassination. He said he did not take his wages owed. He stated that he hitchhiked 1,175 miles to Clare, Michigan. Crafard’s departure was before Ruby had shot Oswald on Sunday, and hence before Ruby was in the spotlight.

    In my prior articles for K&K I postulated that Crafard had a role in the assassination of Kennedy, not as an assassin but impersonating Oswald as part of a frame. An element of that being to act out a fake getaway for Oswald, by getting a downtown bus to Oak Cliff. With Oswald himself having been duped into going to the Texas Theater in a station wagon where he was to be eliminated.

    With that, I assumed things went wrong when Tippit, who was supposed to intercept and protect Crafard’s movement once in Oak Cliff, got cold feet and had to be eliminated. Crafard then had to be taken off the bus and then act out an impromptu part at the Tippit murder scene to make it appear Oswald had done it. It was the mishaps around that which meant Oswald was not killed at the Theater.

    To examine whether that supposition is supportable, Crafard’s movements need to be addressed over an extended period of time, with particular attention to November 22, 1963 itself.

    LEAD I

    Crafard was mistaken for Oswald

     

    A Commission memorandum from Counsels Leon Hubert and Burt Griffin on March 6, 1964, preparing for interviews in Dallas in April 1964, speculated that Curtis Laverne “Larry” Crafard, an employee of Jack Ruby, was used as a look-alike imposter to set up Oswald as a ‘patsy’. What evidence had accumulated for them to think that impersonation might be an issue?

    There had been several reported sightings of Oswald at the Carousel Club in October/November 1963. Hence, indicating a pre-assassination link to the club’s owner, Jack Ruby.

    But any mystery about such sightings should have gone away after a memorandum from Naval Intelligence, not released until September 2017, which dealt with what Robert “Bob” Kermit Patterson, 23, ex US Navy, told the Resident Agent “RA” of Naval Intelligence, Dallas at 13:30 hours on November 26, 1963 (Tuesday).

    Patterson co-owned Contract Electronics, 2533 Elm St, Dallas, and was taken to the FBI that same day, CE2830. Patterson said that he had seen Ruby with Oswald in his shop about two weeks prior to the 26th.

    He said the person had a tattoo on his right forearm, was wearing tight-fitting blue jeans and no jacket, 5’8”-9” tall, 150 lb. He said his colleagues Donald Stuart and Charles Arndt were of the same view. He said Ruby had discussed matters concerning his club and its sound systems. Patterson was shown photographs of six different men and picked out Oswald. Patterson described a 4 by 5-inch notebook and said the names of Stuart and Patterson were added into it by the person on the instruction of Jack Ruby so that Ruby could issue them with passes for the club.

    From getting that lead at lunchtime on November 26, the FBI made several visits to the Carousel Club. It took just six hours for the FBI to establish that Crafard was being mistaken for Oswald, and to issue a request that Crafard be traced, interviewed and photographed.

    That request appears in an FBI teletype message of November 27, 1963. (The term “DASH VICTIM” in the teletype is code for the killing of Oswald.). A short account of that also appears in “the Taylor Memorandum” of November 27, 1963 (Wednesday), where Rear Admiral Taylor, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote to Admiral McDonald about the Patterson lead.

    A memorandum from CIA officer (later Director) Richard Helms of February 24, 1964 to Hubert and Griffin also said that “Crafard fled Dallas area Saturday. November 23, located in rural parts of Michigan November 28”. (Unpublished WC, Andrew Armstrong file, page 331). ‘Fled’ is not a word to describe someone leaving in normal circumstances.

    The FBI traced Crafard to Michigan via his cousin, Gale Cascadden. She lived in rural northern Michigan (her mother was the sister of Crafard’s father). She said to the FBI on December 16, 1963, that he seemed uninterested in the fact that Ruby had shot Oswald. She also said she and her parents did not understand why Crafard had left Dallas. When she asked him why he’d left, she said he changed the subject. (CE 2429).

    However, none of that information from Naval Intelligence, nor the teletype, appears in Commission files.

    Absent that information from Naval Intelligence, the only route from published Warren Commission records to deduce that Kermit Patterson was the prime lead is to note the similarity between Patterson’s account of November 26, 1963 (Tuesday) in CE2830, and Crafard’s FBI statement of November 28, 1963 (Thursday), taken at Bellaire, Michigan CE5226. The photographs taken of Crafard appear as CE 451, 453 to 456.

    In that statement, Crafard gave examples of what he did for Ruby, he said:

    …on a few occasions during the daytime, he would accompany RUBY around the Dallas area.” “On another occasion, approximately three weeks ago, he went with RUBY when RUBY checked about some sound equipment for the club. This was at an electronics company in about the 2200 or 2300 block of Elm Street.  They were there ten or fifteen minutes and did not purchase anything. this occasion he, CRAFARD, was wearing a suit and he feels they were there at about 3:00 PM or 4:00 PM.”

    Patterson in Dallas on November 26, 1963 (Tuesday) had therefore described a situation which aligned with Crafard’s FBI statement of November 28, 1963 (Thursday) in Michigan, and vice versa.

    Donald Stuart was interviewed by the FBI on November 27, 1963, and confirmed a similar situation. But he was less certain that the person was Oswald. An FBI record of some of Ruby’s personal effects has passes duly recorded for Donald Stuart, pass number #170, and Robert Patterson #171. Thus, by Tuesday, November 26, 1963, the investigating authorities had information to attach to the mystery of some of the Oswald sightings – including at the Carousel Club.

    Mistaken identity, as opposed to false identity, is not uncommon. But what is inexplicable, unless there was something to cover up about Crafard looking like Oswald, is that all other people who came forward afterwards with similar leads were ruthlessly discredited by the Dallas Police and the FBI.

    The sightings reported by Litchfield, Kittrell, Crowe, Lawrence, Friedman and Jarnagin

    Griffin and Hubert noted in their Memorandum to Rankin of March 6, 1964, that Wilburn Litchfield told the FBI on December 2, 1964 – CE3149 – that in early November 1963, at Ruby’s Carousel Club, he’d seen a man who said he was from California in a V-necked sweater, ‘sloppily dressed’, 5’7”-5’9” who looked like Oswald.

    Litchfield had been playing poker on November 24, 1963 (Sunday). He said that he and his associates saw Ruby shoot Oswald on TV, which triggered his memory of seeing Oswald at the Carousel.

    Litchfield didn’t say it was Oswald; indeed, he said the person had acne scar pockmarks on the right side of his chin. That doesn’t fit Oswald. But that does match Crafard, who had also been brought up in California. Hubert and Griffin even recognised, in their joint memo of March 6, 1964, that although the DPD tried to discredit Litchfield, the facts stacked up.

    “It is also known that an employee of Ruby, Larry Crafard, closely resembles Oswald. Litchfield’s story checks out, moreover in other significant details including the description of a man resembling Alex Gruber of Los Angeles, California who is known to have visited Ruby at the Carousel during the period to which Litchfield refers.”

    Litchfield did have a criminal record. Associates of his (CE2889) confirmed what Litchfield said, but the FBI report said that one associate had said Litchfield was a “con man”. But so what, given that his story checked out?

    The ‘sloppy’ dress also matches Laura Kittrell’s evidence (see part 3 of my K&K Death of Tippit article). She said that Oswald himself on October 4, 1962 “looked very military as neat as a pin” and was “trim, energetic, compact and well-knitted” but the second person she saw on October 22, 1963 presenting himself as Oswald behaved badly and said he was “a trifling, shirtless, good-for-nothing lout who sprawled oafishly over his chair”. Thus, in her case, that was an active impersonation of someone purporting to be Oswald.

    William Crowe was a ventriloquist who did a memory man act with the stage name of ‘Bill DeMar’.

    He said he told a newsman he had been at the Carousel Club and saw a man who looked like Oswald, who worked for Ruby at the club. His story broke that day – November 22, 1963 – with the Associated Press agency. He was then interviewed by the FBI in Dallas that same day (page 5 of the Commission file for Crowe).

    He said he had performed at the Carousel Club in early November 1963 and asked 20 members of the audience to call the name of an object, so he could then relay them back by memory.

    He said that after seeing Ruby shoot Oswald on TV, he went to the Carousel Club within the hour, as he was concerned about his equipment stored there. He said he saw a newsman and a television man also trying to gain access, given the shooting of Oswald.

    Thereafter he said he’d been misquoted, and only said the person looked like Oswald. He also said he’d been on stage with lights shining in his eyes. In testifying to the Commission on 2 June 1964, before Hubert, Crowe was shown photographs of Oswald and Crafard. He stated it was a possibility that the man he saw was Crafard.

    Crowe was being discredited as late as June 1964 for being an attention seeker wanting to promote his memory act – CE2995.

    Even CBS reporter Dan Rather (later to be CBS evening news anchor) got dragged into it. KRLD Dallas on November 24, (Sunday) reported that Rather had seen Oswald at the Carousel Club. The Crowe file, held by the Warren Commission, on page 42 has a note of June 11, 1964, setting out how Dan Rather was interviewed by agents after the KRLD report.

    Dan Rather stated that he went to the Carousel Club after Ruby had shot Oswald. He came across Crowe trying to get into the Carousel Club to get his personal effects. Crowe told Rather that he’d seen Oswald there.

    Page 50 has the FBI testimony of Pauline Churchill, manager of the Shady Oaks Motel, Dallas, dated June 12, 1964. She confirmed Crowe was staying at the motel and rushed into her office within 15 minutes of Ruby shooting Oswald to tell her it had happened. Dan Rather and Churchill thus vouched for the spontaneity of Crowe. But Rather said (CE3101) that he thought Crowe was making it up.

    Waitress Mary Lawrence told the FBI on December 6, 1963, that she had served Oswald and Ruby together at the Lucas B&B café, Downtown Dallas, at around 2:15 am on the morning of the assassination. A few days after, she received an anonymous telephone call “telling her to get out of town or she would die”.

    When shown a photograph of Oswald, she said the person she saw had a small scar near his mouth on the right or left-hand side. The FBI Bellaire report states that Crafard had a small scar on his lip. So, Litchfield and Mary Lawrence, rather than trying to make up a story to fit with it being Oswald, did the opposite by describing scarring that Oswald didn’t have.

    An internal DPD memorandum and a more comprehensive record described her as a compulsive liar. The police memo was used to discredit her on the basis that Jack Ruby was banned from there and hence could not have been seen there.

    But Gloria Fillmon told the FBI on December 17, 1963, CE2379, that she had worked for three weeks in November 1963 as a champagne girl at the Carousel Club. She left because Ruby wanted her to be a stripper. She said a day or two before the assassination, at 3 am, Jack Ruby, Crafard, and she had eaten at Lucas B&B, Ruby and she picking up Crafard on the way. Hence, Ruby likely was not banned. Making that even more probable is that Lucas B&B was at the junction of Oak Lawn and Bowser. It was next to the Vegas Club, Ruby’s other outfit. The neon tower sign is still there.

    Crafard’s November 28, 1963, FBI interview (CE5226) states that he worked on the evening of November 21, at the Vegas Club, and went with Jack Ruby to Lucas B&B at 2:30 am on November 22, just as Mary Lawrence said.

    If that weren’t enough corroboration. He also said he went there with Ruby and a woman called “Gloria” at around 3:45 am on November 21, just as Gloria Fillmon said. Hence, DPD and the FBI were calling people liars for saying things for which the DPD and the FBI had had parallel evidence to corroborate and had known the cause of since Patterson’s lead of November 26, 1963.

    Bob Barrett and James Bookhout of the FBI, on December 26, 1963, followed a lead (CE2991) from the incarcerated Jack Ruby, who said Edward Rocco of Cabaret Magazine, who had been a visitor to the club, could be mistaken for Oswald. Ruby obviously knew Oswald’s appearance, given that he’d shot him from close range in the abdomen.

    Rocco was a photographer who had stayed a week in Dallas to take photographs of the Club. Rocco led the FBI to Terry Friedman. Friedman was interviewed by the FBI on July 1, 1964 (CE2991) when he said Rocco had shown him a photograph of the Carousel Club, and Friedman said he thought a person in the front row was Oswald. Out of all of that blossomed numerous photographs of the Carousel Club, included in CE5303.

    The Commission did not publish the photographs in another exhibit ‘Exhibit 5212’, but the Mary Ferrell Foundation now has. The reason they were not published was given as their “questionable taste and negligible relevance”. Questionable taste by ’60s standards is correct. Negligible relevance is not. What Exhibit 5212 contains are several photographs showing Larry Crafard, wearing a suit, seated in the front row at the Carousel Club.

    Therefore, Ruby’s false lead regarding Rocco being the Oswald look-alike still led to an outcome, the photographer was traced, and the photographs were obtained. Ultimately, Ruby revealed for posterity the photographic proof that it was Crafard who could be mistaken for Oswald. Was Ruby dropping clues deliberately?

    LEAD II

    An attorney saw ‘Oswald’/Crafard at the Carousel Club on 4 October 1963 discussing a plot to kill Governor Connally.

     

    Carroll Jarnagin was a criminal law attorney; CE2821 is his FBI report of December 6, 1963, the day after he had written a letter to Hoover. He asked to be kept anonymous. That report merely calls him “Witness”.

    The report said that on October 4, 1963 (Friday), he’d been using the phone booth at the back of the Carousel Club and overheard Jack Ruby talking to Oswald. The matter being discussed was a contract to kill the Governor of Texas, John Connally. He said he then ended his call to eavesdrop on what else was being said.

    Jarnagin had contacted Hoover directly in his letter of December 5, 1963, as he wanted to avoid local press publicity. A good reason for that was that he was an attorney in the criminal justice system and was dating a stripper, Shirley Maudin.

    The DPD put him through a polygraph test on March 2, 1964, which he failed, having been taken by Officer Paul Bentley (who had also been at Oswald’s arrest). Bentley was the chief polygraph examiner for the DPD and concluded Jarnagin had made the story up and had been intoxicated at the club. The DPD and Hoover concluded he was an attention seeker.

    But that just begs more questions. Why would someone seeking attention end his letter to Hoover asking not to be identified? Why not simply test whether he was yet another person who had actually seen Crafard? Why would someone seeking to raise attention regarding the assassination of the President talk about a plot to kill Connally instead?

    People who are intoxicated tend not to remember very much from that time. A tribute piece in a newspaper on his death does say he dedicated his last 14 years to working with Alcoholics Anonymous. Whether he was an alcoholic in 1963 is not known. But alcoholics tend to have a high tolerance of alcohol and don’t necessarily display symptoms of drunkenness.

    The FBI file, which has information to discredit him, states that Shirley Maudin, on December 9, 1963, said that he wasn’t drunk. Jarnagin appears to have been treated in the same way that Kittrell, Crowe, Litchfield and Lawrence were.

    DA Henry Wade knew Jarnagin personally, and in his Warren Commission testimony of June 8, 1964 (WC Vol V), Wade went out of his way not to discredit him too much and avoided using his name.

    Mr. Wade. I didn’t use him as a witness [in the Ruby trial] and after giving him the polygraph I was satisfied that he was imagining it. I think he was sincere, I don’t think he was trying–I don’t think he was trying to be a hero or anything. I think he really thought about it so much I think he thought that it happened, but the polygraph indicated otherwise.

    Had Jarnagin attended Ruby’s trial, his evidence would have been discussed in open court. He may also have encountered Crafard himself, who gave evidence in person at that trial as a character witness for Ruby.

    In his letter of December 5, 1963, Jarnagin also claimed the man he thought was Oswald was called H. L. Lee. But Oswald was alleged to use the alias of Alek Hiddell, and the alleged room booking at 1026 N Beckley was O. H. Lee.

    As my article on that subject for K&K, “Oswald, Beckley and the Tippit wallet”, sets out, there was a Herbert Leon Lee staying at 1026 N Beckley. The FBI, tracking of telephone calls from the telephone box opposite 1026 N Beckley, was in an FBI report (page 23) dated December 9, 1963.

    Therefore, rather than embellishing facts gained as an ordinary member of the public after the event, Jarnagin was coming up with accurate information that was not widely known.

    Two questions emerge from that. How could Jarnagin, in raising ‘H.L. Lee’ on December 5, 1963, have picked at random the name of someone who was at the very place Oswald had stayed at – 1026 N Beckley? How could Jack Ruby have known on October 4, 1963, that an HL Lee would be associated with 1026 N Beckley? A place that Oswald only moved into on October 14, but whose housekeeper was the sister of Ruby associate Bertha Cheek.

    This, from a Dallas Police report, set out more of what Jarnagin said.

    “The man who asked to see Jack Ruby is dressed in a tan jacket, has brown hair, needs a haircut, is wearing a sport shirt, and is about 5’ 9” or 10” in height, his general, appearance is somewhat unkempt, and he does not appear to be dressed for night clubbing.”

    A tan jacket has come up before. This, from my “Death of Tippit” series of articles, is from Dallas Morning News reporter Jim Ewell. He had arrived at the Tippit murder scene and wrote.

    “There was another police car there as they were examining a jacket next to the curb which had apparently been located by one of the policemen after Oswald had thrown it down as he ran toward Jefferson. I had a jacket just like it. I remember it as being a light tan windbreaker. I was with Westbrook as we all went over to examine the jacket because it was the only tangible thing we had at the moment that belonged to the killer. In fact, I held the jacket in my hands. I remember that they were talking about a water mark on it that was obviously made by a dry cleaning shop”.

    A post from Education Forum member Gil Jesus shows that the discarded jacket described and presented in monochrome photographs as CE162 as gray, was in fact tan. My Death of Tippit article for K&K also sets out how the evidence submission document, had a strip strategically placed so as to obscure that it was Captain Westbrook who found it. That document also described that tan jacket as gray. Thus, Jarnagin’s detail of a “tan jacket,” matches a jacket found that Captain Westbrook incorrectly reported as gray.

    The jacket is by Maurice Holman of California, and Litchfield had said the person he saw was raised in California. The jacket Crafard was wearing when photographed in Michigan also appears similar. Jarnagin also said that the person said he had been hitchhiking. Oswald’s history has no evidence of hitchhiking. Crafard’s story did.

    The possibility that Crafard was talking to Ruby about killing Governor Connally appears to have been a step in a very inconvenient direction.

    Lead III

    Crafard ‘s tall tales about when he arrived in Dallas, and his work after he left the military.

     

    Crafard portrayed himself as an easy come, easy go, itinerant hitchhiker acting as a barker for “How Hollywood Makes Movies” (HHMM), a side show at the October Texas State Fair, Dallas, which ran until it flopped. He then went to work for Jack Ruby at the Carousel Club before leaving on November 23, 1963.

    Crafard, in his November 28, FBI interview, said Bob Craven ran HHMM and employed him, and HHMM accounted for him being in Dallas on October 15, living in a tent, and that he stayed with its replacement, a rock and roll show, until approximately October 30, still living in a tent. He said he then moved to work with Ruby on November 1, having first met Ruby on or about October 21. However, Crafard’s story sits alongside conflicting accounts of others regarding the dates involved.

    Robert Craven, a co-producer of HHMM, confirmed to the FBI on November 27, 1963 (Wednesday) that the show ran from October 5 to October 15, with the troupe arriving on September 29, presumably for stage set up and rehearsals. CE1534.

    The Craven interview makes no mention of Crafard, but the interview was before Crafard was found from the Patterson lead. (Unfortunately, the FBI record is truncated at the end.)

    October 4 would be too early for Jarnagin, or anyone, to have seen Crafard as an employee of Ruby at the Club. But Jarnagin didn’t describe an employee, but an unkempt visitor wearing a tan jacket.

    HSCA Vol 9-3G page 1093 has a timeline for Jack Ruby. That states the State Fair opened on October 5, and Ruby visited the side show 3-5 times that day. It states HHMM closed on October 15, 1963, and on October 20, the State Fair closed. It also states Crafard was building a cloakroom at the Carousel Club using lumber from the failed HHMM side show that day.

    Andrew Armstrong, the barman at the Carousel Club, testified he met Crafard when the HHMM show closed and borrowed equipment was returned to the club by Armstrong and Crafard, Crafard showered at the club and moved in.

    An FBI document CE2348 has information regarding Marvin Gardner’s, the show’s electrical technician, interview on November 29, 1963 (Friday).

    Gardner said HHMM ran from October 5, 1963, to closure on October 15, 1963. He said the performers and producers left town on the 16th. He said Crafard was a barker working outside the tent, and when the show folded, Crafard worked outside the tent where a rock and roll show took its place.

    Crafard’s true timeline

    Crafard, in his first FBI statement on November 28, put his working for HHMM as October 15 rather than October 5. He said he worked for Ruby from November 1, but there is evidence he was actually working at the Carousel from October 16.

    With the true timeline, it is possible that what Jarnagin saw on October 4, 1963, was Crafard meeting Ruby, as the fair and show were already in town, both commencing the next day.

    Crafard was also deceptive about his activities from when he left the military in November 1959. Crafard testified on 8, 9 and 10 April 1964 in Washington, before Hubert and Griffin. This is from April 8, when he describes his short time in the military.

    Mr. CRAFARD. I was in Fort Ord for 2 months and then I went to Presidio, San Francisco, where I was stationed at an air defense school for a period of 2 months and then I was assigned to D Battery, 2d Missile Battalion, San Francisco Defense Organization. From there I went to Germany in April of 1959. I was transferred to Germany to Deisley Kersne, and I was stationed with the D Battery, 2d Missile Battalion there. I stayed there until November of 1959 then I was transferred back to the United States where I was discharged November 10, 1959.
    Mr. HUBERT. How long did you serve altogether?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Thirteen months

    Crafard then described staying with his sister in Michigan for 7 months (which takes things up to July 1960) working casually in pulp wood cutting. He then went to his father’s in Dallas, Oregon, for fruit picking for a month, then a cannery for six months and then, worked with carnivals.

    For 1961, he described various fairground jobs, and he extended his account up to 1962, with casual work in California and Dallas, Oregon (as opposed to Dallas, Texas).

    But this remarkable question was then posed, which blew that apart.

    HUBERT. Now, we have some information that you worked for Federal Aviation Agency through July and October of 1960 in Los Angeles?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes; in Los Angeles–I believe they were out of Los Angeles, where I worked for them that was over in Nevada.
    Mr. HUBERT. What kind of work did you do?
    Mr. CRAFARD. Surveyor’s assistant. I had forgotten I had worked for them.

    Nevada isn’t Oregon. A surveyor’s assistant for the FAA isn’t fruit picking.

    Hubert then sprung this on him.

    Mr. HUBERT. Do you remember working for the Teer Plating Co., Dallas, Tex.

    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes. Let’s see, I believe it was, I am not certain of that.

    Mr. HUBERT. That was between April and June of 1961, was it not?

    Mr. CRAFARD. I believe so. The way I have traveled around, I had a lot of jobs I even forgot about almost.

    Teer Plating was based on Wyche Boulevard in Dallas, between Love Field Airport and Parkland Hospital. The places in Dallas where Kennedy had arrived and then departed from life. Making it all the more strange that Crafard hadn’t remembered that, given the significance of those places on November 22, 1963.

    Capping all of that, it wasn’t until Hubert then brought up that Crafard had also been in Dallas, Texas in 1961 working for Ablon Poultry that Crafard revealed that he was married, and had met his wife in Amarillo, Texas, in 1961.

    Mr. HUBERT. Did you ever work for Ablon Poultry Co.?

    Mr. CRAFARD. Yes, sir; that was after I was married.

    Mr. HUBERT. That was where?

    Mr. CRAFARD. In Dallas, Tex. At that time I was residing at the Letot Trailer Park with my wife and family.

    Mr. CRAFARD. I was married June of 1962.

    Mr. HUBERT. So your wife lived with you for some time in Dallas, Oreg.?

    Mr. CRAFARD. For about 6 months we was living in Dallas, Oreg., from June 10 until I believe in December.

    Mr. HUBERT. Where were you married?

    Mr. CRAFARD. I was married in Dallas, Oreg.

    Mr. HUBERT. Where was your wife from?

    Mr. CRAFARD. Originally from Texas.

    Mr. HUBERT. Where did you meet her?

    Mr. CRAFARD. I met her in Amarillo, Tex.

    Mr. HUBERT. When? How long before you married?

    Mr. CRAFARD. I believe it was in 1961.

    Mr. HUBERT. What part of 1961?

    Mr. CRAFARD. In the spring, I believe, it would have been in March of 1961.

    Crafard’s approach on each occasion he was caught out is interesting. Rather than doubling down, he gives in. He seems to be confident in knowing he can get away with it.

    The HSCA timeline also sets out that Crafard was in Dallas from March 10, 1963, and from March 21 was at Ablon Poultry and Eggs.

    Meyer Ablon was interviewed by the FBI on December 20, 1963, and that interview appears as CE1275. Ablon was an associate of Ruby and had also owned the Chateau Nightclub, Dallas. Ablon Poultry and Eggs was on Canton Street at the Farmers Market, 7/10th mile from the Carousel Club.

    The story that Crafard was mainly in Oregon after leaving the military was not an accurate one.

    LEAD IV

    Crafard didn’t hitch to Dallas or arrive with the State Fair. He was driven from Memphis by a staff sergeant of an airbase.

     

    How Crafard got to Dallas in October 1963 also has irregularities

    Mr. CRAFARD. I traveled to Dallas, Tex.

    Mr. HUBERT. How did you travel?

    Mr. CRAFARD. With a friend of mine, Mickey Spillane.

    Mr. HUBERT. Mickey who?

    Mr. CRARARD. Mickey Corday.

    Mr. HUBERT. How do you spell the last name?

    Mr. CRAFARD. C-o-r-d-a-y.

    Mr. HUBERT. How did you travel?

    Mr. CRAFARD. Traveled down in his car.

    Mr. HUBERT. Where is he from, do you know?

    Mr. CRAFARD. I don’t know where his home is.

    Mr. HUBERT. Did you know him prior to this time?

    Mr. CRAFARD. I had seen him prior to this time and heard of him prior to this time.

    Mr. HUBERT. I mean it wasn’t a hitchhike?

    Mr. CRAFARD. No, sir; I met him at the fairgrounds in Dallas, Tex., or in Memphis.

    Crafard appears to be playing Griffin with the ‘Mickey Spillane’ (a character from detective fiction). Hubert was astute in breaking the hitchhiker narrative. But also, how can Crafard have met the man who took him on a 9-hour drive to Dallas fairgrounds, at the Dallas fairgrounds?

    The fair that came to Dallas in late September 1963, opening on October 5, had come from Midway, Texas. But if Crafard was driven from Memphis, TN. Midway is not on the route.

    Greg Parker and Mark Groubert writing in an article have identified that a Michael Cordray was a staff sergeant at Carswell Air Force Base in Fort Worth (which is 30 miles from Dallas) and specialized in B-52s and radar systems. The US Air Force had used B-52s in sonic boom tests conducted in Nevada.

    Despite his efforts to camouflage his jobs and locations, Crafard’s job history mirrors Oswald’s—low-level positions mixed with roles involving military connections that might require clearance.

    Click here to read part 2.

  • The Threats to Kill Oswald – Part 2

    Were the threats to kill Oswald genuine, or were they part of a secret plan to get the Dallas Police to improve their protection of the defendant, who was loudly proclaiming his innocence?

    The Threats to Kill Oswald – Part 2

    By Paul Abbott

    With Dallas Police Chief Jesse Curry’s gross incompetence; his lack of regard for due diligence and caution when it came to the handling of Lee Oswald’s security, we must still ask – how legitimate were the ‘committee’ threats against Oswald? The ‘committee’, on whose behalf they were being made, has never been identified. To speculate: which organization would feel so strongly about avenging President Kennedy’s murder? Presumably, they would either have had the membership or resources and motivation in Dallas at the time to mobilize there come Saturday night / Sunday morning.

    Of course, we must bear in mind that Dallas at the time, on account of its heavy, often extreme right-wing climate, was perceived as being the most worrisome of cities that President Kennedy’s tour included that weekend. And with the Democrat Kennedy’s reputation there for being bad for business and soft on communism considered, to the point of being accused of ‘Treason’, are we to suppose that there was an equally extreme organization, to quote Vernon Glossup, that was neither left or right leaning, who felt so strongly about Kennedy’s murder to the point of threatening the life of his accused assassin? It is doubtful.

    One final, but simple point on the ‘committee’ front is that, from the moment of Oswald’s arrest to the morning of his transfer, there was never any record or reports of a large, angry group gathered along the streets of Dallas. No trace of an angry-mob type ‘committee’ anywhere in Dallas that weekend, let alone on November 24, which seems to indicate we can pretty much call the ‘threats’ from a ‘committee’ dubious.

    With the ‘committee’ aspect discounted, what about the caller at least? There is sufficient evidence to substantiate that at least two calls were made that morning. However, the caller/s did not identify themselves nor the organization they were representing, so it literally could have been anyone. The wording attributed to the threat makers by Glossup and Newsom at the FBI, and McCoy at the Sheriff’s Department is interesting and almost verbatim in some parts to each other, particularly with reference to the reason the caller said he was warning of the threat…to ensure no one in the Sheriff or Police departments got injured. Of course, this could be attributed to Glossup’s notes made during the call and the resulting memo passed on to Newsom when calling the Sheriff’s Department and alerting the DPD about it. But neither item ever surfaced, so we can only take Glossup and Newsom’s word for it. Nonetheless, the DPD was not contacted by the threat makers directly, so just how sincere was the caller/s regard for their safety as well?

    Let’s not forget another interesting detail present in both Glossup and the second of McCoy’s calls from the threat makers… that when both first took the call, the caller sounded like they handed the receiver to another man who then warned of harm to Oswald. It’s an odd detail that lends an almost absurdly stage-managed/manufactured slant on it all.

    Could one or both of the callers have been Jack Ruby? If so, was he making such a call to sabotage an order or assignment that he did not want, or was he getting cold feet? It’s an interesting and viable theory that many researchers subscribe to.

    One person largely overlooked, but was central to the whole threat episode, of course, was FBI Special Agent Milton Newsom. He was not present when the clerk, Vernon Glossup, received the first call from the threat makers. This seems odd: for the ranking agent on duty not to be present at that particular moment. Where was Newsom at 2 am? It’s not like it was during the daytime, and therefore there was a greater likelihood of his being in a meeting or out in the field. Wherever he was, he wasn’t far as he seemed to get word of the threat from Glossup and act on it quickly by contacting both the Sheriff and Police departments.

    Perhaps most curious about Newsom was the fact that it was he, and only he, who took the only statement of Deputy McCoy, and the first of Captains Frazier and Talbert for the FBI regarding the whole threat episode. Talk about tying a neat bow on the recording of an event that he was involved in from the start!

    We also have reason to question Newsom on this front because William Frazier, during his testimony to the Warren Commission, disputed literally most of his statement attributed to him by Newsom. For example:

    • Newsom’s statement had Frazier saying that it was Vernon Glossup who rang him to advise of the threat received by him on Oswald’s life.
      • Yet Frazier said it was Newsom who called the DPD and spoke to him.
    • Newsom’s statement also quoted Frazier as saying that plans to transfer Oswald to the County Jail may be changed in view of the threat.
      • Frazier told the Warren Commission that he would not have said this because he did not know what the plans were to transfer Oswald, therefore, he did not know how they might be changed.
    • Newsom’s statement also quoted Frazier as saying Oswald’s planned transfer had been publicized primarily as a form of cooperation with the press and news agencies.
      • Frazier also denied making this statement to Newsom.

    Bear in mind, Frazier’s statement, like McCoy’s and Talbert’s, was barely one page long and consisted of a few paragraphs each. With the above considered, the only portion of his statement that Frazier could confirm as correct was how he (Frazier) mentioned that the DPD had not received any threats and that he was advised that the Sheriff’s office had received a similar threat call.

    Compared to the three-page statement he submitted to Sheriff Bill Decker, C.C. McCoy’s statement attributed to him by Newsom barely lines up. It too attributed McCoy as saying that plans to transfer Oswald to the County Jail at 10:00 am had been made public through news releases. Unfortunately, McCoy did not testify on the matter, so we do not have any record of him denying or confirming Newsom’s accuracy in his statement.

    What we do know is that both Glossup and Milton Newsom continued to work for the FBI in Dallas until at least the late 1970s. The only other part that Newsom played in the assassination investigation was the handling of the Bronson film of President Kennedy’s shooting. In fact, the death notice of Newsom in 2012 stated that he was a 30-year veteran of the Bureau. Vernon Glossup had even worked his way up to Special Agent status and by all reports is still alive. It is a loss to history that both were not subjected to more scrutiny about the threat matter. Unless Mr. Glossop would be willing and able to provide any further details after all these years, we are only left to speculate on him, Newsom and their conduct, in light of Oswald’s fate.

    Threading the Threat Needle

    If the phone call threats on Lee Oswald’s life were not legitimate from either a committee or an (unidentified) individual vengeful against him but merciful for the FBI, Sheriff and Police departments, all we are left with are pieces to speculate on their origin and purpose.

    Let me propose something that might seem outlandish at first glance: the threat phone calls were staged by either Milton Newsom or someone doing so on his orders. Why? He did so to apply pressure on the DPD and, after the fact, manipulate witness statements to further discredit the police.

    Context:

    In his Saturday morning statement, Curry inadvertently accused the FBI of either not knowing of someone like Lee Harvey Oswald and therefore not warning them of his presence in Dallas ahead of President Kennedy’s visit, or knowing of him but not warning them. With its association with Oswald confirmed, to what length did the FBI know of or use Oswald? And how concerned were they that weekend of being implicated by association for the president’s assassination? While Oswald was still alive, they were rendered officially helpless as killing the president was not a federal crime at that time. They would have had more of a stake investigating Oswald if he had shot a postman.

    What we must also consider is that the longer the weekend went with Oswald in police custody at City Hall, the more outrage and controversy were being stirred. For the most part, the scenes filmed and reported on by the media were chaos. Oswald, despite looking unkempt, calmly pronouncing his innocence, asking for legal assistance, and protesting the lineups he was in, provided a clear perception that the Dallas authorities barely had a handle on the situation. And an assortment of officials, including District Attorney Henry Wade, Chief Curry and Captain Fritz, providing updates on the investigation into Oswald did not help either. Doing so attracted the ire of people like J. Edgar Hoover and President Johnson, who were, fairly, worried that Oswald’s defense could argue for a mistrial on the grounds that he could never have received a fair trial thanks to the early opining of police and legal officials.

    Motivation:

    If the Dallas Police Department was out of its depth, with little help and steady guidance from Chief Curry, perhaps the FBI saw an opportunity to exploit this by creating a situation that would really highlight the point – something that would only add to the pressure already heaped on the DPD: a serious threat to Lee Oswald’s life. Such a scheme could be hatched locally with literally nothing to lose and everything to gain for the FBI. It would be the ultimate acid test to see what Chief Curry and his DPD would do. Perhaps the intent was to scare the DPD into actually getting with the program and ensuring Oswald’s security by transferring him sooner rather than later. That’s the best-case scenario because, given his Saturday afternoon statement to the press of when Oswald’s transfer would take place and his reputation for maintaining a closeknit relationship with them, it was more than a safe bet that Curry would remain to his word … even in response to a ‘credible’ threat and not budge on moving Oswald. Recall that Curry is on record as telling his beloved press mid-morning on Sunday that Oswald could have been transferred overnight in light of threats received on his life. But it did not happen because, Curry said, he didn’t want ‘to cross you people.’

    What was the desired outcome? Aside from assuring Oswald’s safety by being transferred early, regardless of how the DPD responded, I think the underlying intent was to completely undermine Curry and the DPD so as to both minimize any more backlash on the FBI from his comments on Saturday morning and to position itself as the ideal body to step in at the right time to competently investigate President Kennedy’s assassination. With control and oversight of the overall investigation, the FBI would be in a position to cover its own tracks in terms of their association with Lee Oswald and protect itself against the likely catastrophic fallout it would attract. Like the fact that Oswald was an informant for the FBI. Which would have been a disaster for J. Edgar Hoover.

    How:

    I think it was as simple as at least two threatening phone calls being made on behalf of a conveniently nameless, purposeless organization that was neither right nor left leaning by a person who also remained nameless. And despite saying they were warning of the threat out of concern for the welfare of FBI, Sheriff and DPD personnel, the threat makers did not bother calling the police to warn them. It was all too easy to make up and do so in such a way that could not be traced back to the FBI. Perhaps the DPD were not called for fear of the call somehow being traced or the voice being recognised. If Newsom was behind it, why risk it when all he had to do was either make or have a call phoned into the FBI (if one was made at all)? From there, Vernon Glossup would have wittingly or unwittingly cooperated in the charade by providing a memorandum to Newsom to make the whole episode official. At that point, Newsom could have made or had someone make two ‘threat warning’ calls to the Sheriff’s Department whilst he, in an official capacity, would call the Sheriff and DPD. That is all it could have taken to whip up the storm that followed that morning.

    Wrapping everything up neatly, as it were, Newsom could have easily positioned himself on behalf of the FBI to take the statements of the two other people pivotal to the threat response – McCoy and Frazier – to cement the narrative. And in doing so, sink a final boot into the Dallas Police Department by misquoting both men to implant a damning reference of Oswald’s transfer being publicized.

    Evidently, the FBI’s stake increased once Oswald was killed because his murder effectively ended the Dallas Police investigation into him. What soon followed was the infamous Belmont memo on November 24th, which mandated that the country be convinced of Oswald’s guilt in killing President Kennedy alone through a report submitted by the FBI. Essentially, with Oswald dead and the DPD out of the picture, with no other suspect to investigate any further, the ball was handed firmly to the FBI to control the narrative. Because the FBI very quickly, yet momentarily, came to sit at the center of the investigation on the back of Oswald’s murder.

    Johnson and Warren Wrap it all Up.

    President Lyndon B. Johnson would establish the Warren Commission on November 29th, which was essentially a high-level PR piece that would ‘review and evaluate’ the findings of the FBI’s investigation into President Kennedy’s assassination and Lee Oswald’s sole guilt. This was because Johnson was concerned that a single report from the FBI would not be enough to prevent a ‘rash of investigations’ that would amount to a ‘three-ring circus’ that would steer away the public from the desired Oswald-lone nut narrative.

    Chief Justice Earl Warren was approached directly by Johnson to head up the commission. Warren originally said no, but when Johnson countered him by putting forth information he had received from Director Hoover about a ‘little incident in Mexico City’, Warren tearfully agreed.

    Just what exactly Johnson used to pressure Warren with has been speculated about ever since. Some have interpreted this reference to be some kind of sordid or salacious piece of blackmail that Hoover had procured on Warren and paid it forward to Johnson. I disagree – I think it was more like the information that FBI-contact/asset Washington Star reporter, Jerry O’Leary, happened upon when in Dallas covering the aftermath of the assassination. I have laid this episode out in another article, but essentially, Jerry O’Leary (who was later named as an asset within the CIA’s Operation Mockingbird) met with a CIA contact of his in Dallas who was an ‘unimpeachable’ source who told him that Oswald returned from Mexico with five thousand dollars in cash. Instead of publishing a story on this stunning revelation, O’Leary promptly reported it to the FBI, who took it straight up to the State Department and the White House. The implication was that either the Soviets or Cubans were behind the president’s murder and that such information could be the catalyst for all-out war with the Soviets. The Warren Commission was formed with sitting senators and representatives such as Hale Boggs, Gerald Ford and Richard Russell, as well as Washington powerhouses in John McCloy and Allen Dulles. Surely enough the Commission would submit its findings that Lee Harvey Oswald was solely guilty of killing President Kennedy and police officer J.D. Tippit on November 22nd and anything contrary to these conclusions was either ignored or manipulated. War against the Soviet Union and Cuba was averted, but the truth behind President Kennedy’s murder, his accused assassin’s intelligence links and Oswald’s own suspicious murder have remained enduring mysteries. We can now add to this mosaic the momentary influence the FBI had when it came to ‘investigating’ the Kennedy assassination and ponder what it did to cover its own tracks when it came to its proven association with Lee Oswald.

    Click here to read part 1.

  • The Threats to Kill Oswald – Part 1

    Paul Abbott revisits a tangent from the first edition of his book, ‘Death to Justice – The Shooting of Lee Harvey Oswald’, involving the threats to kill Oswald before his eventual murder on Sunday, November 24th, 1963.

    The Threats to Kill Oswald – Part 1

    By Paul Abbott

    The incarceration of Lee Harvey Oswald, the alleged killer of President John F. Kennedy and Police Officer J.D. Tippit, and his mistreatment at the hands of the Dallas Police across the weekend of November 22nd has been well established. But the matter of the alleged threats made against his life over the course of the night before his murder at the hands of Jack Ruby has largely been glossed over in the broader scheme of things. But just how they unfolded and were responded to has largely withstood any in-depth scrutiny ever since.

    The Curry Storm

    At approximately 11.30 am on Saturday, November 23rd, Jesse Curry, the Dallas Police Chief, was in his office on the southwest corner of the Third Floor of Dallas City Hall. Seated opposite him were a group of reporters, including the Associated Press’ Peggy Simpson and NBC’s Tom Pettit. It was one of the many occasions that weekend where he would hold court with the members of the press – to the point where he would be directed to stop doing so by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and President Lyndon Johnson across that weekend. Curry’s regard and synergy with the press were legendary and certainly a theme throughout his tenure as chief. In fact, in early 1958, he issued a memorandum to all Dallas police personnel essentially instructing them to provide the media with as much access and assistance as possible. Basically, he regarded them as a PR arm for the department and at that time, with the reputation that Dallas had for crime and corruption, it was clearly a mitigation strategy on his part.

    During Curry’s mini press conference with Simpson, Pettit and others, an interesting exchange took place:

    Curry: (to persons unknown) … They say he.. he said he was a communist…

    Pettit: Hey Chief, did the FBI or your department have him (Oswald) under surveillance prior to yesterday?

    Curry: No, sir, we didn’t have knowledge that he was in the city.

    Pettit: Did the FBI?

    Curry: I understand that they did know he was here and that they interviewed him … oh … a week or two ago.

    Pettit: Did they warn you of his presence in the city?

    Curry: No, they had not.. at the time .. until yesterday.

    Pettit: Do you think they should have?

    Curry: Well, they usually do. They keep us informed. If we don’t have knowledge of it, they usually liaise with us… usually let us know when these communist sympathizers or subversives come into the city. And why they hadn’t got round to informing us of this man, I don’t know.

    This frank exchange would be widely reported and circulated, sparking the wrath of the FBI hierarchy up to and including Director Hoover. The implication of course being that Chief Curry was deflecting all blame on the FBI for failing to detect and stop the communist Oswald and prevent the November 22nd killings. In fact, what Curry was saying to Pettit was completely reasonable. And evidently correct, as the FBI was monitoring Oswald at the time, and they did not alert the DPD to him prior to President Kennedy’s arrival. What followed was an effort by the FBI to mitigate any fallout from Curry’s statement by having Special Agent in Charge in Dallas, Gordon Shanklin, contact Curry and have him retract what he said to Tom Pettit. A summary memo from the FBI’s Cartha De Loach shows that Shanklin was successful in doing this and that Curry even apologized and said that he did not ‘mean to place any blame on the FBI’. The damage control continued with the FBI using their proven media contact on the ground, the Washington Star’s Jerry O’Leary, who was in Dallas to cover events that weekend, to also get in touch with Chief Curry and ‘make him go on record regarding the falsity of his allegations’.

    All of this resulted in Curry speaking to another group of reporters (including Tom Pettit) out in the hall on the Third Floor of City Hall just after 1 pm that same day. He led with the following statement:

    There has been some information that has gone out. I want to correct anything that might have been misinterpreted or misunderstood. And that is regarding information that the FBI might have had about this man (Oswald). I do not know… if and when the FBI has interviewed this man. The FBI is under no obligation to come to us with any information concerning anyone. They have cooperated with us in the past one hundred percent. Any time there’s any information that they feel that might be helpful to us, they have always come to us. Uh.. last night someone told me.. I don’t even know who it was, that the FBI did know this man was in the city and had interviewed him. I wish to say this. Of my knowledge, I do not know this to be a fact and I don’t want anybody to get the wrong impression that I am accusing the FBI of not cooperating or withholding information because they are under no obligation to us but have always cooperated with us one hundred percent. And I do not know if and when they have ever interviewed this man.

    While this episode started and ended within a couple of hours, I think it has been totally overlooked and underestimated in the scheme of things. Think about it…with all of the world focusing on him, his police department and their handling of the man suspected of killing President Kennedy, the Dallas Chief of Police publicly acknowledged that his department was usually alerted by the FBI about people like Lee Oswald (‘communist sympathizer / subversive’) but they were not in Oswald’s instance. It remains a shocking admission.

    No wonder the FBI was quick to act in response to Curry’s initial statement. The implications were doubly negative for them. If they did not know about a ‘communist sympathizer or subversive’ in Oswald, it was a massive oversight on their part that would rightly bring their competence into question. On the other hand, if they did know about Oswald, why did they not alert the DPD to his presence in Dallas? The implication would transcend just incompetence. Thankfully for us, the subsequent years have proven that the FBI was well and truly aware of Oswald, and was monitoring him, so this question, I think, lies at the center of a lot of the intrigue around Lee Oswald, his framing for the November 22nd killings and his own murder.

    What is clear in the Curry matter is that the FBI instantly threw all of its efforts into mitigating any blame it would receive for Oswald and the events of November 22nd, as well as asserting itself as being in control. This is a crucial point to keep in mind for the rest of this article.

    Come the latter hours of that Saturday, the media that had engulfed Dallas City Hall to cover Oswald’s incarceration were starting to dissipate. This was because it had been purported that Oswald had been charged with Kennedy’s murder, so their assumption was that there would be fewer and fewer opportunities to see and ask him any questions. The broader implication being that he would soon be moved to maximum security at the County Jail.

    The matter of transferring Lee Oswald from the City Hall to the County Jail was something that was still only notionally being discussed across the DPD hierarchy that afternoon. In ordinary circumstances, the transfer of a prisoner from City Hall, or any police station, to the County Jail, where they would await sentencing, was the responsibility of the local sheriff. The principle being that the sheriff would present at the police premises the necessary paperwork to take custody of the prisoner from that moment on. Only in extraordinary circumstances, which the weekend of November 22nd clearly presented, would this protocol ever be deviated from. However, in a subsequent statement that he gave, Dallas Sheriff Bill Decker testified to not being notified by the DPD of any plans or intent they had for them (the DPD) or the Sheriff’s Department to facilitate Oswald’s transfer to the County Jail. In fact, he only found out his information on this front through members of the media.

    And examining the statements of Chief Curry and his captain for the Homicide and Robbery Bureau, J.W. Fritz, who had Oswald in custody, shows that the transfer had not been discussed between them at any great length.

    From Curry’s perspective, he was being asked the question by the media about the transfer, so he in turn asked Fritz if he thought he’d be done with his questioning of Oswald that (Saturday) afternoon, so he could be transferred. Fritz said that he still needed more time, which was his right, as it was much easier to interrogate a suspect at City Hall than at the County Jail. Between the two, it was generally agreed that Oswald would stay another night at City Hall for further questioning and be transferred the next morning. On this, Curry duly told the press that Oswald would be transferred the next day at 10 am:

    Over the years, this point has been muddled as Curry telling reporters that if they were at City Hall by 10 am on the Sunday, they won’t have missed the transfer. But using articles) published that weekend, it was clearly reported that Curry stated the transfer would begin at 10 am. (Abbott, Death to Justice, p.363

    As Saturday evening turned into night, Dallas City Hall quietened down to a near state of normalcy, with there only being a handful of reporters staying around in case Oswald was instead transferred that night. We are now able to examine the alleged threats to Lee Oswald’s life in the early hours of Sunday, November 24th, on behalf of a ‘committee’.

    Below is a list of the people who had firsthand, evidential dealings with receiving and acting upon the threats:

    • Police Chief Jesse Curry – DPD
    • Sheriff Bill Decker – Sheriff’s Dept.
    • Captain William B. Frazier – DPD
    • Captain J.W. Fritz – DPD
    • Vernon R. Glossup (civilian clerk) – FBI
    • Deputy C.C. McCoy – Sheriff’s Dept.
    • Special Agent Milton L. Newsom – FBI
    • Captain Cecil E. Talbert – DPD

    Using statements and quoting specific points that each of these people provided to either the FBI or the Warren Commission, we can piece together a chronology when it comes to the receiving and handling of these threats.

    Threat Timeline:

    • At the County Jail, Deputy Sheriff C.C. McCoy was working the night shift which consisted of taking phone calls from all manner of citizens, near and far, who were calling to do anything from express their condolences to warning of a group of ‘fourteen thousand negroes’ who were coming to town to get ‘this bunch’ straightened out. Also on duty were fellow personnel by the names Kennedy, Watkins and ‘Virgil’.
    • At approximately 2:00 am, McCoy even received a call from Sheriff Bill Decker. During this call, he and Decker discussed when Oswald’s transfer would take place and that it should be while it was still dark. They even speculated when it became light (6:30 am or 6:45 am) and agreed that McCoy would call Decker back at 6 am to see about getting Oswald transferred before first light.
    • At 2:15 am, McCoy received another call. This time it was from a man who, according to a statement he later provided, ‘talked like a w/m (white male) and he stated that he was a member of a group of one hundred and that he wanted the Sheriff’s office to know that they had voted one hundred per cent to kill Oswald while he was in the process of being transferred to the County Jail. And that he wanted this department to have the information so that none of the deputies would get hurt.’ McCoy said ‘The voice was deep and coarse and sounded very sincere and talked with ease. The person did not seem excited like some of the calls that had received running down this department, the police department and the State of Texas.’ McCoy said that he had his colleague, ‘Virgil’, listen to part of the call.
    • At 2:30 am, civilian clerk for the Dallas FBI office, Vernon R. Glossup, received a call from an unknown male who also spoke in a calm voice and asked to talk to the man in charge. According to his own statement, Glossup said he ‘told the caller that the SAC (Special Agent in Charge) was not present at that time and asked if someone else could help him. The caller then said, “Wait a minute,” and apparently turned the phone over to another man. I am not certain there were two different voices; however, the tone of the unknown caller’s voice changed somewhat at this point. The voice at this point was calm and mature in sound, and this person stated as follows: “I represent a committee that is neither right nor left wing, and tonight, tomorrow morning, or tomorrow night, we are going to kill the man that killed the president. There will be no excitement, and we will kill him. We wanted to be sure and tell the FBI, Police Department, and Sheriff’s Office, and we will be there and will kill him.” With that, the caller hung up. Glossup transcribed the call in a memorandum for Special Agent Milton L. Newsom, who contacted the Sheriff’s Department at 3:00 am to see if they too had received any such calls. Newsom then called the Police Department at 3:30 am to ask the same and advise of the threat that Glossup had received.
    • Sheriff Deputy McCoy concurred that he received a call from Newsom and that he merely asked if ‘we’ (the Sheriff’s Department) had received any calls threatening Oswald’s life. McCoy said that he had, so Newsom instructed him to contact Dallas Police ‘and give the same information to them.’ According to his statement, McCoy did call the Dallas Police Department but could only recall that he ‘talked to someone in Captain Fritz’s office.’ McCoy stated that he was told by a member of the DPD that they (Dallas Police) hadn’t received any threatening phone calls.
    • Still with McCoy and his statement, he ‘received one other call regarding the transfer of Oswald, and when I answered the telephone, a male voice asked if this is the Sheriff’s office, and I said that it was. He said, “Just a minute,” and then another male voice stated that Oswald would never make the trip to the County Jail. McCoy said he could not determine whether or not this was the same voice that called earlier on behalf of a ‘committee’.
    • At City Hall, Captain William B. Frazier was the ranking officer on duty there that night. He testified to the Warren Commission of being contacted by FBI Agent Milton Newsom between 3:00 am and 3:45 am. He quoted Newsom as telling him that he (Newsom) ‘received a threat from some man to the effect that a group of men of 100 or 200’, Frazier said he couldn’t recall exactly, ‘were going to attempt to kill Oswald that day sometime. That he (the caller) didn’t want the FBI, Dallas Police Department or the sheriff’s office injured in any way. That was the reason for the call.’
    • To somewhat corroborate McCoy’s account, in the same testimony for the Warren Commission, Frazier said he spoke to someone with the surname of, or similar to, ‘Cox’ or Coy’ from the Sheriff’s Department. Frazier testified that he wasn’t clear on the time of the call, but he and McCoy discussed Oswald’s transfer and that McCoy told him that Sheriff Decker recommended that it be brought forward. And if so, there could be two supervisors from the Sheriff Department on hand at the County Jail to receive Oswald.
    • Frazier said that he next called Captain Fritz at his home to tell him of the threats against Oswald and that he would need to be transferred. Fritz told him it was Chief Curry’s decision to make, as he wanted Oswald transferred in the morning. However, when Frazier tried to also reach Curry by phone at home, the line was out of order.
    • At around 6:00 am, McCoy called Bill Decker as agreed and told him who was on duty and how they could carry out Oswald’s transfer if required – including hiding Oswald down in the footwell of the car. He was told by Decker to hold off on any plans until he spoke with Captain Fritz.
    • At 6:15 am, Frazier was at the end of his shift and about to be relieved by Captain Cecil E. Talbert. In the handover, Frazier said that he advised Talbert of the threat situation with Oswald and that both Sheriff Decker and Agent Newsom were anxious to transfer him.
    • According to Talbert’s statement for the Warren Commission, he must have been advised of the issue to reach Curry, as he said that he got the telephone company to put a buzzer on his phone line to determine if the line was faulty. It was, so he sent a squad car to Curry’s house to brief him on the situation and have him call City Hall… if he could.
    • Despite the issues with his phone, Curry soon called Talbert back at City Hall and was briefed on the threats. All Curry did was instruct Talbert to tell Newsom and Decker that he would contact them when he was in his office between 8:00 am and 9:00 am later that morning.

    With all of the above told, no more was done to address the threats to Lee Oswald.

    As the morning rolled on, the transfer at least had some planning put toward it. Once Curry and Decker decided between them that the DPD would facilitate the transfer, it was decided that Oswald would be taken in an armored truck for the twelve-block journey to the County Jail. Acting on orders from Curry, Deputy Chief Batchelor contacted a local armored car company, and they sent two people carrying armored trucks to City Hall’s Commerce Street ramp exit.

    At the last minute, at approximately 11:15 am, Fritz recommended that Oswald instead be placed in the back of an unmarked squad car and that it follow behind the armored car, which in turn would be empty and a decoy. His justification for this was that if there was an attack launched on Oswald during the transfer, a vehicle such as an armored car would be too awkward to maneuver and evade. With that, the transfer finally got underway with a group of detectives and Fritz leaving the Third Floor with Oswald – and the rest is tragic history. Jack Ruby was able to access the basement and be in a position to shoot, and ultimately kill, Oswald when he and his escort emerged into the basement and were walking to the car.

    While there are clear gaps in some of the timings and accounts around the threats response (for example, McCoy’s statement does not include any mention of speaking to Decker after he had both received and received word of the threat calls), it is clear that there was some effort by he and the DPD’s Frazier to bring about Oswald’s transfer early to pre-empt any threat against his life. The roadblocks were Captain Fritz and Chief Curry.

    When first told of the threats by Frazier, Fritz basically put his hands up and said, ‘Not me, not my call.’ What any competent leader within a hierarchy ought to have done, in this instance, was say, ‘It is the Chief’s call… so try and reach him to find out. If you can’t reach him, call me back because we’d best still get the transfer underway.’

    However, if Jesse Curry’s phone line was not a factor and he was reached by Frazier, it would not have made a difference. We can be sure of this because he scuttled any chance to respond accordingly when he instructed that Newsom and Decker be told that he would arrive at City Hall in a couple of hours’ time. That was it. That was how he responded to the word of the threats. There was no action to effect an earlier transfer there and then. If he did decide to do something about it, Curry wouldn’t have had to do much other than give the approval. Between his personnel, and perhaps a quick phone call by him to Sheriff Decker, Oswald’s early and safe transfer would have been incredibly easy to carry out.

    The burning question is why Curry didn’t want to have Oswald transferred at that point in time? At 10:20 am later that morning, when speaking to reporters, Curry not only mentioned the threat made to Oswald overnight, he also said that he could’ve been transferred early as a result but he (Curry) chose not to because he didn’t want to go back on the original time he told the press (Abbott, Death to Justice, p.112). Apparently, it was as simple as that. On top of it all, Curry actually laid out to the reporters that Oswald would be transported to the County Jail in an armored car. Talk about infuriating!

    Having uncovered just how the verifiable threat episode involving the FBI, Sheriff and DPD took place, in Part Two, we will analyze this episode in the context of the furor that Chief Curry started with his candidness on the morning of Saturday when speaking with the press and how the FBI ultimately took the early lead in investigating President Kennedy’s assassination.

    Click here to read part 2.

  • The JFK Files Volume II: Pieces of the Assassination Puzzle

    Jeff Meek is the only American journalist writing a regular column on the JFK case. This is his second collection of his work on important subjects like Gaeton Fonzi and Jim Gocheanaur.

    The JFK Files Volume II: Pieces of the Assassination Puzzle

    By Jeffrey Meek

    Jeffrey Meek is the only writer I know who is allowed to pen a regular column on the JFK case. He writes for the Hot Springs Village Voice newspaper. He has now published his second collection of articles from that paper and added two long essays he wrote for the new version of George magazine. I have previously reviewed his first collection on this site. (Click here for that critique https://www.kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/the-jfk-files-pieces-of-the-assassination-puzzle)

    The main title of this anthology is The JFK Files, Part 2. This second collection leads off with an interview of the late Jim Gochenaur. People who have watched Oliver Stone’s JFK Revisited will know who Jim was. Jim was interviewed by the Church Committee. As the witness says here, and he said to Stone off-camera, that interview transcript went missing. When he arrived in Washington, he was first interviewed by staffers Paul Wallach and Dan Dwyer, and then by Senator Richard Schweiker himself. Schweiker, of course, made up half of the subcommittee running the inquiry into the JFK case for Senator Frank Church. The other half is Senator Gary Hart.

    What makes that loss even odder is that the man he was interviewed about, Secret Service agent Elmer Moore, was also brought in for an interview. The transcript of that interview is available. Jim met Moore back in early 1970 in Seattle when he was doing an academic assignment concerning the JFK case. The following year, he went to visit Moore in his office. Moore agreed to talk to him about his Secret Service inquiry into the JFK case, which began about 72 hours after Kennedy was killed. But he would only speak to him on condition that he took no notes or made no tapes, and he understood that if anything he said appeared in public, Moore would deny it. (p. 5)

    Since most of this site’s readers have seen Stone’s documentary, I will not repeat the things that Jim said on camera for this review. There are some things that Stone and I did not cover in that interview (we did that one jointly). For example, Jim told Jeff that Moore considered George DeMohrenschildt—nicknamed The Baron–a key player in the case. But unfortunately for Moore, he could not get access to him once President Johnson put the FBI in charge of the investigation. Moore also told Jim that he could not understand why Captain Will Fritz did not make a record of his questioning of Oswald, since he knew that there were two stenographers on hand for the Dallas Police. (p. 6). Moore also had a print copy of one of the infamous backyard photographs of Oswald with a rifle and handgun. Jim noted that one could easily see a line through Oswald’s chin. I don’t have to inform the reader why that is of central importance.

    Jim was also interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). Strangely, that was only a phone interview. Even though the HSCA lasted much longer than the Church Committee and was a direct investigation of the JFK case, the Church Committee was chartered with only inquiring about the performance of the FBI and CIA for the Warren Commission. But further, Jim said they were more interested in another acquaintance he made in Seattle, namely, former FBI agent Carver Gayton. Gayton had told him that he knew James Hosty–whom he met after the assassination. The former Dallas agent told Carver that Oswald was an FBI informant. (p. 11) This action by the HSCA is odd since Jim always insisted that Moore was a more important witness than Gayton was. This two-part interview with Jim Gochenaur is one of the volume’s three or four high points. Made all the more important and poignant since Jim has passed.

    II

    Another interesting interview that Jeff did was with a man named Lee Sanders. Sanders was on the Dallas Police force at the time they were participating in a reconstruction of the assassination. This was for the acoustics testing that the HSCA did towards the end of their term. Sanders was involved with crowd and traffic control during a five-day assignment. Live ammunition was being used in these tests. (p. 49)

    Sanders said that the DPD’s best marksman, a man named Jerry Compton, took part in the tests. He and an FBI sharpshooter took their shots from the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. Between test firings, Compton would come down out of the building. Sanders overheard Compton say that they were having problems repeating what the Warren Commission said Lee Oswald had done. As Meek writes, “The scuttlebutt from other officers was that there must have been other shooters.” (p. 49). Sanders then added, “We just didn’t think that one guy could have done this. We didn’t say that in public because it wouldn’t have been good for your career, not if you wanted to stay in good stature with the department.”

    Meek interviewed former Commission counsel Burt Griffin about his 2023 book, JFK, Oswald and Ruby: Politics, Prejudice and Truth. As an interviewing journalist, Meek is rather merciful with Griffin. His technique was to let him burn himself. Griffin tells Jeff that Jack Ruby shot Oswald out of anti-Semitism. He wanted to be seen as an avenger due to the infamous black bordered ‘Wanted for Treason’ ad in the papers. That was signed by a Bernard Weissman. This is Griffin’s money quote about Jack Ruby: “He was convinced at the time, and for the rest of his life, that antisemites were involved, with the goal being to blame the Jews for the president’s assassination.” (p. 56) Griffin properly labels this as his conclusion. He then adds that Jews were being blamed for the attack on General Walker in April of 1963. He then states, “So, antisemitism was an important factor in Dallas at the time.”

    Griffin then continues in this nonsensical vein by saying that there is no evidence that anyone else was involved in the JFK assassination except Oswald. He then adds the antique adage that the Commissioners always use: that the Commission’s goal was to locate a conspiracy. And if he could have done so he would have had an acclaimed political career. Meek does not say if he giggled during these comments. I assume he did not. His goal was to keep Griffin spouting these absurdities, which Griffin did by using Howard Brennan as a reliable eyewitness to the assassination.

    Something puzzling comes up next. It appears to be Griffin who surfaces the fact that the Commission has Jack Ruby entering the basement through the Main Street ramp. The book says that Sgt. Patrick Dean was the head of security, and Dean said no, Ruby did not come down that ramp. ( Meek, p. 57) But if one reads the Warren Commission volumes, one will see that it was Dean who was the first person to say that Ruby proclaimed he did come down the Main Street ramp. And this was right after the shooting. This information is also contained in Paul Abbott’s recent book about the shooting of Oswald by Ruby. (Death to Justice, pp. 226-27) In fact, Abbott implies that Dean might have manufactured this quote by Ruby since, initially at least, no one else heard it. It did not catch on as a cover story for the DPD until November 30th. (ibid) In fact, according to one disputed journalistic account, Dean even said he saw Ruby come down the ramp, which was not possible. (Abbott, p. 229).

    But here it states that Dean said that Ruby did not come down that ramp. It was then this dispute that caused a blow-up between Griffin and Dean. (Meek, p. 57). But yet in Seth Kantor’s book on Ruby he has excerpts from some of Griffin’s contemporaneous memos. This is what one of them says:

    If Dean is not telling the truth concerning the Ruby statement about coming down the Main Street ramp, it is important to determine why Dean decided to tell a falsehood about the Main Street ramp. (p. 288)

    In that memo, Griffin wrote that he thought Ruby came in some other way. And that Dean, who was responsible for security that day, “is trying to conceal his dereliction of duty.” In fact, Griffin even theorized that Dean “simply stated to Ruby he came down the Main Street ramp.” Evidently, through the intervening decades, something got lost in translation or dissipated down the memory hole.

    III

    One of the most fascinating tales in the book was not directly told to Meek. He relates it from an MSNBC show in 2013, an interview with HSCA staffer Christine Neidermeier. She said there was a lot of pressure for the committee to downplay any talk about conspiracy. It also became clear that it was going to be difficult getting straight answers from the CIA, and to a lesser extent, the FBI. (p. 69)

    She then related that she got a call from a man she thought was an FBI agent. Because he seemed to know everything she had told another agent. One of the things she said was that she leaned toward the conspiracy verdict since the HSCA could not duplicate what Oswald did in their rifle tests. The caller then revealed that he knew all about her classes at Georgetown, and also some of her friends. He then said that, with such a bright future ahead of her, maybe she should rethink her position. Niedermeier said this call rocked her back on her heels.

    Three other highlights of the book are interviews by Meek with Morris Wolff, Dan Hardway and Marie Fonzi.

    Wolff was a Yale Law School graduate who was employed by Attorney General Bobby Kennedy in his Office of Legal Counsel, where he worked on civil rights, and also contributed to the famous Peace Speech at American University. (Meek, pp 74-75) According to Morris, he was also a bicycle messenger between the AG and the president when Bobby wanted to get around J. Edgar Hoover. After JFK was killed, Bobby suggested that he go over to the staff of moderate Senate Republican John Sherman Cooper. According to Morris, when Cooper served on the Warren Commission, he was strongly opposed to the Single Bullet Theory. (p. 71)

    The interview with Dan Hardway was for a three-part review of the investigations of the JFK case by the federal government. HSCA staffer Dan tells Jeff that, at first, he and his partner Ed Lopez were stationed at CIA headquarters and allowed to have almost unrestricted access to requested files. That changed in 1978 when Scott Breckenridge, the main CIA liaison, told the HSCA that they were bringing in a new helper, namely George Joannides. George was coming out of retirement. And he assured the HSCA that he had nothing to do with the JFK case back in the sixties. (p. 150)

    As most everyone knows, this was false. Joannides was a CIA propaganda officer who was instrumental in running the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) faction of anti-Castro Cubans in New Orleans. And they had many interactions with Oswald in the summer of 1963. It was around the arrival of Joannides that Dan and Ed were moved out of the CIA offices and into a new building with a safe, and then a safe inside the larger safe. They would now have to wait for files and would get them with missing sentences. They would then have to turn over both the files and their notes into the safe at night. This might indicate that the pair were getting too close to Oswald’s association with the CIA and what really happened in Mexico City, which were the subjects they were working on.

    IV

    The closing three-part essay is an exploration of the life and career of the late Gaeton Fonzi. It is greatly aided by the extensive cooperation Meek had with his widow, Marie. Gaeton Fonzi began as a journalist, first for the Delaware County Daily Times and then for Philadelphia magazine. It was his meetings in Philadelphia with first Vince Salandria and then Arlen Specter that got him interested in the JFK assassination. After consulting with Vince, he was prepared to ask Specter some difficult questions about the Single Bullet Theory, which was the backbone of the Warren Report. Fonzi was troubled by Specter’s halting replies to his pointed questions. (pp. 172-73). He then wrote an article about this for Philadelphia called “The Warren Commission, The Truth and Arlen Specter.”

    In 1972, Gaeton moved south to Florida. He began working for Miami Monthly and Gold Coast. In 1975, he got a phone call that would have a great impact on his life and career. Senator Richard Schweiker was from the Philadelphia area and had apparently heard about Fonzi’s article about Specter. He and Senator Gary Hart now made up a subcommittee of the Church Committee. Their function was to evaluate the performance of the CIA and FBI in aiding the Warren Commission. Schweiker was inviting Gaeton to join as chief investigator, which he did.

    In only one year, that committee made some compelling progress. The combination of their discoveries and the broadcast showing on ABC of the Zapruder film helped cause the HSCA to be formed. Fonzi continued his work there and was hot on the trail of CIA officer David Phillips. That pursuit actually began under Schweiker. And when the HSCA began, the first Deputy Counsel on the Kennedy side, Robert Tanenbaum, went to visit the senator. After a general discussion, Schweiker asked Tanenbaum’s assistant to leave the room. The senator then opened a drawer and pulled out a folder made up largely of Fonzi’s work. He handed it to Tanenbaum and said, “The CIA killed President Kennedy.” (click here https://www.kennedysandking.com/john-f-kennedy-articles/robert-tanenbaum-interviewed-by-probe) That file is what got Fonzi the job with the HSCA.

    As we all know, once Tanenbaum and Chief Counsel Richard Sprague were forced to resign, the writing was on the wall for that committee. And Fonzi did a very nice job outlining this in his memorable book, The Last Investigation. That book was presaged by a long article Fonzi did for Washingtonian magazine, which had a significant impact on the critical community. (p. 174) Fonzi clearly implied in both the article and the book that the findings in the HSCA report were not supported by the research that the committee conducted. When the Assassination Records Review Board ordered the HSCA files declassified, this was proven out in spades.

    A column that Meek apparently got a lot of reaction to involved an interview with this reviewer. It was about John Kennedy’s evolving foreign policy views from 1951 until his death. This included his visit to Saigon and his signal 1957 speech on the Senate floor about the French crisis in Algeria. (p. 103) No speech Kennedy made up to that time elicited such a nationwide reaction as the Algeria address. The Africans now looked to Kennedy as their unofficial ambassador. Meek follows through on this with the Congo crisis: how Kennedy favored Patrice Lumumba, while Belgium and the CIA opposed him. This was at least partly the cause of Lumumba’s death in January of 1961, about 72 hours before Kennedy was inaugurated.

    There are two essays that I find problematic. The first is with Antoinette Giancana, daughter of Chicago Mafia chieftain Sam Giancana. As I have been at pains to demonstrate, the Mob had nothing to do with either Kennedy’s primary win in West Virginia or the result in the general election in Illinois. Dan Fleming proved the former in his important book Kennedy vs Humphrey, West Virginia, 1960. He conducted extensive interviews and found no evidence of any Mafia influence on anyone. And he also outlines three official investigations of that election, on a state level, on a federal level, and one by Senator Barry Goldwater, which all came up empty. As per Illinois, Professor John Binder did a statistical study showing that, in the wards controlled by Giancana, not only did the results not show his support for Kennedy, they indicated the contrary: that he might have discouraged voting for candidate Kennedy. That essay first appeared in Public Choice, and it has been preserved at Research Gate.

    The second essay I find problematic is the one dealing with the whole Ricky White/Roscoe white imbroglio from the early nineties. In August of 1990, Ricky White was presented as the son of the Grassy Knoll shooter, namely Roscoe White. Roscoe was also supposed to have killed Patrolman J. D. Tippit. Meek bends over backwards to be fair to Ricky White. I will not take up space to deal with all the problems with this story. But for a contrary view, I include a link to Gary Cartwright’s 1990 article critiquing this concept. (https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.7560/711990-014/html?lang=en)

    All in all, Jeff Meek has done some good work. We are lucky to have him toiling in the vineyards of the JFK case oh so many years afterwards. I hope he keeps it up.