Tag: WARREN REPORT

• The Depleted Patrols in Dallas on November 22, 1963

  Were the Dallas Police clearing the way for an escape route in advance of the JFK murder in Dealey Plaza?

  The Depleted Patrols in Dallas on November 22, 1963

  In my very first article for Kennedysandking, “The Tippit Tapes”, I set out how Officers JD Tippit (district 78) and Ron Nelson (district 87) were not dispatched from those home districts from far south Dallas at 12:45 pm to “Central Oak Cliff”. Yet Dallas Police patrol radio dispatcher Murray Jackson had claimed they were.

  Nelson said to CBS in 2013 that he was on the west side of the Commerce viaduct at 12:30 pm (the south side of the Trinity River, which is district 108). He said he heard the assassination shots and drove into Dealey Plaza within a minute to see people still cowering on the ground. Tippit was at the Gloco Gas Station (also district 108). Both men were thus several miles north of their home districts.

  Firstly, I must refute any inference that some researchers have drawn that Tippit patrolling on his own was unusual. There were three shifts in a day. The 4 pm to midnight, and midnight to 8:00 am patrols had pairs in a car due to night work being seen as more dangerous. On November 22, 1963, Tippit was working a day shift, where pairing was the exception, not the norm.

  What is new in this article is the extent to which southwest Dallas was depleted of patrol officers. The details for that are at the end of this article as an Appendix.

  Researcher and Warren Commission supporter Dale Myers interviewed Jackson and supported Jackson’s account. Which was that Jackson had called them away from their home districts because Oak Cliff was bereft of officers and Oak Cliff was a likely getaway area in light of the shooting in Dealey Plaza.

  But when Chief Jesse Curry testified to the Warren Commission on April 15, 1963 (WC IV p192), he confirmed Oak Cliff was a ‘center of activity’ at the time Tippit was sent there.

  Mr. MCCLOY. When Officer 78, that is Tippit, was directed to the Oak Cliff area that was simply because the Oak Cliff area was sort of a center of activity at that point?

  Mr. CURRY. At that time.

  Mr. MCCLOY. It wasn’t – it wasn’t because you were trying to or had any idea that the suspect might have been there?

  Mr. CURRY. Not from the Presidential shooting, but we were sure that the suspect in the Officer Tippit shooting was in the central area.

  Mr. MCCLOY. But Tippit was still alive on the first direction to go out there?

  Mr. CURRY. That was because some of the squad had been moved out of the Oak Cliff into the Dallas area. You see, this is across the river.

  Mr. MCCLOY. What is the Oak Cliff area?

  Mr. RANKIN. I think that ought to be clarified. Chief Curry.

  Having denied that a suspect from the Presidential assassination was the catalyst for sending Tippit there, Curry then said that the suspect who shot Tippit was suspected of being in that area. Hence, McCloy’s sarcastic interjection that Tippit must have been alive when he was sent there.

  Curry’s answers are remarkable. As I set out later, Oak Cliff was indeed a ‘center of activity’. It was packed with police officers before Tippit was shot.

  Jackson’s explanation falls over for at least three reasons, and I have not seen any adjustment of Myers’ conclusions in the light of all the emerging facts. A crucial point is what Nelson himself said in 2013, shortly before he died.

  Tippit and Nelson moved out of their districts off radio

  The time of movement aspect is not true, by the account of Nelson, nor the true position of Tippit, because they’d have had to have already left their own districts well before 12:45 pm to be where they were. Neither of those discrepancies came to the attention of the Warren Commission.

  Central Oak Cliff was the one place not short of officers

  The depletion aspect is not true either. Linked here and reproduced below is a map from the time. (The high resolution is needed to read the landmarks and streets separating districts.)

  My annotations show the significant lack of officers patrolling their allocated districts for southwest Dallas as a whole. There were 27 districts south of the Trinity River, being : 21-23 (Northwest Platoon command), 76-79, 81-89, 91-98 (Southwest Platoon command) and 108-109 (Downtown Platoon command). Due to the shape of the City of Dallas, there was no Southeast command.

  There were also four districts, 71-75, north of the river, which fell under the Southwest Platoon command. (That command being for the 70s, 80s and 90s sequences). Those 4 districts were also vacant of patrols as the relevant officers, Cox, Wise, and Sebastian, had been allocated motorcycle outrider duties for the motorcade.

  Therefore, only three officers were covering about 400 square miles, in six districts out of 31. (Dallas-Fort Worth is a huge metroplex covering almost 9,000 square miles.)

  

  The Trinity River is the purple/blue line.

  The three officers in their designated districts are shown as the light green figure of eight (two districts each). Mentzel’s district 91 is red.

  The yellow area is north of the river, but under SW Dallas platoon command (hence also under Sgt Hugh Davis). Again, with no overt officers. It contains Industrial Boulevard.

  Officer Mentzel and Central Oak Cliff

  WD Mentzel (districts 91 and 92 at the center of Oak Cliff) was said to be at lunch and incommunicado from 12:30 pm. Mentzel’s absence from – overt – service meant only six districts were overtly patrolled.

  I covered Mentzel’s inconsistent accounts in another K&K article, “The Missing Calls of Officer Mentzel”. He wasn’t incommunicado. That was a fiction maintained by not transcribing the radio calls he made.

  That left two unnamed officers patrolling the peripheral districts of 88/89/and 97/98, plus RW Walker in 85/85, which was south of the Santa Fe Railroad. Jackson, like Curry, was also wrong regarding Oak Cliff itself being depleted. It had officers – Tippit (78), Angell (81), Parker (56) and Lewis (35) – doing covert and unusual things, outside of their allocated districts. In the case of Parker and Lewis, they are on the wrong side of the river.

  Plus, there was Officer Mentzel with his dubious lunch story near the Texas Theater in his District 91. There was also off-duty officer Harry Olsen somewhere near Lansing and Eighth, also in district 91. Then there was Officer Charles T Walker, from the motor accident branch at the junction of E 10^th and Jefferson at the southern edge of district 91.

  The ‘getaway’ zone – Jackson

  Nelson’s account from 2013 means his appearance in the third official transcript almost has to have been a faked call. It is not Nelson’s voice. By that measure, Tippit’s was likely faked, too, masking that he was at Gloco. That voice is also different. (See Joseph McBride, Into the Nightmare, p. 425 for this issue; see also Sylvia Meagher, Accessories After the Fact, pp. 262-63)

  But that call does use Jackson’s voice. By that, Jackson wasn’t merely covering up the real reasons for the movements of Tippit but was complicit in making that call, which was retrospectively added to the tape and the transcript of it. The question, therefore, arises whether he was also complicit in the pre-emptive draining of much of Southwest Dallas’ patrol cover.

  A further giveaway is that the obvious way to boost patrol cover in Oak Cliff would have been to call Mentzel from his supposed lunch. Mentzel was making calls on the patrol radio immediately after the assassination at 12:30 pm. But those calls were not transcribed, thus helping the story that he was incommunicado, despite the fact that he wasn’t. Half past noon can be lunchtime for a 9-to-5 job. But the day shift that day was 7:00 am to 3 pm. No other officer was having lunch from 12:30 pm.

  But even if Mentzel were to have been back on duty at 1:00 pm, he would be off lunch by the time Nelson and Tippit could arrive; had they really been in their home districts when supposedly called at 12:45 pm. Whichever way one looks at it, either Nelson in 2013, or Jackson in 1963/64 were untruthful. None of the evidence vindicates Jackson’s story.

  Jackson said he sent Nelson and Tippit –which we know he didn’t–as Oak Cliff was a likely getaway area. That is strategically correct, and I believe that can be played against him, as I set out later.

  Researcher Dale Myers – “Move Downtown”

  I have used the same sources as Myers CE2645, plus Captain Charles Talbert’s FBI statement (page 50) of June 2, 1964, and DPD patrol tapes and transcripts. To his credit, Myers does agree that a call at 12:47 pm of “87. ON, south end of Houston Street viaduct” was Nelson (87), not Officer Bass (101).

  The mistranscription of Nelson to Bass occurred before the third transcript. Without the faked call, a question would arise as to how Nelson had managed to be there within 2 minutes of being told to go to Oak Cliff from District 87. But the faked 12:45 pm call location – Marsalis at RL Thornton – gives a superficial appearance that Nelson could just about have covered the distance in 2-3 minutes. As perhaps Myers realized in having no qualms about revealing that the tape was mistranscribed for that call.

  One would expect, in the light of such a serious mistranscription, that Myers would have subjected all of the tape to such scrutiny for other cases of that occurring. I do not see evidence of his doing that. Instead, he gives latitude to police versions of events that still do not stand up.

  For example. I have not seen Myers mention the mistranscription of this significant command at 12:44 pm from Jackson. The transcripts state (my underlines):

  “Attention all squads, report to downtown area, Code 3 (Emergency – red lights and sirens) to Elm and Houston, with caution.”

  But what is actually very clear on the tape is:

  “Attention all squads in the downtown area: Code 3 to Elm and Houston with caution.”

  The distinction between phrases ‘report to” and ‘in the’ is important. The mistranscription provides a reason for a mass exodus of officers from far-flung parts of Dallas to Dealey Plaza. The true command, which only applied to those officers already downtown, does not.

  Further, if Myers was able to determine that the 12:47 pm was Nelson’s and not Bass’s voice, why has he not identified that the 12:45 pm call is not Nelson’s young-sounding Texan voice either? The age –older man–and accent are different. Nelson’s voice is pleasant-sounding. The voice on the tape at 12:45 pm is not.

  The essence of detective work is looking for inconsistencies in what suspects say. In the case of Dallas on November 22, 1963, the inconsistencies are in what certain police officers did and said.

  Industrial Boulevard – Officer Angell

  As set out earlier, with districts 71-75 free of officers, there was no patrol coverage of the industrial zones north of the Trinity River. There is a call from Jackson as the Dispatcher ordering all emergency vehicles to stay off Industrial Boulevard (now called South Riverfront Boulevard) at 12:36 pm. That is included in District 73.

  “Attention all emergency equipment. Attention all emergency equipment. Do not use Industrial Boulevard. Do not use Industrial Boulevard.”

  There is then this at 12:45 pm 81 (JL Angell) “ We’re going north on Industrial from Corinth”.”

  Thus, Angell appears to have disobeyed orders. The tape puts someone in the car with him. But it was transcribed in CE 1974 as “I’ll be going north on Industrial from Corinth”.

  As I cover later, this is not a one-off discrepancy so far as Angell is concerned.

  Was Industrial Boulevard a getaway route for shooters? Angell went there circuitously.

  Angell’s zig-zag route

  Angell at 12:42 pm (untranscribed and mistranscribed by Shearer as ‘ Corinth and Eighth’), said “we’re still at Lansing and Eighth”. That is the same place Tippit’s last call was at 12:53 pm (in that case, transcribed as Lancaster and Eighth).

  Angell’s districts (81 and 82 ) were also south of the Santa Fe Railroad between Zang and Corinth. Taking account of the railroad, the normal grid of streets is broken. From west to east, only Zang, Beckley, Marsalis, Ewing, Moore, and Corinth cross it.

  With the Trinity River providing another barrier, then if Angell was heading – on instruction or of his own accord – from districts 81/82 to Dealey Plaza, then, if he was westwards, anywhere near Zang, Beckley or Marsalis, his route would then be over Houston St or Commerce viaducts (only Houston viaduct if he was on Marsalis). If he were eastwards near Corinth, then the Corinth viaduct would be the route. 

  The irregularities abound

  Firstly, Angell was not just passing by Lansing and Eighth as he said he was “still” at that place.  Then he moved east to the Corinth Street viaduct. But the direct route to Dealey Plaza from Lansing Street (one block west of Marsalis) would be over the Houston Street viaduct. He then used Industrial Boulevard despite the command for emergency vehicles not to use it. The route he took was almost twice the distance.

  None of that was questioned by Jackson as the dispatcher. Despite Angell saying “still”, Jackson was not surprised Angell was there. Nor did Jackson query why Angell had zig-zagged to Corinth. Nor did Jackson query why Angell was using Industrial Boulevard. Just as Jackson did not challenge why Nelson was on the south end of the Houston Street viaduct. Just as Jackson did not recall Mentzel from ‘lunch’.

  The leaving out of the transcripts the fact that Angell was at Lansing and Eighth gives the impression he was moving from his district 81 along Corinth. It also covers up the fact that Angell at 12:42 pm was in the same place that Tippit was at 12:53 pm, his last call before being shot.

  Mistranscriptions do not appear to be mistakes, as they have the effect of making the irregularities appear less obvious.

  The command and control of Dallas patrols

  In my K&K article “The Death of Tippit,” I set out how the command of the SW Dallas Platoon had been changed on November 22, 1963.

  Lieutenant Fulgham was sent to traffic school at Northwestern University, Illinois. His role was taken over that day by Sergeant Bud Owens. One of the three Sergeants, Don Steele, was off duty. That left Sergeant Hugh Davis in charge of the 80s and 90s districts. Sgt. Bud Owens was in charge of the 70s districts but said to the Warren Commission that control over Tippit passed to the same Sergeant as Angell (81), which makes it Davis. Owens said he could not furnish a reason. Owens had been sent to the depository.

  The standing down of Owens across lunchtime meant that Davis (80) was supervising control of half of Dallas, with a depleted number of officers. But despite that, he makes just two appearances on patrol radio at 12:38 pm and 12:43 pm when he said, “80 Clear” and then “80 Code 5”. He remained silent thereafter, even though one of his officers was shot dead. 

  CE2645 states that Davis, too, had been sent to the Depository, which is itself extraordinary, given there were only three officers left in the whole of southwest Dallas. But the question arises: Where was Davis in fact? Owens had been at the Depository until the call that Tippit had been shot came over the patrol radio. At 1:42 pm, Owens asked where Davis was, as Tippit’s wife needs to be told he is dead. Owens seems to have been in the dark. Nothing was forthcoming.

  As well as the question ‘Where was Davis?’, the question arises: Who was not in the dark as to what was going on in southwest Dallas?

  To answer that question, one needs to look in part at Captain Cecil E Talbert. Three Captains, Talbert, Souter and Williams were in charge of all patrols on a rotating basis, as there were three shifts in a day.

  Talbert’s FBI statement, page 59, is the basis of much of CE2645. Talbert only testified concerning the events of Sunday, November 11, the murder of Oswald by Jack Ruby. It’s not, therefore, possible to deduce anything from him or about him firsthand, other than the contents of his FBI statement and CE2645.

  But amongst the gross irregularities I have identified in this article, one stands out. Talbert failed to refer to Owens’ relinquished command, and we only know of that because of what Owens said in giving testimony.

  Talbert was an early arrival at the Depository and is hands on the radio regularly throughout the events. He drove to the Tippit murder scene and then the Texas Theater. Chief Jesse Curry testified on April 15, 1964 (WC Vol XII, p25) and confirmed that Talbert was also in charge of the protection of Oswald in the basement when he was shot by Jack Ruby.

  Given what was going on on November 22 and November 24^th, and given the misleading accounts afterwards, it is logical to suggest that Talbert was an active participant in the nefarious activities. Any competent and honest commander should have been able to see then what is apparent now.

  Dale Myers also claims to have written the definitive book on the shooting of Tippit. I therefore find it peculiar that he does not mention that the command over the subject of his book changed over lunchtime on November 22, from Owens to Davis.

  What might depletion of a getaway area achieve?

  The depletion could achieve these things:

  Provide cover for any officers acting covertly in Oak Cliff in the run-up to and immediately after the assassination.

  That means no regular officer would intrude on whatever Mentzel, Tippit and others were up to in District 91. District 91 includes the Texas Theater, 1026 N Beckley, E10th, as well as Olsen’s location near Lansing and Eighth. Tippit and Angell went there too.

  I do not believe that Davis was at the Depository. No one answered the question of Owens as to where Davis was. If Jackson knew, he should have said. If Jackson didn’t know, he should have asked. Jackson likely knew but wouldn’t say.

  On the basis of my previous research, something shortly after the assassination caused Tippit to behave erratically and head to Lansing and Eighth. One possible conclusion is that he went there to meet his command, Davis, and something in that interaction caused the ambush and elimination of Tippit. It is inexplicable as to why Davis–the person in covert control of Tippit at the time Tippit was murdered– filed no report and was not put forward to testify.

  The Industrial Boulevard area (73-74) would be free of officers. 

  Industrial Boulevard, and the road to Houston, headed southeast, would be free of patrols. Parkland and the airport, being in NW Dallas, are in the opposite direction. One would not expect pre-planned getaways to go in the direction of legitimate assassination response activity.

  Depleting the adjacent districts before 1:00 pm would limit the first responders in the vicinity of the Texas Theater.

  Only Mentzel, Tippit, CT Walker and RW Walker had proximity. Therefore, any planned assault on the Texas Theater (district 91) to deal with Oswald could be controlled with only the desired officers arriving as first responders. RW Walker was districts 85/86. It is not possible to determine what he was doing until after the Tippit shooting announcement was made. By the patrol radio, he was on Jefferson approximately three minutes after Bowley’s first call of approximately 1:12 pm, declaring the shooting at 410 E 10^th near the corner with Patton. Dispatch then put out conflicting locations of the shooting (telephone calls were also coming in), and Walker said: “85: I don’t see anything on Jefferson yet”.

  Given his home districts were on the other side of the Santa Fe Railroad, he could only have left his districts via Zang, Beckley or Marsalis. His travel time to Jefferson could have been three minutes. He was then immediately asked by dispatch to “check 501 East Tenth at Denver.” However, Jackson then immediately announced, “Suspect just passed 401 East Jefferson”. That is the Ballew gas station at the corner of Crawford and E Jefferson. One block from Patton and two from Crawford

  Within a minute of that, Walker then announced, “We have a description on this suspect over here on Jefferson. Last seen about 300 block of East Jefferson. He’s a white male, about thirty, five eight, black hair, slender, wearing a white jacket, a white shirt and dark slacks”.

  He made that announcement in the minute before the arrival at the Tippit murder scene at 410 E 10^th of Officers Jez and Poe (105) and then Owens (19), seconds apart: at approximately 1:16 pm.

  That is consistent with Walker approaching E10th and Patton from the south rather than then encountering Warren Reynolds, who, from the 500 block of Jefferson, had heard the shots, seen the fugitive running and followed him along the 400 block to Ballew, a distance of approximately 400 yards. Whereas cars 105 and 19 had arrived from downtown in the north. From the announcements on the tape and the times on the tape, RW Walker did not have time to go, nor did he say he went, to 410 E. 10th until after having dealt with the scene at Ballew.

  That scenario stacks up with Warren Reynolds’ statement, as well as Mary Brock at Bellew. Mary Brock said that the first officer told her that the shooting was of a police officer. That is rational given Bowley’s call and four subsequent calls had made clear the victim was a police officer. One of which said the officer was dead.

  I cannot conclude whether RW Walker was left in his districts so as to be a desirable first responder for planned action at the Texas Theater. He does not seem to have entered the Theater, though he arrived there quickly after the first radio announcement that someone had entered the Texas Theater. And he was at 2:00 pm, sent to 2400 East Ledbetter, hence back in service for his home districts 10 minutes after the arrest of Oswald.

  However, Talbert’s reasoning for officer placings says:

  CE2645 RW Walker. Districts 85-85, Car 127. Assigned to remain in district to answer calls in regard to suspects.

  That begs the question as to why Walker was assigned to answer “calls in regard to suspects”. What suspects? There are no relevant calls on the tapes for Walker. How could that have been predicted, and why was that a reason given that all other near districts had been depleted of officers?

  Just as Jesse Curry couldn’t give a credible answer to McCloy as to why Tippit was sent to Oak Cliff, Talbert’s explanation regarding RW Walker isn’t clear either.

  Conclusion

  What I have set out above is based on circumstantial evidence. But it is based on corrected evidence that has erstwhile been misrepresented by various parties, including by the Dallas Police Department to the Warren Commission.

  Appendix – movement of officers

  District		Officer/s		Reason for leaving district
  21		D.P. Tucker and C.R. Graham		TSBD
  22		LL Hill		TSBD
  23		BE Barnes		Parkland
  70s to 90s		Lt. Fulgham		Out of State
  70s		Sgt. CB Owens*		TSBD
  71-75		Wise, Cox and Sebastian		Allocated bike duties
  76		HH Horn		TSBD
  77		WE Smith		TSBD
  78		JD Tippit		In 108 and 91
  79		BW Anglin		TSBD
  80s & 90s		Sgt. HF Davis		Open question
  81-82		JL Angell		In 91
  83-84		RL Gross		Went to Trade Mart
  85-86		RW Walker		Remained
  87		RC Nelson		In 108
  88-89		Not known		Not known
  91-92		WD Mentzel		In 91
  93-94		HM Ashcraft		TSBD
  95-96		MN McDonald/TR Gregory		TSBD
  97-98		Not known		Not known
  108-109		OH Ludwig		Allocated to guard hotel

  *Owens lost command of Tippit over lunch break to Davis.

  November 16, 2025

• The Wrong Bus Transfer – Part 2

  Did Will Fritz and the Dallas Police create the Marsalis bus transfer story to neutralize the corroborated testimony of Roger Craig seeing Oswald leave Dealey Plaza in a car?

  How Did Oswald Get the Wrong Bus Transfer? – Part 2

  Taking the transfer at face value, it is obvious it was punched for someone disembarking from Line 23, the Lakewood line and not Line 30, the Marsalis line. Which is what the Warren Report would have the reader believe. Officer Dhority gave this undated internal police written account of his activity on November 22, 1963.

  “About 6:00pm, Lt. Wells gave C. W. Brown and myself information that Mr. C. J. McWatters was driving Piedmont Bus and was due at Commerce and Harwood at 6:15 PM. We met Mr. McWatters and carried him to the Detail Room. At 6:30 PM, Mr. McWatters made identification of Oswald as 12 man in four man line up.

  Mr. Mc Watters gave me an affidavit in the Homicide Office and identified the transfer that he had given Oswald positively.

  
  
  The photos above indicate that a Lakewood bus line transfer (right photo) is irrelevant to a southbound Marsalis bus from downtown’s Union Station (left photo).
  

  Brown said in a similar account.

  “At approximately 6:00 pm Lt. T. P. Wells gave my partner, C. N. Dhority, and myself information that the bus driver that picked up Oswald near the scene of the President’s murder was driving the Piedmont bus #50 and would be at the Intersection of Commerce and Harwood at 6:15 pm.”

  The fact that McWatters switched lines and was approached at around 6:15 pm on November 22 by the Dallas police is relevant to unpacking the confusion. It can be deduced in several ways that the transfer DPD presented as evidence of Oswald getting off the Marsalis bus at 12:43 pm on Elm Street had instead been issued hours later when McWatters was driving the 23 Lakewood line.

  Firstly, because that is what, at face value, the transfer states.

  Secondly, McWatters’ schedule, set out in CE358, taken with the FBI route map, shows that when he was to finish his Marsalis 30 run, there is a coincident section of overlap where he would have been able to take on the Lakewood 23 run, which goes past City Hall, Downtown and back. With his Marsalis run being 40-50 minutes late, he would have finished that at approximately 3 pm, and he was then on the Piedmont Line 50 run at City Hall at 6:15 pm.

  Third, when asked by Ball about the lineup when McWatters was taken to identify Oswald, he said that the transfer was for the Lakewood trip.

  Mr. McWATTERS. They brought four men out. In other words, four men under the lights; in other words, they was all—

  Mr. BALL. All the same age?

  McWATTERS. No, sir; they were different ages, different sizes and different heights. And they asked me if I could identify any man in particular there, and I told them that I couldn’t identify any man in particular, but there was one man there that was about the size of the man. Now, I was referring back, after they done showed me this transfer at that time and I knew which trip, that I went through town on at that time, in other words, on the Lakewood trip and just like I recalled, I only put out two transfers and I told them that there was one man in the lineup was about the size and the height and complexion of a man that got on my bus, but as far as positively identifying the man I could not do it.

  Fourth, McWatters’ receipt transfer for the noontime start of his day is number 004451. As McWatters stated above, “I only put out two transfers”. Then he said it again.

  “Mr. McWatters. I only gave two transfers going through town on that trip and that was at the one stop of where I gave the lady and the gentleman that got off the bus, I issued two transfers. But that was the only two transfers that were issued.”

  And,

  “So, I said, “I sure will.” So I gave her a transfer and opened the door and as she was going out the gentleman I had picked up about 2 blocks asked for a transfer and got off at the same place in the middle of the block where the lady did.”

  Roy Milton Jones said that when he got on the bus on Elm near the Capri Theater, he was the only passenger on the bus. Then, when the bus was stopped and held up by the police, about 15 people were on it.

  Transfer 004459 is the eighth issue from that book of transfers. That is not one of only two transfers issued on the bus at the Lamar transfer point at 12:40 pm, for which one should have had number 004453 and the other 004452.

  Fifth, and the most obvious of all. Someone getting off a bus stuck in traffic isn’t going to need a transfer if their objective is to get a cab.

  I. DISCREPANCY ON TIME

  A Globe transfer can’t be altered to make it valid for longer. But a ticket can be tampered with to an earlier time by cutting off some of it. If – as the evidence suggests – DPD obtained a transfer cut for later in the afternoon from McWatters, by then driving a Line 23 bus, a 1:00 pm position could be achieved by cutting everything else off to leave a stub, just like 004459.

  For the CE381–a transfer to fit with the Commission’s timeline–Oswald would have needed to get off the bus before 12:45 pm. And it should have been punched at 12:45 pm with a 15-minute validity from then. That anomaly caused Gerald Ford to ask this.

  Representative Ford. It is 10:25 now. How would you cut it right now?

  Mr. McWATTERS. At 10:25.

  Representative Ford. Why don’t you cut one?

  Mr. McWATTERS. I have a regular cutter, you see; let’s see if he can get something that would-in other words, 10:25, I will just cut it, in other words, cut across there, and cut it, in other words, at 10:30, in other words, it would show at 10:30.

  That answer rules out cutting for 1:00 pm if someone had gotten off before 12:45 pm. Ball picked up on that, too.

  Mr. Ball. … Now, I show you this document which is the bus schedule of Marsalis-Ramona-Elwood-Munger, and it shows you leave St. Paul at 12:36 and you arrive at Lamar 12:40. The bus transfers are punched you told me for 1 o’clock. We have a transfer here that you have seen or we will show you in a few minutes as soon as it gets here, which has a punch mark of 1 o’clock. You told Senator Cooper that you usually punched within 15 minutes of the time you reached the transfer points?

  Mr. McWatters. Yes.

  Mr. Ball. If that is the case, what——

  Mr. McWatters. You mean why did I have it punched at 1 o’clock?

  Mr. Ball. Yes.

  Mr. McWatters. Because I punch it p.m. In other words, I have a punch, I am going to Lakewood, I mean I am going Marsalis and I am going back Lakewood, so I just take me two books of transfers. Instead of punching one of them a.m. and one p.m. I just punched them p.m.

  Mr. Ball. Do you punch within 15 minutes of the time you reach the transfer points?

  Mr. McWatters. That is the way that the transfers are supposed to be cut.

  Further:

  Representative Ford. This is the practice you have used for 2 years approximately?

  Mr. McWatters. That is right, when I worked that run, in other words, when I am going one way at 1 o’clock, coming back from the other end of the line I set them at 2. I am back in there at, my next trip I am back in there at Lamar Street, I think it is 1:38 but I always just set them at 2 o’clock.

  Once again, McWatters slipped out of Lakewood. But he still did not explain why a 12:40 pm arrival would be cut to 1:00 pm rather than 12:45 pm.

  II. SORTING IT ALL OUT

  From the evidence, Oswald was not identified by McWatters or Milton Jones on the Marsalis bus. And the transfer was not issued on that run, but after 2:30 pm, when McWatters was driving the Lakewood 23 run.

  Planting a transfer on Oswald with a line 23 Lakewood transfer appears to have been a blunder, caused by McWatters changing lines. But from the time of his 22 November affidavit, McWatters’ transfer number 004459 set out in the affidavit – for the wrong line – was locked in as evidence.

  The full text of that affidavit is.

  “Today, November 22, 1963 about 12:40p.m. I was driving Marsalis Bus No. 1213. I picked up a man on the lower end of town on Elm around Houston. I went on out Marsalis and picked up a woman. I asked her if she knew the President had been shot and she thought I was kidding. I told her if she did not believe me to ask the man behind her that he had told me the President was shot in the temple. This man was grinning and never did say anything. The woman said that it was not a grinning matter. I don’t remember where I let this man off. This man looks like the #2 man I saw in a line-up tonight. The transfer #004459 is a transfer from my bus with my punch mark.”

  To summarize McWatters’ pressure points, he:

  • retracted in front of the Commission itself his “positive” ID of Oswald.
  • could not give a credible reason why someone on the Marsalis 30 Line would punch Lakewood 23.
  • did not refer to the police getting on the bus on Elm Street.
  • other than indirectly, via the Dallas Morning News, did not refer to the delay on Elm being 40-50 minutes.
  • indirectly, slipped out in his testimony that other buses were being let through when he was held up on Elm.
  • could not give a credible reason why a transfer would be cut for 1:00 pm.
  • the transfer serial number is the eighth from the book, when one issued at the requisite time on Elm would have been first or second.
  • was held at the police department until 1am.

People have long speculated why Oswald would board a Marsalis bus if he was heading to 1026 N Beckley, rather than a Beckley bus, one of which was right behind and stopped right outside 1026. And where he was last seen by his landlady after leaving his room, after the assassination.

If Oswald was being framed for being on a bus to return home, then a Beckley bus might seem the obvious choice for a frame. But Oswald used the Beckley bus to get to work for 5 weeks prior. There would be the risk that a regular driver would know the real Oswald and know that he was not on his bus, especially as there was a stop right outside 1026 N. Beckley.

My assumption, based on the evidence, is that prior to November 22, 1963, the script was that Oswald was to be framed as being on a bus on the Marsalis 30 line. By the afternoon of November 22, Fritz knew that, and that is why Roger Craig’s competing story was so inconvenient and needed to be rapidly rebutted.

My prior articles for this site have implicated Sgt Gerry Hill, Sgt Davis, and Reserve Sgt. Croy, in pre-planned assassination assistance, with Captain Westbrook in overall command. I cannot assume that should taint all other cops involved in the aftermath. However, the events after Oswald’s arrest demonstrate something very wrong with Fritz’s behavior. Dallas County District Attorney Henry Wade stated this to the Commission, at Volume V, regarding Captain Fritz:

“But Fritz runs a kind of a one-man operation there where nobody else knows what he is doing. Even me, for instance, he is reluctant to tell me, either, but I don’t mean that disparagingly. I will say Captain Fritz is about as good a man at solving a crime as I ever saw, to find out who did it but he is poorest in the getting evidence that I know, and I am more interested in getting evidence, and there is where our major conflict comes in.”

Fritz was the Detective in charge of the Venice Parker murder case. Tommy Lee Walker was an African American executed in 1956 for the murder. It was later found to be a miscarriage of justice involving a forced confession. Wade had been the prosecutor.

My prior articles also set out my assumption that Oswald was supposed to have been killed at the Texas Theater. Had Oswald been killed at the Texas Theatre, then Craig would not have had the opportunity to see him in Fritz’s office. A transfer was needed as the pressure was on to give some substance to the bus side of the storyline.

An evidence-planting cop – getting “evidence” for Fritz – knowing he was looking for McWatters, might assume he was still on the same bus route, and got a transfer. Hence, McWatters was traced via the bus company. But by 6:15 pm, McWatters had twice switched lines and a transfer from a Lakewood 23 bus – the eighth he’d issued that day – was punched for the wrong line for the purpose of framing Oswald. A confusion possibly enhanced by the fact that there is a similar-sounding Lake Cliff in Oak Cliff on the Marsalis route. With a frame-up happening and with so many moving parts, it is necessary to look at the whole picture.

If the Marsalis bus McWatters was driving was not relevant at all, then why was it important to find McWatters? Things point towards McWatters’ bus being relevant because there was something to hide regarding it being singled out and boarded by the police and held up for 40-50 minutes.

It was that bus I posited that Officer Tippit was waiting for at Gloco on the south end of the Houston Street viaduct to assist a decoy on that bus. (The Beckley bus used the Commerce St Viaduct). In my other articles, I set out a scenario of Tippit ruining the plans and the impromptu killing of him that ensued, which led to deviations from the plan that resulted in an improvised planting of defective evidence. Tippit’s death was the first of several ‘cleanup’ murders.

If the departure from the bus of a person impersonating Oswald was not scripted, then an outcome of that would be that McWatters would have to be pressured not to mention how the bus was stopped by police within minutes of Kennedy’s assassination. By the time he testified to the Commission, McWatters did refer to a man and woman getting off his bus when held up in traffic on Elm.

Mr. MCWATTERS. Well, I left there that day on time because coming into town that day, I guess everybody done went to, down to, see the parade, I didn’t have over four or five passengers coming into downtown. and that was at the one stop of where I gave the lady and the gentleman that got off the bus, I issued two transfers. But that was the only two transfers that were issued.

Mr. BALL. What did the man look like who knocked on your door and got on your bus?

Mr. MCWATTERS. Well, I didn’t pay any particular attention to him. He was to me just dressed in what I would call work clothes, just some type of little old jacket on, and I didn’t pay any particular attention to the man when he got on.

And, the FBI said this of Milton Jones.

JONES advised that the bus proceeded in the direction of Houston Street and, approximately four blocks before Houston Street, was completely stopped by traffic which was backed up in this area. He recalled that at this time a policeman notified the driver the President had been shot and he told the driver no one was to leave the bus until police officers had talked to each passenger. JONES estimated that there were about fifteen people on the bus at this time and two police officers boarded the bus and checked each passenger to see if any were carrying firearms.

JONES advised that before the bus was stopped the driver made his last passenger pickup approximately six blocks before Houston Street, that one was a blonde-haired woman and the other was a dark-haired man. He said the man sat in the seat directly behind him and the woman occupied the seat further to the rear of the bus. JONES advised that when the bus was stopped by traffic, and prior to the appearance of the police officers, the woman left the bus by the rear door and the man who was sitting behind him left the bus by the front door while it was held up in the middle of the block. JONES stated he did not observe this man closely since he sat behind him in the bus, but, on the following Monday when he caught the same bus going home from school with the same driver, the driver told him he thought the man might have been LEE HARVEY OSWALD.

JONES said that after the driver mentioned this, and from his recollection of OSWALD’s picture as it appeared on television and in the newspapers, he thought it was possible it could have been OSWALD. He emphasized, however, that he did not have a good view of this man at any time and could not positively identify him as being identical with LEE HARVEY OSWALD. He said he was inclined to think it might have been OSWALD only because the bus driver told him so.

So, digesting all of that. On November 22 and 23 (Friday and Saturday), McWatters had not identified Oswald in the line-up as the person who got on and then off in Elm, but misidentified Milton Jones, who rode to near the end of the line.

But by March 1964, McWatters for the Commission and Milton Jones for the FBI did give an indistinct description of a dark-haired man who had gotten off the bus on Elm near Lamar.

A question arises whether Mary Bledsoe was on that same bus.

Both Bledsoe and McWatters referred to a man stopping the bus to tell the driver the President had been shot. Milton Jones said the man was a policeman. She also said the bus she was on was stuck, so she got onto the one behind. That fits with Milton Jones’ description of a delay and McWatters saying so, indirectly, as he said other buses were let through.

III. THE LINE-UPS

From my assumptions above, the bus transfer would have had to have been introduced as evidence sometime between approximately 3 pm and 6:30 pm. When and how?

The ‘fillers’ from one of the lineups

There were three line-ups (WC Vol XXIV, p. 247) that Oswald was in on November 22. The first at 4:35 pm for Helen Markham from the Tippit murder scene. The second, around 6:30 pm, which included McWatters, Guinyard and Callaway—the last two witnesses were from the Tippit scene. The third, at 7:50 pm, were with Barbara and Virginia Davis. Detective Simms was purported to have found the transfer just before the first line-up.

From what McWatters said. The line-ups weren’t set up to achieve a positive identification. But instead, who looked the most similar? The above photograph of fillers, with two wearing suits and ties, discredits that approach.

The transfer was supposedly found in Oswald’s shirt chest pocket. But FBI agent James Bookhout, on November 23, 1963, stated that Oswald had changed his shirt:  “…that after arriving at his apartment, he changed his shirt and trousers, because they were dirty. He described his dirty clothes as being a reddish colored, long-sleeved shirt with a button-down collar and gray colored trousers”. 

If McWatters wasn’t found until 6:15 pm, then one possibility is that he punched 004459 after then, and it was not planted on Oswald until after 6:15 pm. However, by then, he was driving a Piedmont 50 bus, and by the testimonies of Dhority and McWatters, he wasn’t asked to look at the transfer until after he had “identified” Oswald in the 6:30 pm lineup.

That would explain how the McWatters situation could get out of hand if the transfer was planted before 4:35 pm, and the problem with it only emerged later. Suggesting that someone else had taken a transfer from McWatters before 4:35 pm, but after 3:00 pm, posing as a normal passenger on the Lakewood line.

The testimony of Detective Simms, who said he found the ticket on Oswald at 4:05 pm, needs to be read to get the flavor of it. The first part is clear and decisive, where he described being allocated duties at the Trade Mart for Kennedy’s luncheon speech; he then went to the Depository and then to City Hall as Oswald arrived for interrogation.

Oswald was kept in Fritz’s office rather than the neighboring interrogation room from 2:20 pm to 4:35 pm. Simms consistently pleaded a memory block of that interrogation. But Simms’ memory wasn’t lacking for the three line-ups and for the arrival of Judge Johnson for charging Oswald for the murder of Tippit.

Simms was evasive as to whether he looked at the transfer for dates and time. He just said he signed it. Ball asked Simms if he had taken contemporaneous notes, given that he had put specific details in the undated memorandum. But all he would say was that the memorandum was created in the week after Jack Ruby shot Oswald. It reads as if he either wasn’t there to observe anything or he was there but didn’t want to perjure himself by saying what he knew was untrue.

Conclusion

The Commission’s final report (Chapter 4) stated.

“When Oswald was apprehended, a bus transfer marked for the Lakewood-Marsalis route was found in his shirt pocket”

That is patently untrue. The transfer is marked for the Line 23 Lakewood (and back to Lakewood) route. To have been the Lakewood-Marsalis route, it would have had to have been marked 30 Marsalis.

If it is accepted that what Roger Craig saw was Oswald cooperating – unknowingly – in a move in which Oswald was being set up, then it is apparent there would have had to have been a decoy operation to give a counter account of Oswald’s movements.

Something Fritz was aware of by mid-afternoon of November 22, 1964.

Click here to read part 1.